Event Notification Report for July 31, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/30/2008 - 07/31/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
44379443774465144517
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44379
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK JENKIN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/31/2008
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Notification Time: 21:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSTULATED HIGH-ENERGY LINE BREAK THAT COULD DISABLE BOTH TRAINS OF COMPONENT COOLING
"At 1345 Prairie Island staff declared both trains of Unit 2 Component Cooling (CC) system inoperable due to discovery that a postulated high energy line break (HELB) in the Turbine Building that could fail a CC line in the turbine building that would affect both trains of CC. The inoperability of Unit 2 CC caused entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The CC line in question is not automatically isolated on a safety injection signal and the loss of CC inventory would eventually affect both trains of CC. Since a Unit 2 HELB could directly result in a loss of both trains of CC (a system that is required to meet the single failure criterion), the CC system does not meet the single failure criterion in the as-found configuration. Thus, in accordance with the guidance in NUREG 1022, this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The CC line in the Turbine Building was isolated at 1614 on 7/31/08 returning Unit 2 CC to operable status. Unit 2 remained at 100% power."
The isolated line went to a chemistry lab cooler that can be isolated during operation. The condition was discovered during a high-energy line break vulnerability walk-down. A similar line on Unit 1 was already isolated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 1345 Prairie Island staff declared both trains of Unit 2 Component Cooling (CC) system inoperable due to discovery that a postulated high energy line break (HELB) in the Turbine Building that could fail a CC line in the turbine building that would affect both trains of CC. The inoperability of Unit 2 CC caused entry into Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. The CC line in question is not automatically isolated on a safety injection signal and the loss of CC inventory would eventually affect both trains of CC. Since a Unit 2 HELB could directly result in a loss of both trains of CC (a system that is required to meet the single failure criterion), the CC system does not meet the single failure criterion in the as-found configuration. Thus, in accordance with the guidance in NUREG 1022, this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"The CC line in the Turbine Building was isolated at 1614 on 7/31/08 returning Unit 2 CC to operable status. Unit 2 remained at 100% power."
The isolated line went to a chemistry lab cooler that can be isolated during operation. The condition was discovered during a high-energy line break vulnerability walk-down. A similar line on Unit 1 was already isolated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44377
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/31/2008
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 08:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 08:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DURING TESTING
"Unit one (1) experienced a reactor trip during SP-1003 Analog Protection Functional Test. The yellow Tave channel was in test when the red Tave channel bistable failed causing an OTDT reactor trip. Applicable emergency operating procedures were entered and completed. The plant is now implementing 1C1.3, the normal plant shutdown procedure.
"All systems performed as expected with exception of 11 turbine driven auxiliary feed (AFW) pump auto started and tripped 50 seconds later on low suction / discharge pressure which the plant is continuing to investigate. All rods inserted and all other AFW system components are operating as expected."
Decay heat removal is from Main and Auxiliary Feedwater to the Steam Dump system. No safety or relief valves actuated. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector.
"Unit one (1) experienced a reactor trip during SP-1003 Analog Protection Functional Test. The yellow Tave channel was in test when the red Tave channel bistable failed causing an OTDT reactor trip. Applicable emergency operating procedures were entered and completed. The plant is now implementing 1C1.3, the normal plant shutdown procedure.
"All systems performed as expected with exception of 11 turbine driven auxiliary feed (AFW) pump auto started and tripped 50 seconds later on low suction / discharge pressure which the plant is continuing to investigate. All rods inserted and all other AFW system components are operating as expected."
Decay heat removal is from Main and Auxiliary Feedwater to the Steam Dump system. No safety or relief valves actuated. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44651
Rep Org: HAMPTON UNIVERSITY
Licensee: HAMPTON UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: State: VA
County: Hampton
License #: 45-09657-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL GUEYE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: HAMPTON UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: State: VA
County: Hampton
License #: 45-09657-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL GUEYE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/10/2008
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2008
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB via email (ILTA)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
ILTAB via email (ILTA)
LOST SOURCE
An 8.6 microCi Th-228 licensed source (Isotope Products Lab 535-24-1) of the Physics Department at Hampton University has been identified as lost. As of July 31, 2008, several attempts in trying to locate the source have failed.
The licensee contacted NRC Region 1.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
An 8.6 microCi Th-228 licensed source (Isotope Products Lab 535-24-1) of the Physics Department at Hampton University has been identified as lost. As of July 31, 2008, several attempts in trying to locate the source have failed.
The licensee contacted NRC Region 1.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44517
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM SCHENK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TIM SCHENK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/25/2008
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2008
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2008
Event Time: 19:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DUE TO A POWER FAILURE
"On July 31, 2008, at 7:30 p.m. CDT, power was lost on the reactor protection system (RPS) bus A. The plant was operating at 100 percent power at the time. The loss of RPS bus A interrupted power to the containment isolation actuation circuitry. This caused the Division 1 containment isolation valves in various balance-of-plant systems to automatically close, as designed. Plant operators implemented recovery procedures to shift RPS A to its alternate power supply, and restore the systems affected by the isolation to service. The containment isolation valves were confirmed to have actuated as required. Plant capacity was not interrupted by the containment isolation signal.
"The normal power supply for each RPS bus is a dedicated motor-generator set. The output of that generator is routed to the bus via two Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers arranged in series. Each EPA breaker has an internal power supply supporting the various trip functions designed into the breaker. Troubleshooting activities determined that the power supply in the upstream EPA breaker between the motor-generator set and the A RPS bus had failed, causing the undervoltage function of that EPA to actuate. The cause of the failure of the power supply has not been determined. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of the division 1 containment isolation actuation system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On July 31, 2008, at 7:30 p.m. CDT, power was lost on the reactor protection system (RPS) bus A. The plant was operating at 100 percent power at the time. The loss of RPS bus A interrupted power to the containment isolation actuation circuitry. This caused the Division 1 containment isolation valves in various balance-of-plant systems to automatically close, as designed. Plant operators implemented recovery procedures to shift RPS A to its alternate power supply, and restore the systems affected by the isolation to service. The containment isolation valves were confirmed to have actuated as required. Plant capacity was not interrupted by the containment isolation signal.
"The normal power supply for each RPS bus is a dedicated motor-generator set. The output of that generator is routed to the bus via two Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers arranged in series. Each EPA breaker has an internal power supply supporting the various trip functions designed into the breaker. Troubleshooting activities determined that the power supply in the upstream EPA breaker between the motor-generator set and the A RPS bus had failed, causing the undervoltage function of that EPA to actuate. The cause of the failure of the power supply has not been determined. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of the division 1 containment isolation actuation system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.