Event Notification Report for August 19, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/18/2008 - 08/19/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
4442544426444294442144423
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44425
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CURTIS DUNSMORE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 11:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 11:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2)
STEVE ROSE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN LOCAL START CAPABILITY OF ALL FOUR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
"On August 18, 2008, during biennial (i.e., every two years) non-Technical Specification related testing, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 4 failed to start from the EDG local control panel. This occurred with the EDG aligned for Alternate Safe Shutdown (ASSD) response versus its normal alignment. The purpose of the testing is to confirm that the EDG control logic is isolated from the control room and only operable via local controls. Based on troubleshooting activities, it was discovered that this failure to start was due to improper wiring in the circuitry associated with the EDG lockout relay. The improper wiring was introduced by a modification performed on all four EDGs in 2007.
"At 1110 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 19, 2008, it was concluded that this condition impacted the ability of EDG Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to perform their intended ASSD function. The 2007, modification affected the termination point for the power to the EDG lockout relay reset coil. Per the modification, this termination point was incorrectly connected to the downstream side of the alternate shutdown isolation switch which results in a loss of power to the lockout reset when the switch is placed in local control. Therefore, in the unlikely event of a fire, an induced failure could potentially initiate a lockout signal which could not be reset from the EDG local control panel. Although the modification was installed on all four EDGs, only the local control of EDGs 2, 3, and 4 is credited in the safe shutdown analysis.
"This condition does not affect the Technical Specification operability of the EDGs and they remain fully capable of performing their intended design basis accident response functions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Compensatory fire watches have been established and an engineering change package to correct the condition is being developed.
"On August 18, 2008, during biennial (i.e., every two years) non-Technical Specification related testing, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 4 failed to start from the EDG local control panel. This occurred with the EDG aligned for Alternate Safe Shutdown (ASSD) response versus its normal alignment. The purpose of the testing is to confirm that the EDG control logic is isolated from the control room and only operable via local controls. Based on troubleshooting activities, it was discovered that this failure to start was due to improper wiring in the circuitry associated with the EDG lockout relay. The improper wiring was introduced by a modification performed on all four EDGs in 2007.
"At 1110 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 19, 2008, it was concluded that this condition impacted the ability of EDG Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to perform their intended ASSD function. The 2007, modification affected the termination point for the power to the EDG lockout relay reset coil. Per the modification, this termination point was incorrectly connected to the downstream side of the alternate shutdown isolation switch which results in a loss of power to the lockout reset when the switch is placed in local control. Therefore, in the unlikely event of a fire, an induced failure could potentially initiate a lockout signal which could not be reset from the EDG local control panel. Although the modification was installed on all four EDGs, only the local control of EDGs 2, 3, and 4 is credited in the safe shutdown analysis.
"This condition does not affect the Technical Specification operability of the EDGs and they remain fully capable of performing their intended design basis accident response functions.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Compensatory fire watches have been established and an engineering change package to correct the condition is being developed.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44426
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS ONCOLOGY P.A. - KLABZUBA
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: TEXAS ONCOLOGY P.A. - KLABZUBA
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT TREATMENT CALCULATION
"Hospital cited for current calibration of SR-90 eye applicator. During previous inspection, after calibration, recalculation of recent treatments indicated 3 patients received 50% overdose over the past year. RSO reports Oncologist and referring physician were pleased with patients response to treatment."
Texas Incident # I 8539
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
"Hospital cited for current calibration of SR-90 eye applicator. During previous inspection, after calibration, recalculation of recent treatments indicated 3 patients received 50% overdose over the past year. RSO reports Oncologist and referring physician were pleased with patients response to treatment."
Texas Incident # I 8539
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44429
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: 25-1323-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEOLA DEKOCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON
Region: 3
City: MADISON State: WI
County:
License #: 25-1323-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEOLA DEKOCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 08/20/2008
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2008
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
CHRISTIAN EINBERG (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN RESEARCH LABORATORY
This information was received from the state via fax:
"The afternoon of 8/19/2008 DHS [Department of Health Services] staff became aware a fire had occurred at a licensee facility the previous evening. Reports indicated the local fire department and hazardous materials teams had responded to a fire in a molecular biology lab on the campus of the University of Wisconsin - Madison. The fire was extinguished within 15 minutes. Reports also indicated the Hazardous Incident Team used instruments to rule out the presence of any radioactive materials. Although no contamination was detected, fire equipment was rinsed with water to remove any reside from the fire.
"DHS contacted the licensee. The licensee indicated staff members from radiation safety had responded to the incident the next morning. The research lab performs molecular biology research using P-32. The safety department staff performed surveys of the fire scene and identified areas of contamination on the floor. The areas had been decontaminated. Initial information from the licensee indicates approximately 0.5 to 0.7 millicuries of P-32 in waste containers was involved.
"The licensee did not report the incident to DHS. DHS inspectors were dispatched to investigate."
This information was received from the state via fax:
"The afternoon of 8/19/2008 DHS [Department of Health Services] staff became aware a fire had occurred at a licensee facility the previous evening. Reports indicated the local fire department and hazardous materials teams had responded to a fire in a molecular biology lab on the campus of the University of Wisconsin - Madison. The fire was extinguished within 15 minutes. Reports also indicated the Hazardous Incident Team used instruments to rule out the presence of any radioactive materials. Although no contamination was detected, fire equipment was rinsed with water to remove any reside from the fire.
"DHS contacted the licensee. The licensee indicated staff members from radiation safety had responded to the incident the next morning. The research lab performs molecular biology research using P-32. The safety department staff performed surveys of the fire scene and identified areas of contamination on the floor. The areas had been decontaminated. Initial information from the licensee indicates approximately 0.5 to 0.7 millicuries of P-32 in waste containers was involved.
"The licensee did not report the incident to DHS. DHS inspectors were dispatched to investigate."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44421
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN PHILLIPS
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 06:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2008
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 06:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
A non-licensed PG&E employee was inattentive to his responsibilities, and was relieved of his duties. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM T. GRAF TO V. KLCO AT 1232 EDT ON 8/20/08 * * *
" After review of the circumstances and Reg. Guide 5.62, the licensee believes the event is loggable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).
A non-licensed PG&E employee was inattentive to his responsibilities, and was relieved of his duties. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM T. GRAF TO V. KLCO AT 1232 EDT ON 8/20/08 * * *
" After review of the circumstances and Reg. Guide 5.62, the licensee believes the event is loggable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44423
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM GUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2008
Event Time: 09:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2)
STEVE ROSE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONED
"On August 19, 2008, with the Unit shut down in Mode 3, post maintenance testing was being performed for the Digital Rod Position Indication System. While performing this test a 'Rod Control Urgent Failure' alarm was received upon initial withdrawal of Control Bank-C. All other control and shutdown banks remained fully inserted in the core. Local inspection revealed a phase failure on movable gripper coils in a power cabinet. In accordance with plant procedures, at 0905 hours, a manual reactor trip was initiated by operators opening the reactor trip breakers. All Safety Systems functioned as designed and Rod Control System repairs are in progress.
"This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor was subcritical when the reactor trip breakers were opened. Compliance with all Technical Specification requirements was maintained. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"On August 19, 2008, with the Unit shut down in Mode 3, post maintenance testing was being performed for the Digital Rod Position Indication System. While performing this test a 'Rod Control Urgent Failure' alarm was received upon initial withdrawal of Control Bank-C. All other control and shutdown banks remained fully inserted in the core. Local inspection revealed a phase failure on movable gripper coils in a power cabinet. In accordance with plant procedures, at 0905 hours, a manual reactor trip was initiated by operators opening the reactor trip breakers. All Safety Systems functioned as designed and Rod Control System repairs are in progress.
"This event posed no significant safety implications because the reactor was subcritical when the reactor trip breakers were opened. Compliance with all Technical Specification requirements was maintained. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.