Event Notification Report for June 19, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN IMPROPERLY STORED/ACCOUNTED FOR TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Oklahoma via email:

"Ramey Enterprises was licensed for portable gauges, and held radioactive materials license OK-21291-01, which expired 1/31/2005. The license authorized possession of portable soil moisture density gauges containing Cesium and Americium. The licensee is located at 505 East 19th street in Owasso, OK. Ramey retained their radioactive material and continued to operate after the license expired. DEQ initiated enforcement action, leading to issuance of a consent order in late 2007 which involved payment of a penalty spread over three payments and submission of a new application, following which DEQ would issue a new license. Ramey stopped making the penalty payments and the Ramey RSO did not respond to DEQ attempts at telephone contact. A DEQ inspector visited the property on 6/19/08 to verify the security of the radioactive material. The inspector could not locate anyone at the facility office, and investigated the property to see if he could find a facility employee to assist him. He found an unlocked door and opened it to see if he could find an employee. The investigator had his survey meter out and turned on, and noticed that the meter reacted in the area of the door. He found a wooden chest with a Yellow II RAM transportation label. Outside the chest, his meter read about 10 mrem/hour. The chest was not chained, locked, or secured in any way. He attempted to call a cell phone belonging to the facility RSO, and the RSO answered. She was unavailable, but arranged for another employee to contact the inspector and provide assistance. When the employee arrived, the inspector and the employee opened the chest and found a Radium-beryllium portable gauge (details provided below). Radiation levels outside the shutter were approximately 50 mrem/hr. Measurements of a wipe of the closed shutter did not reveal any removable contamination. The RaBe gauge was not listed on the previous license, nor the new license application, and the facility staff denies any prior knowledge of the gauge's presence. Facility staff will secure the gauge properly. The inspector verified that the previously-known Cs/AmBe gauges were still present chained in their storage area. The licensee has acknowledged their responsibility to ensure that the RaBe gauge is secure.

Troxler Model 2401
Device s/n 1498
mfr date 9/16/71

1.9 millicurie radium beryllium
s/n unknown

"Troxler reports the gauge was sold to another engineering consulting firm in 1973. That firm no longer has a radioactive materials license. There is no known connection between the original purchaser and the present property, and how or when the gauge ended up in possession of Ramey is unknown at this time.

"The above is a preliminary notice based on a telephonic report from the inspector in the field."

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION INOPERABLE

"At 17:35 hours on June 19, 2008, the Control Room authorized post maintenance testing following replacement of solenoid valves affecting the 2B Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem. This testing was required to restore this Subsystem to OPERABLE following maintenance. This test inputs a Simulated high radiation signal into the logic for Control Building HVAC system and ensures that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation subsystem automatically aligns to the Radiation/Smoke Protection mode. During performance of this test, the Control Building Exhaust Fan Damper (2D) failed to close and the associated Control Building Exhaust Fan failed to trip as expected. These functions are required to occur to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Building during a high radiation in the Control Building ventilation intake plenum or during smoke intrusion into the Control Building. Since Brunswick has a shared control room, Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3,'Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,' Required Action B.1 (i.e., be in Mode 3 within 12 hours).

"At 1910, the 2A Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem was manually placed in the Radiation/Smoke Protection mode. This action fulfilled the Control Room Emergency Ventilation safety function and allowed the 2A Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem to be declared OPERABLE. Required Action B.1 of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 (be in Mode 3 within 12 hours) was exited.

"This report applies to both Units 1 and 2 and is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The condition with the Control Building Exhaust Damper (20) is intermittent. The solenoid valve for this damper was recently replaced on 5/3/2008. The post maintenance test included ensuring this damper would close on demand and was completed satisfactory. In addition, this same test was performed on the other division of CREV logic on 5/17/2008, the Control Building Exhaust Damper and Exhaust Fan functioned as required. In addition, the exhaust damper and fan operated properly, when manually operated from the Control Room, while manually placing the CREV system in service.

"All systems functioned as required except for the Control Building exhaust fan.

"2A Control Building Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem placed in the Radiation/Smoke. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Repair options for the Control Building Exhaust Damper are being developed."