Event Notification Report for May 23, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/22/2008 - 05/23/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44236
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUCHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUCHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 05/23/2008
Notification Time: 08:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2008
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Notification Time: 08:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2008
Event Time: 03:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)
MEL GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CHARGING PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO RELIEF VALVE LIFTING BELOW SETPOINT
"During normal operation with 23 Charging Pump in service, 21 Charging Pump was placed in service for quarterly testing. Shortly after starting 21 Charging Pump, 23 Charging Pump relief valve lifted below its set point value. CVCS system pressure was approximately 2520 psig. This is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown. 23 Charging Pump was declared inoperable. Recent NRC guidance indicates that a loss of a single train system not credited in accident analysis is reportable when identified in LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1446 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM ROKES TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on May 23, 2008, at 08:11 hours (EN #44236). The notification reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of the relief valve for the 23 charging pump lifting below its setpoint value. The condition was discovered during Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS) operation with the 23 charging pump in operation. Shortly after the 21 charging pump was placed in service for quarterly testing, the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted. The operating speed of the charging pumps was reduced and the 23 charging pump relief valve re-seated. The 23 charging pump is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown from the control room. The relief valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide overpressure protection for the 23 charging pump and associated piping. The relief valve has an active safety function in the closed position to prevent charging pump discharge flow from continuously re-circulating to the pump suction. At the time of the event Operations believed the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted prematurely and declared the 23 charging pump inoperable and made the 8-hour non-emergency notification for loss of remote shutdown capability for a component specified in Technical Specification 3.3.4, 'Remote Shutdown.' The relief valve was subsequently changes out with a spare.
"Subsequent investigations determined that the CVCS pressure was set high in the operating band for two pump operation. Engineering determined that when the 21 charging pump was started the pulsation at the discharge of the positive displacement charging pump exceeded the limit of the relief valve pressure setting. Initial header pressure with the 23 charging pump in operation was approximately 2420 psig with typical charging header pressure at approximately 2300 psig. When the 21 charging pump was placed in service, the resultant pressure with consideration for pulsation immediately at the discharge of the charging pump would have been approximately 2701 psig. The charging pump relief valve lift pressure setting is 2735 +/- 3% (2653 psig to 2817 psig). Therefore, the resultant pressure from two pump operation was within the relief valve lifting pressure. An inspection of the removed relief valve showed only minor anticipated seat degradation of the disc ring insert. Further assessment indicated that the 23 charging pump relief valve did lift and also reseated when aligned for parallel pump operation when the CVCS pressure was adjusted. Engineering and Operations concluded that the 23 charging pump and associated relief valve were operable and capable of performing this safety function. The initial condition was determined to have been attributed to elevated initial CVCS pressure that resulted in challenging the relief valve during two pump operation."
The licensee will notify the State and the Resident Inspector.
R1D0 (Dentel) notified.
"During normal operation with 23 Charging Pump in service, 21 Charging Pump was placed in service for quarterly testing. Shortly after starting 21 Charging Pump, 23 Charging Pump relief valve lifted below its set point value. CVCS system pressure was approximately 2520 psig. This is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown. 23 Charging Pump was declared inoperable. Recent NRC guidance indicates that a loss of a single train system not credited in accident analysis is reportable when identified in LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1446 EDT ON 7/21/08 FROM ROKES TO HUFFMAN * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on May 23, 2008, at 08:11 hours (EN #44236). The notification reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of the relief valve for the 23 charging pump lifting below its setpoint value. The condition was discovered during Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS) operation with the 23 charging pump in operation. Shortly after the 21 charging pump was placed in service for quarterly testing, the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted. The operating speed of the charging pumps was reduced and the 23 charging pump relief valve re-seated. The 23 charging pump is the alternate safe shutdown pump responsible for inventory control for remote shutdown from the control room. The relief valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide overpressure protection for the 23 charging pump and associated piping. The relief valve has an active safety function in the closed position to prevent charging pump discharge flow from continuously re-circulating to the pump suction. At the time of the event Operations believed the 23 charging pump relief valve lifted prematurely and declared the 23 charging pump inoperable and made the 8-hour non-emergency notification for loss of remote shutdown capability for a component specified in Technical Specification 3.3.4, 'Remote Shutdown.' The relief valve was subsequently changes out with a spare.
"Subsequent investigations determined that the CVCS pressure was set high in the operating band for two pump operation. Engineering determined that when the 21 charging pump was started the pulsation at the discharge of the positive displacement charging pump exceeded the limit of the relief valve pressure setting. Initial header pressure with the 23 charging pump in operation was approximately 2420 psig with typical charging header pressure at approximately 2300 psig. When the 21 charging pump was placed in service, the resultant pressure with consideration for pulsation immediately at the discharge of the charging pump would have been approximately 2701 psig. The charging pump relief valve lift pressure setting is 2735 +/- 3% (2653 psig to 2817 psig). Therefore, the resultant pressure from two pump operation was within the relief valve lifting pressure. An inspection of the removed relief valve showed only minor anticipated seat degradation of the disc ring insert. Further assessment indicated that the 23 charging pump relief valve did lift and also reseated when aligned for parallel pump operation when the CVCS pressure was adjusted. Engineering and Operations concluded that the 23 charging pump and associated relief valve were operable and capable of performing this safety function. The initial condition was determined to have been attributed to elevated initial CVCS pressure that resulted in challenging the relief valve during two pump operation."
The licensee will notify the State and the Resident Inspector.
R1D0 (Dentel) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44237
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MLYNAREK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MLYNAREK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/23/2008
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2008
Event Time: 12:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2008
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2008
Event Time: 12:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON POSSIBLE GENERATOR LOCKOUT
The reactor automatically tripped at 1249 EDT on 05/23/08. The cause of the reactor trip signal is not positively known, but it is believed to be related to trip of the 346 negative sequence relay which caused a trip of the 386C generator independent trip (coastdown) lockout relay. All plant systems performed as designed with minor deficiencies noted. EOP-1, 'Standard Post Trip Actions', and EOP-2, 'Reactor Trip Recovery', performed.
All control rods fully inserted. All atmospheric steam dump valves lifted and reseated. CV-0780 (B Steam Generator ASDV) was identified as leaking and was manually isolated. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Auxiliary feedwater system actuated automatically as designed in response to low steam generator water levels. AFW actuation consisted on AFW pump P-8A auto start and AFW valve operation. Steam generator water levels were subsequently restored to normal and are being maintained for primary coolant system heat removal via main steam isolation valves to main condenser (via the turbine bypass valves). Plant is at Normal Operating Pressure (2060 psia) and Temperature (533 degrees F). Grid is stable with safety bus station power being provided from Safeguards transformer.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The reactor automatically tripped at 1249 EDT on 05/23/08. The cause of the reactor trip signal is not positively known, but it is believed to be related to trip of the 346 negative sequence relay which caused a trip of the 386C generator independent trip (coastdown) lockout relay. All plant systems performed as designed with minor deficiencies noted. EOP-1, 'Standard Post Trip Actions', and EOP-2, 'Reactor Trip Recovery', performed.
All control rods fully inserted. All atmospheric steam dump valves lifted and reseated. CV-0780 (B Steam Generator ASDV) was identified as leaking and was manually isolated. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Auxiliary feedwater system actuated automatically as designed in response to low steam generator water levels. AFW actuation consisted on AFW pump P-8A auto start and AFW valve operation. Steam generator water levels were subsequently restored to normal and are being maintained for primary coolant system heat removal via main steam isolation valves to main condenser (via the turbine bypass valves). Plant is at Normal Operating Pressure (2060 psia) and Temperature (533 degrees F). Grid is stable with safety bus station power being provided from Safeguards transformer.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.