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Event Notification Report for May 20, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/19/2008 - 05/20/2008

EVENT NUMBERS
442264422744228

Power Reactor
Event Number: 44226
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN SAXON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/20/2008
Notification Time: 17:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF FUNCTIONALITY TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER

"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 Emergency Response Facilities Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center [TSC] has been lost due to the failure of the TSC Chiller to maintain chilled water within the normal control band. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to FUNCTIONAL status with high priority."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 44227
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: SUSAN GARDNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/20/2008
Notification Time: 18:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2008
Event Time: 13:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 99 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
3 N Y 80 Power Operation 80 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE POWER GRID DISTURBANCE

"On Tuesday, May 20, 2008, at approximately 1310 PDT, the offsite power grid connected to San Onofre experienced a momentary system disturbance. Control Room indicators alerted Operators that the grid frequency dipped to approximately 59.69 Hz. Because frequency dipped below 59.7 Hz, SCE is reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The frequency dip lasted approximately 10 seconds, reportedly due to a high voltage DC transmission line disturbance in Oregon. The grid is currently operating at nominal frequency.

"At the time of the event, San Onofre Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 99 percent power and Unit 3 was operating in Mode 1 at approximately 80 percent power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event and provided a copy of this report."


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44228
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT LINDQUIST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/21/2008
Notification Time: 02:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2008
Event Time: 19:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
Event Text
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL COOLING INTERUPTED DURING CORE RELOAD

"At 1956, during reactor core reload with a full refueling cavity, power was lost to the #2 non-vital instrument bus. This power loss resulted in closure of the shutdown cooling temperature control valve, HCV-341. The closure of HCV-341 interrupted the cooling capability of the in service shutdown cooling loop.

"While cycling a condenser motor operated valve a 480 volt ground occurred which resulted in tripping the feeder breaker to motor control center MCC-4B2. MCC-4B2 was supplying power to Instrument Bus 2 via the Inverter 2 test transformer. The test transformer was powering Instrument Bus 2 due to Inverter 2 replacement per plant modification. The loss of the #2 Instrument Bus resulted in HCV-341, the shutdown cooling heat exchangers temperature control valve, failing closed. HCV-341 was manually opened to restore cooling at 2019. At 2049 power was restored to Instrument Bus 2 and the shutdown cooling system was returned to automatic operation. Flow through the core was maintained throughout the event, as the shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valve responded by opening to maintain flow. At the time shutdown cooling was lost, 44 of 133 assemblies had been loaded into the vessel and shutdown cooling temperature was approximately 88 degrees F. Time to boil was conservatively calculated to be 22.5 hours per plant procedures which assume decay heat from all 133 assemblies. Shutdown cooling temperature rose approximately one degree during this event.

"Technical Specification 2.8.1(3)(1) was entered due to no Shutdown Cooling loop in Operation. No reactor coolant boron reductions were in progress. Irradiated fuel assembly loading into the reactor core was secured and actions to restore a Shutdown Cooling loop were being initiated. [Ft. Calhoun] entered] a 4 hour LCO to close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1416 EDT ON 05/27/08 * * *

"Following a detailed review of the event of May 20, 2008, Fort Calhoun station determined that the safety function of removing residual heat from the reactor coolant system was available throughout the entire event. The system is largely manual and the manual functions were not affected by the event. At the time of the loss of power the core was being reloaded. The heat load was very small and the temperature control valve (HCV-341) was closed to allow the system to increase in temperature. When control power to HCV-341 was lost the valve did not change position.

"Since the ability of the shutdown cooling system to remove residual heat was not impacted by the loss of power and plant procedures have provisions to control the system locally, the safety function of removing decay heat was not lost. Therefore this notification is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (William Jones)