Event Notification Report for June 18, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/17/2008 - 06/18/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44305
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MURELL EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MURELL EVANS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 20:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 20:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
METEORLOGICAL MIXING CALCULATIONS UNAVAILABLE
"This is an 8-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. On June 18, 2008, at approximately 2015 PDT, the backup meteorological tower 60-meter air temperature indication failed. The primary meteorological tower is also unavailable. This results in a loss of the delta temperature function. This delta temperature function would be used to determine air mixing for offsite does calculations in the event of an emergency. Without actual delta temperature data, procedures specify conservative assumptions for determining air mixing.
"Other meteorological functions (10-meter temperature, wind speed and wind direction, and 60-meter wind speed and wind direction) remain functional."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is an 8-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of emergency assessment capability. On June 18, 2008, at approximately 2015 PDT, the backup meteorological tower 60-meter air temperature indication failed. The primary meteorological tower is also unavailable. This results in a loss of the delta temperature function. This delta temperature function would be used to determine air mixing for offsite does calculations in the event of an emergency. Without actual delta temperature data, procedures specify conservative assumptions for determining air mixing.
"Other meteorological functions (10-meter temperature, wind speed and wind direction, and 60-meter wind speed and wind direction) remain functional."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44306
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: RICKY PATTERSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 14:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/18/2008
Event Time: 14:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HR CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE VIOLATION REPORT
"Entergy discovered on June 18, 2008 at 1412 that, due to an error in the Cask Loader Database, four spent fuel casks were loaded in a manner not in compliance with the Certificate of Compliance (CofC). As discussed below, this event is not safety significant since all cask design limits (e.g., heat load, radiation levels, and criticality) continue to be met although some specific spent fuel assemblies loaded were outside of the conservative individual fuel assembly limits specified in the CofC.
"Specifically, during a data update of the Cask Loader Database, it was discovered that four HI-STORM 100 model casks had been loaded with spent fuel bundles that exceeded the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) limits. The four casks involved are F16D003AD, F16D003AE, F16D003AF, and F16D003AG. Verification of the database has determined that 34 of fuel assemblies loaded in these four casks exceeded the maximum allowed Decay Heat per Fuel Storage Location Limit and/or the Fuel Burnup Limit as specified in the CofC Section 2.4 when the assemblies were loaded into the casks. This condition is reportable in accordance with CofC Section 22.
"CAUSE: The preliminary cause is an error in the Cask Loader Database. The database had incorrect bundle exposures for these assemblies. The Cask Loader Database is used to select fuel to load in each cask. The assembly exposures in the Cask Loader Database are used to ensure assemblies selected for loading into fuel casks meet the applicable exposure and cooling time limits provided in the Certificate of Compliance.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: It has been verified that currently the decay heat loads for all assemblies are less than the CofC limits. All casks are below the cask total heat load limit of 28.19 kW and all cooling features for the casks are functioning properly. Since the total heat loads in the casks are below the required limits, the structural integrity of the casks is not challenged. A preliminary evaluation of the as loaded configurations was performed on the four casks. This evaluation concludes that fuel cladding in the affected casks is not adversely affected since the fuel cladding temperature will not exceed the fuel cladding design limit of 400 degrees centigrade.
"Furthermore, the fuel assembly exposure assumed in the dose calculations bounds the exposure of the loaded fuel assemblies. Radiation levels of stored casks are within Cask Technical Specification limits and there are no radiation anomalies. Reactivity parameters are not affected by the errors identified.
"There has been no impact on occupational dose and all surveillance parameters are within acceptance limits. All four casks are currently considered operable and performing their intended safety function."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Entergy discovered on June 18, 2008 at 1412 that, due to an error in the Cask Loader Database, four spent fuel casks were loaded in a manner not in compliance with the Certificate of Compliance (CofC). As discussed below, this event is not safety significant since all cask design limits (e.g., heat load, radiation levels, and criticality) continue to be met although some specific spent fuel assemblies loaded were outside of the conservative individual fuel assembly limits specified in the CofC.
"Specifically, during a data update of the Cask Loader Database, it was discovered that four HI-STORM 100 model casks had been loaded with spent fuel bundles that exceeded the Certificate of Compliance (CoC) limits. The four casks involved are F16D003AD, F16D003AE, F16D003AF, and F16D003AG. Verification of the database has determined that 34 of fuel assemblies loaded in these four casks exceeded the maximum allowed Decay Heat per Fuel Storage Location Limit and/or the Fuel Burnup Limit as specified in the CofC Section 2.4 when the assemblies were loaded into the casks. This condition is reportable in accordance with CofC Section 22.
"CAUSE: The preliminary cause is an error in the Cask Loader Database. The database had incorrect bundle exposures for these assemblies. The Cask Loader Database is used to select fuel to load in each cask. The assembly exposures in the Cask Loader Database are used to ensure assemblies selected for loading into fuel casks meet the applicable exposure and cooling time limits provided in the Certificate of Compliance.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: It has been verified that currently the decay heat loads for all assemblies are less than the CofC limits. All casks are below the cask total heat load limit of 28.19 kW and all cooling features for the casks are functioning properly. Since the total heat loads in the casks are below the required limits, the structural integrity of the casks is not challenged. A preliminary evaluation of the as loaded configurations was performed on the four casks. This evaluation concludes that fuel cladding in the affected casks is not adversely affected since the fuel cladding temperature will not exceed the fuel cladding design limit of 400 degrees centigrade.
"Furthermore, the fuel assembly exposure assumed in the dose calculations bounds the exposure of the loaded fuel assemblies. Radiation levels of stored casks are within Cask Technical Specification limits and there are no radiation anomalies. Reactivity parameters are not affected by the errors identified.
"There has been no impact on occupational dose and all surveillance parameters are within acceptance limits. All four casks are currently considered operable and performing their intended safety function."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.