Event Notification Report for July 21, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/20/2008 - 07/21/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44357
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN STERMER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN STERMER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/21/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 09:08 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 09:08 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD DEESE (R4)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
RICHARD DEESE (R4)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED - UNABLE TO VALIDATE A FIRE ALARM WITHIN 15 MINUTES
The licensee received a fire alarm (smoke alarm) for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Room at 0853 PDT. An operator was dispatched to visually inspect the area of the fire alarm. The area was not able to be accessed due to a high delta pressure across the door. Operators were not able to access the area within 15 minutes of receiving the alarm and declared EAL HU 2.1 at 0908 PDT. A maintenance worker in the area of the alarm opened the door from the other side and an operator was able to visually inspect the area. The area was free of smoke and fire and the Unusual Event was exited at 0915 PDT. The licensee performed required notifications to the State of California and the local government.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1602 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM NIMIK TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee plans to issue a press release concerning the Unusual Event. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
R4DO (Deese) informed.
The licensee received a fire alarm (smoke alarm) for the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Room at 0853 PDT. An operator was dispatched to visually inspect the area of the fire alarm. The area was not able to be accessed due to a high delta pressure across the door. Operators were not able to access the area within 15 minutes of receiving the alarm and declared EAL HU 2.1 at 0908 PDT. A maintenance worker in the area of the alarm opened the door from the other side and an operator was able to visually inspect the area. The area was free of smoke and fire and the Unusual Event was exited at 0915 PDT. The licensee performed required notifications to the State of California and the local government.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE AT 1602 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM NIMIK TO HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee plans to issue a press release concerning the Unusual Event. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
R4DO (Deese) informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44358
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/22/2008
Notification Time: 04:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 20:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2008
Notification Time: 04:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 20:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITIES DUE TO TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS OUT OF SERVICE
"On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1B Emergency Diesel generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement. The 1B Emergency Diesel remains out of service and is anticipated to be returned to service on 7/26/08.
"On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A Emergency Diesel generator was declared inoperable due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system.
"The combination of these two diesels being out of service results in two emergency diesels, one in each train, being inoperable for Farley Unit One. This represents a Unit One loss of safety function for mitigating the consequences of an accident in the event of a loss of off-site power.
"Farley Unit Two is affected only by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel and is maintaining a B-Train Emergency Diesel operable.
"The 1-2A Emergency Diesel is suspected of having a lube oil heat exchanger tube leak. Confirmation of the tube leak and repairs are anticipated to take three to four days."
The loss of two EDGs places Unit One in an 8-hr plant shutdown action statement which will require the unit to initiate shutdown by 0458 CDT on July 22, 2008 and be in hot standby by 1058 CDT. Unit Two is in a 10-day non-shutdown action statement as a result of the loss of the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM HOBSON TO KNOKE AT 1009 ON 07/22/08 * * *
"On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1 B Emergency Diesel Generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement.
"On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.1 due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system.
"The combination of both diesels out of service required entry into Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition E. With both an 'A' train and a 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, a loss of safety function exists. A technical specification required shutdown from Mode 1 to Mode 3 was commenced at 0541 CST in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition F. Unit 1 is required to be in Mode 3 prior to 1058 CST.
"Unit 2 is affected by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator being removed from service. However, there is no loss of safety function on Unit 2 because the B train Emergency Diesel Generator is operable. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1, 100% power."
Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey)
"On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1B Emergency Diesel generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement. The 1B Emergency Diesel remains out of service and is anticipated to be returned to service on 7/26/08.
"On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A Emergency Diesel generator was declared inoperable due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system.
"The combination of these two diesels being out of service results in two emergency diesels, one in each train, being inoperable for Farley Unit One. This represents a Unit One loss of safety function for mitigating the consequences of an accident in the event of a loss of off-site power.
"Farley Unit Two is affected only by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel and is maintaining a B-Train Emergency Diesel operable.
"The 1-2A Emergency Diesel is suspected of having a lube oil heat exchanger tube leak. Confirmation of the tube leak and repairs are anticipated to take three to four days."
The loss of two EDGs places Unit One in an 8-hr plant shutdown action statement which will require the unit to initiate shutdown by 0458 CDT on July 22, 2008 and be in hot standby by 1058 CDT. Unit Two is in a 10-day non-shutdown action statement as a result of the loss of the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM HOBSON TO KNOKE AT 1009 ON 07/22/08 * * *
"On 7/20/08 at 1757, the 1 B Emergency Diesel Generator was voluntarily removed from service for a planned exhaust header replacement.
"On 7/21/08 at 2058, the 1-2A emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.8.1 due to excessive amounts of water present in the diesel lube oil system.
"The combination of both diesels out of service required entry into Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition E. With both an 'A' train and a 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable, a loss of safety function exists. A technical specification required shutdown from Mode 1 to Mode 3 was commenced at 0541 CST in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition F. Unit 1 is required to be in Mode 3 prior to 1058 CST.
"Unit 2 is affected by the 1-2A Emergency Diesel Generator being removed from service. However, there is no loss of safety function on Unit 2 because the B train Emergency Diesel Generator is operable. Unit 2 remains in Mode 1, 100% power."
Licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44364
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: NEUTRON PRODUCTS INC
Region: 1
City: DICKERSON State: MD
County:
License #: MD-3102503
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN JACOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Licensee: NEUTRON PRODUCTS INC
Region: 1
City: DICKERSON State: MD
County:
License #: MD-3102503
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN JACOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 18:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2008
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2008
Event Time: 18:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OCCUPATIONAL OVEREXPOSURE
On July 22, 2008, the State of Maryland was informed by the Teletherapy Operations Manager for Neutron Products, Inc. that one of their teletherapy service engineers performing an Alcyon Co-60 source exchange in Brazil had received a potential overexposure.
During the source exchange, the engineer's electronic dosimeter alarmed. Immediate actions were taken to properly secure the source. Preliminary dosimetry readings for the service engineer indicated a potential whole body exposure of approximately 5,211 mrem and extremity reading at the right wrist exceeding 10R (off scale high). The service engineer's film badge was sent for immediate processing to Global Dosimetry with expected results available for evaluation by Thursday, 7/24.
The results from Global Dosimetry for the service engineer prior to the incident are as follows:
Monthly whole body (DDE, mrem) - 13,465 + 92 (Jan. - May) = 13,557
Left wrist (SDE, mrem) - 73,356 + 236 (Jan. - May) = 73,592
Right wrist (SDE, mrem) - 746 + 488 (Jan. - May) = 1,234
Brazilian regulatory personnel were onsite at the hospital at the time the incident occurred and were briefed within one (1) hour by the service engineer.
* * * UPDATE FROM ALAN JACOBSON TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0739 EDT ON 07/28/08 * * *
"Per our telephone conversation of today [between the state and the licensee], this is to update our initial verbal and written Twenty-Four Hour Notifications made July 22, 2008 regarding the incident in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and to summarize our employee's written account thereof.
"On July 21, 2008 at approximately 6:20 pm EDT, Neutron Products employee #502, informed us via telephone that he may have received an over-exposure while performing a source exchange on an Alcyon II teletherapy unit located in Sao Paulo, Brazil. On July 21, 2008, employee #502 and a radiation worker from Brazil were in the process of transferring the expended cobalt-60 source from the Alcyon II unit into Neutron's transfer cask in accordance with Specification P-9, Appendix XI. After engaging the source holder with the removal tool, #502 transferred the source holder from the Alcyon II unit head into the transfer cask. Once the source holder was in the transfer cask, #502 continued making preparations to complete the removal sequence.
"Employee #502 had completed all the steps of the removal sequence and was in the process of removing the removal tool from the transfer cask, when it was determined by audible alarms and before the tool was completely out of the cask, that the cobalt-60 source was still connected to the end of the removal tool. At that point, #502 reinserted the removal tool back into the cask and repeated the steps again to make sure that the Source was disengaged from the removal tool. Once he was sure that the source was no longer attached to the removal tool, the tool was removed from the cask, and all the covers installed. The transfer cask now contains both the expended and new sources.
"Immediately after the container was secured, both men read their SRD's and reported their dose as follows: #502: WB-5,211 mrem, Left Wrist-300 mrem, and Right Wrist-off Scale (10R dosimeter); Brazilian Worker: WB-533 mrem, Left Wrist-off scale (10R dosimeter), and, Right Wrist-4,100 mrem. The TLD's were sent via FED-EX to Global Dosimetry Solutions in Irvine, CA, for emergency reading and the results are as follows: #502: Monthly WB DDE-13,465 mrem, Quarterly WB DDE-11,126 mrem, Left Wrist SDE-73,356 mrem, and Right Wrist SDE-746 mrem. Brazilian Worker: Monthly WB DDE-702 mrem, Quarterly WB DDE-1,559 mrem, Left Wrist SDE-3,030 mrem, and Right Wrist SDE-8,542 mrem.
"Employee #502 will be returning home sometime this weekend. He will not be involved in any radiation work for the remainder of the year."
Notified R1DO (Trapp) and FSME (M. Burgess)
On July 22, 2008, the State of Maryland was informed by the Teletherapy Operations Manager for Neutron Products, Inc. that one of their teletherapy service engineers performing an Alcyon Co-60 source exchange in Brazil had received a potential overexposure.
During the source exchange, the engineer's electronic dosimeter alarmed. Immediate actions were taken to properly secure the source. Preliminary dosimetry readings for the service engineer indicated a potential whole body exposure of approximately 5,211 mrem and extremity reading at the right wrist exceeding 10R (off scale high). The service engineer's film badge was sent for immediate processing to Global Dosimetry with expected results available for evaluation by Thursday, 7/24.
The results from Global Dosimetry for the service engineer prior to the incident are as follows:
Monthly whole body (DDE, mrem) - 13,465 + 92 (Jan. - May) = 13,557
Left wrist (SDE, mrem) - 73,356 + 236 (Jan. - May) = 73,592
Right wrist (SDE, mrem) - 746 + 488 (Jan. - May) = 1,234
Brazilian regulatory personnel were onsite at the hospital at the time the incident occurred and were briefed within one (1) hour by the service engineer.
* * * UPDATE FROM ALAN JACOBSON TO JOHN KNOKE AT 0739 EDT ON 07/28/08 * * *
"Per our telephone conversation of today [between the state and the licensee], this is to update our initial verbal and written Twenty-Four Hour Notifications made July 22, 2008 regarding the incident in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and to summarize our employee's written account thereof.
"On July 21, 2008 at approximately 6:20 pm EDT, Neutron Products employee #502, informed us via telephone that he may have received an over-exposure while performing a source exchange on an Alcyon II teletherapy unit located in Sao Paulo, Brazil. On July 21, 2008, employee #502 and a radiation worker from Brazil were in the process of transferring the expended cobalt-60 source from the Alcyon II unit into Neutron's transfer cask in accordance with Specification P-9, Appendix XI. After engaging the source holder with the removal tool, #502 transferred the source holder from the Alcyon II unit head into the transfer cask. Once the source holder was in the transfer cask, #502 continued making preparations to complete the removal sequence.
"Employee #502 had completed all the steps of the removal sequence and was in the process of removing the removal tool from the transfer cask, when it was determined by audible alarms and before the tool was completely out of the cask, that the cobalt-60 source was still connected to the end of the removal tool. At that point, #502 reinserted the removal tool back into the cask and repeated the steps again to make sure that the Source was disengaged from the removal tool. Once he was sure that the source was no longer attached to the removal tool, the tool was removed from the cask, and all the covers installed. The transfer cask now contains both the expended and new sources.
"Immediately after the container was secured, both men read their SRD's and reported their dose as follows: #502: WB-5,211 mrem, Left Wrist-300 mrem, and Right Wrist-off Scale (10R dosimeter); Brazilian Worker: WB-533 mrem, Left Wrist-off scale (10R dosimeter), and, Right Wrist-4,100 mrem. The TLD's were sent via FED-EX to Global Dosimetry Solutions in Irvine, CA, for emergency reading and the results are as follows: #502: Monthly WB DDE-13,465 mrem, Quarterly WB DDE-11,126 mrem, Left Wrist SDE-73,356 mrem, and Right Wrist SDE-746 mrem. Brazilian Worker: Monthly WB DDE-702 mrem, Quarterly WB DDE-1,559 mrem, Left Wrist SDE-3,030 mrem, and Right Wrist SDE-8,542 mrem.
"Employee #502 will be returning home sometime this weekend. He will not be involved in any radiation work for the remainder of the year."
Notified R1DO (Trapp) and FSME (M. Burgess)