Event Notification Report for May 09, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/08/2008 - 05/09/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
4419744198441994419544320
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44197
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 14:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 05:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 14:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 05:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
LOSS OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY DETECTION SYSTEM FOR TWO AREAS CAUSED DURING MAINTENANCE
"On 05/09/2008 at 0525 PDT during a maintenance activity, a fuse in a Nuclear Criticality Detection System cabinet failed open which caused two of the nine Nuclear Criticality Accident Alarm system coverage areas to go offline. About 5 minutes later, Security personnel made a plant wide PA announcement to suspend all movement of fissile material. The alarm horns were placed in manual mode and manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panel was established at this time and continued until the system was restored to full operation.
"The safety significance is very low. Accidental nuclear criticality is highly unlikely. The system was only degraded for about 5 minutes before Security personnel made a plant wide announcement to suspend all fissile material movement. NCD coverage for the entire plant was reestablished within about 35 minutes.
"Corrective Actions to Restore the Safety System and when each was implemented:
- Manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panels was established at 0530
- The NCD panel fuse was replaced by 0605 restoring NCD coverage to all areas of the plant.
- The alarm horns were placed back in automatic mode at 0720 and the system continued to be monitored by maintenance personnel.
- Complete system operability was declared at 0730.
- A plant wide PA announcement that the suspension of fissile material movement had been lifted was made at 0745."
The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2 and the State of Washington Department of Health.
"On 05/09/2008 at 0525 PDT during a maintenance activity, a fuse in a Nuclear Criticality Detection System cabinet failed open which caused two of the nine Nuclear Criticality Accident Alarm system coverage areas to go offline. About 5 minutes later, Security personnel made a plant wide PA announcement to suspend all movement of fissile material. The alarm horns were placed in manual mode and manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panel was established at this time and continued until the system was restored to full operation.
"The safety significance is very low. Accidental nuclear criticality is highly unlikely. The system was only degraded for about 5 minutes before Security personnel made a plant wide announcement to suspend all fissile material movement. NCD coverage for the entire plant was reestablished within about 35 minutes.
"Corrective Actions to Restore the Safety System and when each was implemented:
- Manual monitoring of the NCD comparator panels was established at 0530
- The NCD panel fuse was replaced by 0605 restoring NCD coverage to all areas of the plant.
- The alarm horns were placed back in automatic mode at 0720 and the system continued to be monitored by maintenance personnel.
- Complete system operability was declared at 0730.
- A plant wide PA announcement that the suspension of fissile material movement had been lifted was made at 0745."
The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2 and the State of Washington Department of Health.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44198
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 14:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2008
Notification Time: 19:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 14:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
BOTH TRAINS OF RHR DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 05/09/2008, at 14:20 CDT, Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A, was entered when the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train was declared inoperable due to a gap in one of the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer modules greater than 1/8 inch. At the time this condition was discovered, the 'B' RHR train was already inoperable for maintenance.
"The Unit is in the process of being returned to service following completion of a Refueling Outage. The unit remained stable, in Mode 4, with the 'A' RHR Train inservice providing cooling for decay heat removal. Efforts to correct the gap in the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer were commenced shortly after identification of this condition, and the condition was corrected and 'A' Train RHR returned to Operable status at 17:45 CDT. 'B' Train RHR is currently being restored following completion of maintenance. The Unit will remain in Mode 4 until the 'B' RHR train is restored to Operable status.
"Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train to be operable while in Mode 4. An operable ECCS train includes both an RHR Subsystem, and a Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) subsystem. The 'A' Train CCP Subsystem remained operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/1/08 AT 1616 FROM PRESTON LAWSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Wolf Creek further evaluated this condition and determined that the safety function of the containment sump was maintained under WCGS current licensing basis. Therefore the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train was not inoperable. Wolf Creek is retracting the notification made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Bywater).
"On 05/09/2008, at 14:20 CDT, Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A, was entered when the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train was declared inoperable due to a gap in one of the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer modules greater than 1/8 inch. At the time this condition was discovered, the 'B' RHR train was already inoperable for maintenance.
"The Unit is in the process of being returned to service following completion of a Refueling Outage. The unit remained stable, in Mode 4, with the 'A' RHR Train inservice providing cooling for decay heat removal. Efforts to correct the gap in the 'A' Train Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer were commenced shortly after identification of this condition, and the condition was corrected and 'A' Train RHR returned to Operable status at 17:45 CDT. 'B' Train RHR is currently being restored following completion of maintenance. The Unit will remain in Mode 4 until the 'B' RHR train is restored to Operable status.
"Technical Specification 3.5.3 requires one Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Train to be operable while in Mode 4. An operable ECCS train includes both an RHR Subsystem, and a Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) subsystem. The 'A' Train CCP Subsystem remained operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/1/08 AT 1616 FROM PRESTON LAWSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Wolf Creek further evaluated this condition and determined that the safety function of the containment sump was maintained under WCGS current licensing basis. Therefore the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Train was not inoperable. Wolf Creek is retracting the notification made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Bywater).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44199
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RON CREWS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RON CREWS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 23:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 23:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 21:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY SIREN OUT OF SERVICE
"On March 9, 2008, Watts Bars Security staff was notified by the Rhea County Sheriff's Department that a single emergency preparedness siren had spuriously activated due to inclement weather and possible lightning strike. The county subsequently notified the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) who, in turn, contacted the Tennessee Valley Authority Operations Duty Specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The siren has been deactivated and repairs will be initiated. Due to the interaction with the county and TEMA (State and local government agencies), this report is being made as a four hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 9, 2008, Watts Bars Security staff was notified by the Rhea County Sheriff's Department that a single emergency preparedness siren had spuriously activated due to inclement weather and possible lightning strike. The county subsequently notified the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) who, in turn, contacted the Tennessee Valley Authority Operations Duty Specialist in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The siren has been deactivated and repairs will be initiated. Due to the interaction with the county and TEMA (State and local government agencies), this report is being made as a four hour notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44195
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JACK OSBORNE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 10:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 10:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1)
ART BURRITT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 47 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
"A manual trip of Salem Unit 2 was initiated due to a high water level in 23 Steam Generator. The high water level in 23 Steam Generator occurred while reducing power in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for loss of circulating water. The operators had entered the abnormal operating procedure for circulating water due to loss of the electrical bus supplying power to the screens. The main supply breaker had tripped open due to the panel being wet from heavy rain. With the screens out of service, TWS [traveling water screen] DP's rose to a value where the circulators were removed from service per procedure. The restoration of the supply breaker is currently in progress. The cause of the high level in 23 Steam Generator during the power reduction is currently under investigation. Following the trip, 2N43, power range nuclear instrumentation channel 3, was declared inoperable due to inaccurate indication and is currently under investigation.
"The crew entered EOP-TRIP-1, appropriately transitioned to EOP-TRIP-2 and stabilized the plant at no load conditions. All rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as designed with decay heat being removed via the 21 -24MS10's, the atmosphere relief valves.
"The AFW Pumps were manually started as required to maintain steam generator levels.
"Salem Unit-2 is currently in mode 3. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547°F with pressure at 2235 psig. All ECCS and ESF Systems are available.
"No personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the Trip. No radiological release due to this event."
No Primary relief valves or PORVs lifted during the trip. There are no known fuel or steam generator tube leaks. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Township.
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1647 EDT ON 05/09/08 FROM JOHN OSBORNE TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
The licensee called to correct the original report that stated the AFW pumps were started manually to maintain SG level. The AFW pumps started automatically due to manually tripping the 21 and 22 SGFPs. The licensee also added notification of the 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)-Specified System Actuation due to the automatic start of the motor driven AFW pumps.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Notified R1DO (Burritt)
"A manual trip of Salem Unit 2 was initiated due to a high water level in 23 Steam Generator. The high water level in 23 Steam Generator occurred while reducing power in accordance with the abnormal operating procedure for loss of circulating water. The operators had entered the abnormal operating procedure for circulating water due to loss of the electrical bus supplying power to the screens. The main supply breaker had tripped open due to the panel being wet from heavy rain. With the screens out of service, TWS [traveling water screen] DP's rose to a value where the circulators were removed from service per procedure. The restoration of the supply breaker is currently in progress. The cause of the high level in 23 Steam Generator during the power reduction is currently under investigation. Following the trip, 2N43, power range nuclear instrumentation channel 3, was declared inoperable due to inaccurate indication and is currently under investigation.
"The crew entered EOP-TRIP-1, appropriately transitioned to EOP-TRIP-2 and stabilized the plant at no load conditions. All rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as designed with decay heat being removed via the 21 -24MS10's, the atmosphere relief valves.
"The AFW Pumps were manually started as required to maintain steam generator levels.
"Salem Unit-2 is currently in mode 3. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547°F with pressure at 2235 psig. All ECCS and ESF Systems are available.
"No personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the Trip. No radiological release due to this event."
No Primary relief valves or PORVs lifted during the trip. There are no known fuel or steam generator tube leaks. Unit 2 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Township.
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1647 EDT ON 05/09/08 FROM JOHN OSBORNE TO JEFF ROTTON * * *
The licensee called to correct the original report that stated the AFW pumps were started manually to maintain SG level. The AFW pumps started automatically due to manually tripping the 21 and 22 SGFPs. The licensee also added notification of the 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)-Specified System Actuation due to the automatic start of the motor driven AFW pumps.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Notified R1DO (Burritt)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44320
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RON FELLOWS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 21:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2008
Event Time: 21:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
INVALID AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).
"On May 9, 2008, while in a refueling outage, an invalid actuation of the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater train occurred while performing the Turbine Trip and Auxiliary Governor Solenoids Operability Check.
"The cause of the event was a failure of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) bypass control relay, 63XT3-TDA. The relay failed to operate as designed under the system conditions and configuration specified by the procedure, resulting in an actuation signal. No actual plant condition existed which required an Auxiliary Feedwater actuation.
"The event resulted in the complete actuation of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater train. All equipment functioned as designed for the existing plant configuration. Relay 63XT3-TDA was replaced and retested per the appropriate R. E. Ginna work control processes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspection.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).
"On May 9, 2008, while in a refueling outage, an invalid actuation of the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater train occurred while performing the Turbine Trip and Auxiliary Governor Solenoids Operability Check.
"The cause of the event was a failure of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) bypass control relay, 63XT3-TDA. The relay failed to operate as designed under the system conditions and configuration specified by the procedure, resulting in an actuation signal. No actual plant condition existed which required an Auxiliary Feedwater actuation.
"The event resulted in the complete actuation of the 'A' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater train. All equipment functioned as designed for the existing plant configuration. Relay 63XT3-TDA was replaced and retested per the appropriate R. E. Ginna work control processes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspection.