Event Notification Report for July 23, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State via e-mail:

"On July 23, 2008, at approximately 10:35 a.m., [the] RSO for Harrington Geotechnical Engineering, Inc., notified RHB about a nuclear gauge (CPN model MC-3 S/N M35116478, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241) that had been stolen at a residence (in Westminster, CA 92683, located near the intersection of Magnolia St. and McFadden Ave.) sometime between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. Due to an urgent personal need, the operator left the truck outside the residence, with the gauge locked to the bed of the truck by a cable. The cable was cut by the perpetrator to remove the transport case containing the gauge. The Westminster Police Department was notified and a police report was generated (report number 08-06699). The RSO stated that the residence of the operator was in an area that had some gang activity. The RSO was informed of the requirement for a written report within 30-days. The RSO stated that he would place an ad in the newspaper and to offer a reward for the gauge. RHB will investigate this incident.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF OIL SPILL TO FLORIDA DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

"At 1708 EDT on 7/23/08, the Control Room was notified that a 900ml initial baseline sample from a potential ground water monitoring well contained 120ml of oil. During the sample, it was also noted that the well was partially filled with debris. This well is not part of the site ground water monitoring program. There was no indication that any oil has entered the storm drain system.

"Although the quantity of oil recovered does not exceed any EPA regulations, a courtesy notification was made to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection at 1723 EDT on 7/23/08.

"This 4-hour NRC notification is being made based on a notification to an off-site government agency."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF ONE OFFSITE POWER CIRCUIT TO SAFETY BUSES

"This 60-day report, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an unplanned, invalid actuation of specified systems, specifically the Units 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS). On 7/23/08, at approximately 2325 hours, Units 2 and 3 experienced invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) partial isolations. Unit 2 experienced an outboard PCIS Group II isolation, while Unit 3 experienced inboard and outboard PCIS Group II isolations. The isolations involved various process lines including Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU), Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) / Containment Atmospheric Dilution (CAD), Drywell Sumps, and Containment Instrument Nitrogen. The Units 2 and 3 PCIS isolations were reset by approximately 2350 hours in accordance with procedures. All required isolation valves operated as designed.

"The invalid PCIS isolations were a result of a fast transfer on associated 4 kV safety-related electrical buses for Units 2 and 3 caused by a loss of one of the two off-site power circuits that supply the 4 kV buses. This fast transfer resulted in a momentary voltage transient on electrical power supplies to the logic for the Units 2 and 3 PCIS. The two station off-site power circuits are fed from three offsite sources. The loss of the offsite power circuit was caused by failure of the 'A' phase of the '#1' transformer, which is associated with one of the three offsite power sources. This transformer is located at the North Substation. The transformer automatically isolated as a result of a fire associated with this transformer and resulted in the loss of two of the three offsite power sources. Subsequent to fire extinguishment, appropriate electrical switching was performed and the offsite power circuit was returned to an operable status by 0650 hours on 7/24/08.

"This issue has been entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CR 799684, 811332) for evaluation and implementation of further corrective actions including determining why two offsite sources were lost as a result of the transformer failure. The NRC resident has been informed of this notification."