Event Notification Report for June 23, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/22/2008 - 06/23/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
443304432144313443144431144329
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44330
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC
Region: 4
City: MILPITAS State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC
Region: 4
City: MILPITAS State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/01/2008
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2008
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
AGREEMENT STATE - LEAKING STATIC ELIMINATOR SOURCES
The state submitted this report via e-mail.
"Seagate leases static discharging (elimination) devices from a licensed manufacturer, NRD LLC. These static dischargers are Po-210 based alpha emitters. Seagate employees noticed oxidation/discoloration on these static discharges within 2-3 months after installation in their clean rooms. They were concerned about possible flaking of any particulates onto their micro sensitive products and cost of swapping the devices more frequently than every 12 months (lease period). Seagate removed these units from the clean rooms and wipe tested them and sent them for processing to Sterling & Associates. On 6/23/08, the CIH from Sterling & Associates informed Seagate that 4 of the 5 fans exhibiting discoloration, exceeded the limit (0.005 microcuries) 'leaking' with sample results ranging from 0.009-0.01 microcuries. These units included Model # P-2063 with S/Ns A2FD498 (0.02 microcuries), A2FH895 (0.01 microcuries), A2FD505 (0.02 microcuries) & A2FH915 (.009 microcuries). In addition, the remaining 12 fans sampled collectively showed results of 0.3 microcuries. All these 12 units were same Model # P-2063. After the findings, Seagate wipe tested 5 more units (1 brand new, 1 clean looking, & 3 discolored) and the nearby work areas of leaking sources, and the results were non-detect. Seagate notified NRD and all the units that were tested (5+12) were shipped to NRD for further verification. NRD believed that the wipe sampling of the unit, if not done properly might affect the ultra-thin gold encapsulation layer and thereby pick up some imbedded Po-210.
"07/01/08 - Per NRD RSO, they still have not received the units from Seagate. He also stated that these units contain a very thin layer of plating and if wipes are not done properly, wipes will pick up imbedded Po-210 indicating contamination. NRD will be wipe testing all the units as soon as they are received and will be calling RHB to notify their findings."
The state submitted this report via e-mail.
"Seagate leases static discharging (elimination) devices from a licensed manufacturer, NRD LLC. These static dischargers are Po-210 based alpha emitters. Seagate employees noticed oxidation/discoloration on these static discharges within 2-3 months after installation in their clean rooms. They were concerned about possible flaking of any particulates onto their micro sensitive products and cost of swapping the devices more frequently than every 12 months (lease period). Seagate removed these units from the clean rooms and wipe tested them and sent them for processing to Sterling & Associates. On 6/23/08, the CIH from Sterling & Associates informed Seagate that 4 of the 5 fans exhibiting discoloration, exceeded the limit (0.005 microcuries) 'leaking' with sample results ranging from 0.009-0.01 microcuries. These units included Model # P-2063 with S/Ns A2FD498 (0.02 microcuries), A2FH895 (0.01 microcuries), A2FD505 (0.02 microcuries) & A2FH915 (.009 microcuries). In addition, the remaining 12 fans sampled collectively showed results of 0.3 microcuries. All these 12 units were same Model # P-2063. After the findings, Seagate wipe tested 5 more units (1 brand new, 1 clean looking, & 3 discolored) and the nearby work areas of leaking sources, and the results were non-detect. Seagate notified NRD and all the units that were tested (5+12) were shipped to NRD for further verification. NRD believed that the wipe sampling of the unit, if not done properly might affect the ultra-thin gold encapsulation layer and thereby pick up some imbedded Po-210.
"07/01/08 - Per NRD RSO, they still have not received the units from Seagate. He also stated that these units contain a very thin layer of plating and if wipes are not done properly, wipes will pick up imbedded Po-210 indicating contamination. NRD will be wipe testing all the units as soon as they are received and will be calling RHB to notify their findings."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44321
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UCLA
Region: 4
City: WESTWOOD State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: UCLA
Region: 4
City: WESTWOOD State: CA
County:
License #: 1335-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
DAVID PROULX (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
POTENTIAL UNDERDOSE TO PATIENT UNDERGOING WHOLE BODY RADIATION
The following report was received from the state via e-mail:
"On June 25, 2008 at approximately 3 pm, RHB received preliminary notification of a medical event, which occurred June 23, 2008, involving a 50% under-dose to a patient undergoing whole-body irradiation with a Co-60 teletherapy unit. The event was discovered at approximately 2 pm on June 25, 2008. RHB held the initial report to NRC until additional details could be provided by the licensee, who was still reviewing the situation with the radiation oncology department. The prescription was for total body irradiation at 17.12 minutes AP (anterior posterior), then 17.13 minutes AP, then 17.12 minutes PA (posterior anterior), then 17.13 minutes PA, for a total of 34.25 minutes AP and 34.25 minutes PA, and a total of 300 cGy. The therapist only treated 17.13 minutes AP and 17.13 minutes PA for a total dose of 150 cGy. The patient was seen by the attending physician on 6/25/08, with no known medical effects observed. There is currently no plan to re-treat the patient per the attending physician. The licensee is following up with a written report.
"5010 Number - 062508"
The attending physician and patient have been notified.
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following report was received from the state via e-mail:
"On June 25, 2008 at approximately 3 pm, RHB received preliminary notification of a medical event, which occurred June 23, 2008, involving a 50% under-dose to a patient undergoing whole-body irradiation with a Co-60 teletherapy unit. The event was discovered at approximately 2 pm on June 25, 2008. RHB held the initial report to NRC until additional details could be provided by the licensee, who was still reviewing the situation with the radiation oncology department. The prescription was for total body irradiation at 17.12 minutes AP (anterior posterior), then 17.13 minutes AP, then 17.12 minutes PA (posterior anterior), then 17.13 minutes PA, for a total of 34.25 minutes AP and 34.25 minutes PA, and a total of 300 cGy. The therapist only treated 17.13 minutes AP and 17.13 minutes PA for a total dose of 150 cGy. The patient was seen by the attending physician on 6/25/08, with no known medical effects observed. There is currently no plan to re-treat the patient per the attending physician. The licensee is following up with a written report.
"5010 Number - 062508"
The attending physician and patient have been notified.
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44313
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CHERYL GOFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: CHERYL GOFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 10:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 10:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
GORDON BJORKMAN (NMSS)
BINOY DESAI (R2)
GORDON BJORKMAN (NMSS)
ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE FOR SAFETY FOR GREATER THAN 8 HOURS
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: In April of this year, BWXT replaced the recirculation columns on the High Level Trough Dissolvers in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The columns were processed out of the area according to standard waste handling procedures for disposal. An NMC technician raised a concern as the columns were checked by BWXT Security before placement into a SeaLand container. The technician believed the response of Security's monitor was overly sensitive compared to the assigned 235-U values based on calculations. NMC immediately placed a hold on the columns.
"The columns were later moved into the Decon Area of BWXT's Waste Treatment Facility where they were stored for approximately three weeks. The Decon area is posted by Nuclear Criticality Safety for 100 grams of 235-U. NMC personnel conducted subsequent NDA field measurements of the columns and estimated an accumulation of approximately 695 grams 235-U in four of the columns. The Decon Area was immediately secured and a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) generated to clean and reevaluate the columns in the Uranium Recovery's Maintenance area.
"The four columns were relocated to the Recovery Maintenance area where they were cleaned according to the instructions in the RWP. NDA measurements of the columns and cleaning materials indicated a total 235-U content of 577 grams. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in the Decon Area is 400 grams. The Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for control of mass was degraded.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: The safety basis for the Decon Area takes credit for two IROFS, control of mass and moderation. The control for mass was degraded. Although the LCO for 235-U mass was exceeded by 177 grams, this was less than the fully reflected, optimally moderated minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. A criticality was not credible in this scenario.
There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. The amount of 235-U present in the columns was less than the minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and only one remaining, double contingency could no longer be assured.
"III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 1 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(5) - Loss of controls such that only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Analysis Summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: In April of this year, BWXT replaced the recirculation columns on the High Level Trough Dissolvers in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The columns were processed out of the area according to standard waste handling procedures for disposal. An NMC technician raised a concern as the columns were checked by BWXT Security before placement into a SeaLand container. The technician believed the response of Security's monitor was overly sensitive compared to the assigned 235-U values based on calculations. NMC immediately placed a hold on the columns.
"The columns were later moved into the Decon Area of BWXT's Waste Treatment Facility where they were stored for approximately three weeks. The Decon area is posted by Nuclear Criticality Safety for 100 grams of 235-U. NMC personnel conducted subsequent NDA field measurements of the columns and estimated an accumulation of approximately 695 grams 235-U in four of the columns. The Decon Area was immediately secured and a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) generated to clean and reevaluate the columns in the Uranium Recovery's Maintenance area.
"The four columns were relocated to the Recovery Maintenance area where they were cleaned according to the instructions in the RWP. NDA measurements of the columns and cleaning materials indicated a total 235-U content of 577 grams. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in the Decon Area is 400 grams. The Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for control of mass was degraded.
"II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: The safety basis for the Decon Area takes credit for two IROFS, control of mass and moderation. The control for mass was degraded. Although the LCO for 235-U mass was exceeded by 177 grams, this was less than the fully reflected, optimally moderated minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. A criticality was not credible in this scenario.
There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. The amount of 235-U present in the columns was less than the minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and only one remaining, double contingency could no longer be assured.
"III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 1 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(5) - Loss of controls such that only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Analysis Summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours.
"IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44314
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO MINOR OIL SPILL
"Oil spill detected in outfall structure of joint operating units IP2 and IP3. Oil pool contained by partial boom in place at outfall structure. Slight rainbow sheen detected after outfall structure in Hudson River."
The source of the leak is unknown. The licensee has made arrangements for remediation and has informed the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center, State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Oil spill detected in outfall structure of joint operating units IP2 and IP3. Oil pool contained by partial boom in place at outfall structure. Slight rainbow sheen detected after outfall structure in Hudson River."
The source of the leak is unknown. The licensee has made arrangements for remediation and has informed the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center, State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44311
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN BRUCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN BRUCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 03:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 03:26 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 03:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY - TSC IS UNAVAILABLE
"UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC CHARCOAL FILTER FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 0300 on Monday, June 23,2008, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system charcoal filter was removed from service for planned charcoal bed maintenance. The balance of the TSC ventilation is not affected by the charcoal bed maintenance and remains available.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"Charcoal filter maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1000 on Wednesday, June 25, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE AT 1455EDT ON 06/24/08 FROM SCOTT SCHNEIDER TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 0905 on Tuesday, June 24, 2008, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system charcoal filter was removed from service for planned charcoal bed maintenance. The balance of the TSC ventilation is not affected by the charcoal bed maintenance and remains available. The charcoal filter was removed from service at 0300 on Monday, June 23, 2008 (as previously reported via EN # 44311), and subsequently restored to available status at 1614.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"Charcoal filter maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1300 on Wednesday, June 25, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DEAN BRUCK TO JASON KOZAL AT 1846 ON 6/27/08 * * *
"The planned maintenance and testing was completed. The TSC Ventilation system was returned to service at 2045 EDT on 06/26/08.
"The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
"UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC CHARCOAL FILTER FOR SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 0300 on Monday, June 23,2008, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system charcoal filter was removed from service for planned charcoal bed maintenance. The balance of the TSC ventilation is not affected by the charcoal bed maintenance and remains available.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"Charcoal filter maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1000 on Wednesday, June 25, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE AT 1455EDT ON 06/24/08 FROM SCOTT SCHNEIDER TO S. SANDIN * * *
At 0905 on Tuesday, June 24, 2008, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system charcoal filter was removed from service for planned charcoal bed maintenance. The balance of the TSC ventilation is not affected by the charcoal bed maintenance and remains available. The charcoal filter was removed from service at 0300 on Monday, June 23, 2008 (as previously reported via EN # 44311), and subsequently restored to available status at 1614.
"Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary based upon results of procedurally required monitoring of TSC radiological conditions.
"Charcoal filter maintenance is scheduled to complete at 1300 on Wednesday, June 25, 2008.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss an emergency response facility."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DEAN BRUCK TO JASON KOZAL AT 1846 ON 6/27/08 * * *
"The planned maintenance and testing was completed. The TSC Ventilation system was returned to service at 2045 EDT on 06/26/08.
"The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Lipa).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44329
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/30/2008
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 20:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2008
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2008
Event Time: 20:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
RUSS BYWATER (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
PREMATURE LOCKING OF INC IR-100 EXPOSURE DEVICE
"On June 23rd at approximately 8 p.m., at a temporary job site [located at a refinery in Sinclair, Wyoming] a Kakivik Asset Management radiography crew experienced the premature tripping of the automatic locking device on a INC IR-100 exposure device.
"During retraction of the source it was noted that the locking device had returned to the trapped position. When the crank handles were moved back and forth to insure that it had, it was noted that the source traveled back out of the exposure device. The radiographer immediately took control of the cranks and the assistant moved back to the unrestricted area. The source was returned to the collimator and the lock reset to capture the source. Upon retraction the event occurred again. This happened three times.
"The radiographer with help from other crew members established a secure unrestricted area. The Night Supervisor, the Lead Radiographer and RSO were notified. Prior to their arrival the radiographer on-site turned the key and this effectively left the source in the camera but not in the safe and secure position.
"The radiography was being performed at a fabrication shop during a turnaround and the RSO made the decision to have the exposure device placed in the lead lined transportation box and moved to a more secure location away from the General Public.
"The vehicle was surveyed and the radiation levels for the driver were < 1 mR/Hr. The vehicle was locked and placed under constant surveillance until INC [manufacturer] could be contacted. RSO contacted INC at 7 a.m. the following morning and explained the situation. Their RSO indicated that the Lead Radiographer under his guidance could reset the lock and secure the source in the safe and secure position. This was accomplished successfully.
"Kakivik's Material License (#50-27667-01) does allow for the retrieval of sources.
"At no time was the General Public in any danger of coming into the restricted area.
"The lead radiographer, radiographer and assistant radiographer received 80, 65 and 55 Mr on the 23rd of June respectively and 80, 25 and 5 Mr on the 24th. [Doses for the lead radiographer on the 23 and 24th June were accumulated during event response. Doses for the radiographer and the assistant radiographer were a mix of normal radiography and event response on 23 June, and doses on 24 June were due to event response.]
"The camera has been removed from service and returned to INC for evaluation. The camera received annual maintenance at the INC facilities November 5, 2007."
"On June 23rd at approximately 8 p.m., at a temporary job site [located at a refinery in Sinclair, Wyoming] a Kakivik Asset Management radiography crew experienced the premature tripping of the automatic locking device on a INC IR-100 exposure device.
"During retraction of the source it was noted that the locking device had returned to the trapped position. When the crank handles were moved back and forth to insure that it had, it was noted that the source traveled back out of the exposure device. The radiographer immediately took control of the cranks and the assistant moved back to the unrestricted area. The source was returned to the collimator and the lock reset to capture the source. Upon retraction the event occurred again. This happened three times.
"The radiographer with help from other crew members established a secure unrestricted area. The Night Supervisor, the Lead Radiographer and RSO were notified. Prior to their arrival the radiographer on-site turned the key and this effectively left the source in the camera but not in the safe and secure position.
"The radiography was being performed at a fabrication shop during a turnaround and the RSO made the decision to have the exposure device placed in the lead lined transportation box and moved to a more secure location away from the General Public.
"The vehicle was surveyed and the radiation levels for the driver were < 1 mR/Hr. The vehicle was locked and placed under constant surveillance until INC [manufacturer] could be contacted. RSO contacted INC at 7 a.m. the following morning and explained the situation. Their RSO indicated that the Lead Radiographer under his guidance could reset the lock and secure the source in the safe and secure position. This was accomplished successfully.
"Kakivik's Material License (#50-27667-01) does allow for the retrieval of sources.
"At no time was the General Public in any danger of coming into the restricted area.
"The lead radiographer, radiographer and assistant radiographer received 80, 65 and 55 Mr on the 23rd of June respectively and 80, 25 and 5 Mr on the 24th. [Doses for the lead radiographer on the 23 and 24th June were accumulated during event response. Doses for the radiographer and the assistant radiographer were a mix of normal radiography and event response on 23 June, and doses on 24 June were due to event response.]
"The camera has been removed from service and returned to INC for evaluation. The camera received annual maintenance at the INC facilities November 5, 2007."