Event Notification Report for September 20, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/19/2008 - 09/20/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
44506445074450845225
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44506
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILLY JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/20/2008
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2008
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"At 0906 EDT Watts Bar Unit 1 experienced a Reactor trip in response to a Turbine trip. This caused an automatic AFW Pump start from P-4 coincident with Lo Tave signal. First indications are that the Exciter Field Breaker tripped open. The cause is under investigation. All ESF systems responded as designed with no other issues. The plant is currently stable and is being maintained in Mode 3. Plans for plant restart are pending awaiting the cause investigation."
All control rods fully inserted into the core. Plant decay heat removal is through the steam dumps to the main condenser. The offsite power is available and lined up to plant system loads.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0906 EDT Watts Bar Unit 1 experienced a Reactor trip in response to a Turbine trip. This caused an automatic AFW Pump start from P-4 coincident with Lo Tave signal. First indications are that the Exciter Field Breaker tripped open. The cause is under investigation. All ESF systems responded as designed with no other issues. The plant is currently stable and is being maintained in Mode 3. Plans for plant restart are pending awaiting the cause investigation."
All control rods fully inserted into the core. Plant decay heat removal is through the steam dumps to the main condenser. The offsite power is available and lined up to plant system loads.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44507
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BART CZECH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BART CZECH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/20/2008
Notification Time: 20:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 20:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2008
Notification Time: 20:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 20:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2008
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
JIM CALDWELL (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
JIM CALDWELL (RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
MELANIE GALLOWAY (NRR)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 1 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A FIRE IN THE MAIN TURBINE
D.C. Cook Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event (EAL H4 & H5) due to a fire in the Main Turbine. The reactor was manually tripped from 100 percent. The fire occurred at the upper level of the turbine building (Level 633), and was extinguished by the fire suppression system and local fire brigade. Three fire pumps are running at this time. No injuries were reported.
All rods fully inserted, auxiliary feed water initiated and decay heat is being removed via atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is currently shutdown and stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Main steam stop valves are closed. Main condenser vacuum was broke. Unit 2 was not affected. All Unit 1 safety-related equipment is in-service and available. The licensee is currently assessing the extent of damage.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DOE (Morrone), USDA (Shaf) and HHS (Mammarelli) that the NRC entered Monitoring Mode at 2045 EDT.
* * * UPDATE AT 0005 EDT ON 09/21/08 FROM BRADDOCK LEWIS TO V. KLCO * * *
"On September 20, 2008 at [2005] the DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped after a malfunction occurred on the main turbine generator causing high vibration. A fire in the Unit 1 Main Generator resulted from this malfunction. A Notification of Unusual Event was declared September 20, 2008 at [2018] due to Event classifications H-4, Fire within the protected area not extinguished within 15 minutes and H-5, Toxic or Flammable gas release affecting plant operation. The Unit 1 Main Generator Fire was reported extinguished at September 20, 2008 at [2028].
"The Unit 1 plant trip was uncomplicated and all Automatic Control systems functioned as expected. All control rods inserted on the Reactor trip. The Turbine and both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started and fed all four Steam Generators as designed. The Steam Generator Stop Valves were manually closed to arrest plant cooldown. The cause of the Main Generator fire has not yet been determined, but the investigation is ongoing. No radiological release resulted from this event.
"This event is being reported as a four hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the Reactor Protection System automatic actuation and as an eight hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. The Notification of Unusual Event was reported separately.
"Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3. Shutdown Margin was satisfactorily verified. The main condenser was isolated as the primary heat sink. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves are removing core decay heat in automatic control due to breaking main condenser vacuum. Main condenser vacuum was broken to stop the Unit 1 main turbine generator due to high vibration. Preparations are in progress to cooldown Unit 1 to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.
"The Fire Suppression Water System was actuated and one of two 565,000 gallon tanks was drained. The second 565,000 gallon Fire Suppression Water tank was placed in service to restore the Fire Suppression Water system function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, local and state authorities. The licensee will likely make a press release.
Notified R3RA (Caldwell) and NRR (Galloway).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PAUL LEONARD TO JASON KOZAL AT 0414 ON 09/21/08 * * *
At 0409 the licensee terminated from the Notice of Unusual Event. The licensee has established the forced outage recovery team. No fires exist and no conditions conducive to fires exist due to the event. The licensee has established the integrity of the fire protection system.
Notified R3RA (Caldwell), R3DO (Stone), NRR (Galloway), IRD (Grant), DHS (Jason), DOE (Maroni), FEMA (Sweetser), USDA (Phillip), and HHS (Nathan).
D.C. Cook Unit 1 declared an Unusual Event (EAL H4 & H5) due to a fire in the Main Turbine. The reactor was manually tripped from 100 percent. The fire occurred at the upper level of the turbine building (Level 633), and was extinguished by the fire suppression system and local fire brigade. Three fire pumps are running at this time. No injuries were reported.
All rods fully inserted, auxiliary feed water initiated and decay heat is being removed via atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is currently shutdown and stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Main steam stop valves are closed. Main condenser vacuum was broke. Unit 2 was not affected. All Unit 1 safety-related equipment is in-service and available. The licensee is currently assessing the extent of damage.
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DOE (Morrone), USDA (Shaf) and HHS (Mammarelli) that the NRC entered Monitoring Mode at 2045 EDT.
* * * UPDATE AT 0005 EDT ON 09/21/08 FROM BRADDOCK LEWIS TO V. KLCO * * *
"On September 20, 2008 at [2005] the DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor was manually tripped after a malfunction occurred on the main turbine generator causing high vibration. A fire in the Unit 1 Main Generator resulted from this malfunction. A Notification of Unusual Event was declared September 20, 2008 at [2018] due to Event classifications H-4, Fire within the protected area not extinguished within 15 minutes and H-5, Toxic or Flammable gas release affecting plant operation. The Unit 1 Main Generator Fire was reported extinguished at September 20, 2008 at [2028].
"The Unit 1 plant trip was uncomplicated and all Automatic Control systems functioned as expected. All control rods inserted on the Reactor trip. The Turbine and both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps automatically started and fed all four Steam Generators as designed. The Steam Generator Stop Valves were manually closed to arrest plant cooldown. The cause of the Main Generator fire has not yet been determined, but the investigation is ongoing. No radiological release resulted from this event.
"This event is being reported as a four hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the Reactor Protection System automatic actuation and as an eight hour report required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system. The Notification of Unusual Event was reported separately.
"Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3. Shutdown Margin was satisfactorily verified. The main condenser was isolated as the primary heat sink. Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves are removing core decay heat in automatic control due to breaking main condenser vacuum. Main condenser vacuum was broken to stop the Unit 1 main turbine generator due to high vibration. Preparations are in progress to cooldown Unit 1 to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.
"The Fire Suppression Water System was actuated and one of two 565,000 gallon tanks was drained. The second 565,000 gallon Fire Suppression Water tank was placed in service to restore the Fire Suppression Water system function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, local and state authorities. The licensee will likely make a press release.
Notified R3RA (Caldwell) and NRR (Galloway).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PAUL LEONARD TO JASON KOZAL AT 0414 ON 09/21/08 * * *
At 0409 the licensee terminated from the Notice of Unusual Event. The licensee has established the forced outage recovery team. No fires exist and no conditions conducive to fires exist due to the event. The licensee has established the integrity of the fire protection system.
Notified R3RA (Caldwell), R3DO (Stone), NRR (Galloway), IRD (Grant), DHS (Jason), DOE (Maroni), FEMA (Sweetser), USDA (Phillip), and HHS (Nathan).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44508
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MATT SCHILLERSTROM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MATT SCHILLERSTROM
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/21/2008
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 21:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2008
Notification Time: 02:13 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 21:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
REGION 3 IRC (R3)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)
REGION 3 IRC (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNPLANNED LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING DUE TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"On Saturday, September 20, 2008, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) experienced an actuation of the following systems: Reactor Protection System (with the reactor shutdown), Containment Isolation, and Emergency Diesel Generators.
"The apparent cause of the actuation was a pressure pulse in the reference leg of a Reactor level instrument that resulted when a CRD [Control Rod Drive] pump was started without the reference leg backfill system isolated from the CRD system.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
Due to the containment isolation, shutdown cooling was lost for approximately 90 minutes. Initial reactor temperature was ~95 degrees when the isolation occurred. When shutdown cooling was restored, reactor temperature had increased to ~120 degrees. The Emergency Diesel Generators started but did not load. The diesels have been restored to normal standby status.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On Saturday, September 20, 2008, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) experienced an actuation of the following systems: Reactor Protection System (with the reactor shutdown), Containment Isolation, and Emergency Diesel Generators.
"The apparent cause of the actuation was a pressure pulse in the reference leg of a Reactor level instrument that resulted when a CRD [Control Rod Drive] pump was started without the reference leg backfill system isolated from the CRD system.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
Due to the containment isolation, shutdown cooling was lost for approximately 90 minutes. Initial reactor temperature was ~95 degrees when the isolation occurred. When shutdown cooling was restored, reactor temperature had increased to ~120 degrees. The Emergency Diesel Generators started but did not load. The diesels have been restored to normal standby status.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45225
Rep Org: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES
Licensee: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: BUCKHANNON State: WV
County:
License #: 37-30412-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEW CESSNA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: BUCKHANNON State: WV
County:
License #: 37-30412-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEW CESSNA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 07/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2009
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2008
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
LOST (THEN RECOVERED) LICENSED NUCLEAR MATERIAL
This is an historical report for an incident submitted in response to an on-site inspection by an NRC Inspector (Lodhi).
"On September 20, 2008 at approximately 2:30pm, while returning from an open hole job north of Buckhannon, the neutron shield and the density shield separated from the radiation compartment of an open hole logging truck near Lost Creek on Interstate 79 [exit 110] southbound. The driver continued driving to the shop. Upon return, he noticed a chain hanging freely from the radiation compartment of his truck. He looked in the compartment and noticed that both transport shields and the pig holder had been separated from the unit. He immediately called his supervisor at approximately 3:00pm, who had stopped at the BP in Lost Creek for a drink on the way to the shop, and told him that the transport shield had been separated from the wireline unit. The driver mentioned hearing something after crossing the bridge on interstate 79 South at Lost Creek. The supervisor, who was ? of a mile away from the bridge, proceeded to the spot and immediately picked up the transport shields and pig holder. The supervisor loaded the transport shields and pig holder into the box of his pick-up truck and secured them with separate chains and padlocks and returned to the facility. Upon returning to the facility with the sources, the supervisor contacted his mechanic to reweld the pig holder to the floor of the open hole wireline unit. The supervisor also contacted the camp EIC [Engineer-In-Charge] to report the incident and notify him that all equipment was resecured. The supervisor then placed both sources into the downhole storage pig until the welding was completed.
"According to witness statements both sources were secured with a padlock in their respective transport shields. The shields were mounted on a pig holder that was tack welded to the floor of the radiation compartment on the right rear of the truck. The radiation compartment door was secured with the T-handle closed and locked and a hasp lock on the rear of the compartment. The transport shields were chained together.
"Root Cause: Failure of the tack welds on the pig holder. The failure of the tack welds that held the pig holder to the truck caused the transport shields and the pig holder to be free in the radiation compartment.
"Secondary Cause # 1: Failure of the T-handle and the hasp lock on the compartment door. The failure of the T-handle and the hasp lock on the radiation compartment door allowed the compartment door to open freely and failed to contain the 150+ lbs of material that was inside of the compartment.
"Secondary Cause # 2: Hitting a pothole on interstate 79 South. When the driver of the open hole wireline unit struck the pothole on interstate 79 south it caused the transport shields and the pig holder to move inside of the radiation compartment. The movement of the equipment and the failure of the door mechanisms allowed the equipment to separate from the open hole wireline unit.
"Corrective Actions: Corrective actions were taken immediately to eliminate the possibility of a reoccurrence.
-Complete weld along the base of the pig holder.
-Chain through both transport shields that is bolted to a structural member of the truck (floor, frame, etc).
-Heavy hasp lock (bolt style) on the exterior of the radiation compartment door.
"Research: Research was conducted to verify that there were no overexposures included calculating the expected dose in the worst case scenario with the transportation shields removed from the wireline unit.
Surface reading: 2.0 mR/hr
TI: 0.4 mR/hr
Time along 79: 30 minutes
Expected dose if a person were sitting on the shield for ¢ hour: 1 mR
"A survey meter reading was taken at nine feet from the transport shields in order to estimate the potential for exposure to members of the public who would be traveling southbound on interstate 79.
9 ft Reading: 0.02 mR/hr
Average Speed: 70 miles per hour = 369,600 feet per hour
Possible exposure: 0.02/369,600 = 0.00000005411255411 mR."
The licensee stated that visual inspection revealed no damage to the neutron or density shield and that this was confirmed by leak test analysis.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.
This is an historical report for an incident submitted in response to an on-site inspection by an NRC Inspector (Lodhi).
"On September 20, 2008 at approximately 2:30pm, while returning from an open hole job north of Buckhannon, the neutron shield and the density shield separated from the radiation compartment of an open hole logging truck near Lost Creek on Interstate 79 [exit 110] southbound. The driver continued driving to the shop. Upon return, he noticed a chain hanging freely from the radiation compartment of his truck. He looked in the compartment and noticed that both transport shields and the pig holder had been separated from the unit. He immediately called his supervisor at approximately 3:00pm, who had stopped at the BP in Lost Creek for a drink on the way to the shop, and told him that the transport shield had been separated from the wireline unit. The driver mentioned hearing something after crossing the bridge on interstate 79 South at Lost Creek. The supervisor, who was ? of a mile away from the bridge, proceeded to the spot and immediately picked up the transport shields and pig holder. The supervisor loaded the transport shields and pig holder into the box of his pick-up truck and secured them with separate chains and padlocks and returned to the facility. Upon returning to the facility with the sources, the supervisor contacted his mechanic to reweld the pig holder to the floor of the open hole wireline unit. The supervisor also contacted the camp EIC [Engineer-In-Charge] to report the incident and notify him that all equipment was resecured. The supervisor then placed both sources into the downhole storage pig until the welding was completed.
"According to witness statements both sources were secured with a padlock in their respective transport shields. The shields were mounted on a pig holder that was tack welded to the floor of the radiation compartment on the right rear of the truck. The radiation compartment door was secured with the T-handle closed and locked and a hasp lock on the rear of the compartment. The transport shields were chained together.
"Root Cause: Failure of the tack welds on the pig holder. The failure of the tack welds that held the pig holder to the truck caused the transport shields and the pig holder to be free in the radiation compartment.
"Secondary Cause # 1: Failure of the T-handle and the hasp lock on the compartment door. The failure of the T-handle and the hasp lock on the radiation compartment door allowed the compartment door to open freely and failed to contain the 150+ lbs of material that was inside of the compartment.
"Secondary Cause # 2: Hitting a pothole on interstate 79 South. When the driver of the open hole wireline unit struck the pothole on interstate 79 south it caused the transport shields and the pig holder to move inside of the radiation compartment. The movement of the equipment and the failure of the door mechanisms allowed the equipment to separate from the open hole wireline unit.
"Corrective Actions: Corrective actions were taken immediately to eliminate the possibility of a reoccurrence.
-Complete weld along the base of the pig holder.
-Chain through both transport shields that is bolted to a structural member of the truck (floor, frame, etc).
-Heavy hasp lock (bolt style) on the exterior of the radiation compartment door.
"Research: Research was conducted to verify that there were no overexposures included calculating the expected dose in the worst case scenario with the transportation shields removed from the wireline unit.
Surface reading: 2.0 mR/hr
TI: 0.4 mR/hr
Time along 79: 30 minutes
Expected dose if a person were sitting on the shield for ¢ hour: 1 mR
"A survey meter reading was taken at nine feet from the transport shields in order to estimate the potential for exposure to members of the public who would be traveling southbound on interstate 79.
9 ft Reading: 0.02 mR/hr
Average Speed: 70 miles per hour = 369,600 feet per hour
Possible exposure: 0.02/369,600 = 0.00000005411255411 mR."
The licensee stated that visual inspection revealed no damage to the neutron or density shield and that this was confirmed by leak test analysis.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.