Event Notification Report for April 29, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/28/2008 - 04/29/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44175
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JONATHON JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JONATHON JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 07:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 07:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF TSC VENTILLATION DURING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"This notification is to report a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At 0750 CDT on 4/29/08, the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was removed from service for a scheduled surveillance procedure (SP 1738) to replace charcoal filters and measure the cleanup efficiency. It is scheduled to be returned to service on 5/1/08 [at approximately 1500 CST]. The TCS ventilation system is now considered non-functional. The TSC will be staffed in the event it is needed and radiological conditions monitored. If radiological conditions require actions, procedure F3-6, 'Activation and operation of the TSC,' Section 7.6 directs the TSC management to relocate TSC activities to a radiological safe area if necessary."
Alternate facilities are available.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is to report a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At 0750 CDT on 4/29/08, the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was removed from service for a scheduled surveillance procedure (SP 1738) to replace charcoal filters and measure the cleanup efficiency. It is scheduled to be returned to service on 5/1/08 [at approximately 1500 CST]. The TCS ventilation system is now considered non-functional. The TSC will be staffed in the event it is needed and radiological conditions monitored. If radiological conditions require actions, procedure F3-6, 'Activation and operation of the TSC,' Section 7.6 directs the TSC management to relocate TSC activities to a radiological safe area if necessary."
Alternate facilities are available.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44178
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
MARIE MILLER (R1)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING IDENTIFICATION OF DEFECT ALCO SNUBBER VALVE MICRO-CRACKING
The reporting organization provided the following information via facsimile:
"Name and address the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Mr. Dominic Dedolph, Manager, Quality Assurance, Fairbanks Morse Engine, 701 White Avenue, Beloit, WI 53511.
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Facility- Entergy (Indian Point).
"Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: ALCO Fuel Snubber Valve P/N 2402466-1. The snubber valves in the Emergency Diesel Generator are installed in the high pressure fuel line between the fuel injection pump and the injection nozzle and serve as a pulsation dampener.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nature of defect: Fairbanks Morse Engine (FME) evaluation has determined that a potential safety hazard exists for ALCO fuel injection snubber valves due to micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve created during the material surface hardening process when the tips of the snubber valve were quenched in water.
"Safety hazard which could be created by such defect: Micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve could potentially lead to material flaking . It has been postulated that the flakes (or particles) could be flushed downstream and become lodged in the nozzle, causing excessive fuel to enter the combustion space and wash the cylinder liner dry and lead to a piston seizure.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. Deviation discovered on February 29, 2008. Evaluation completed on April 28, 2008.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. Root cause analysis was performed and found that water quenching during the heat treatment process resulted in approximately 40% of the tips of the snubber valves to have micro-cracking present. When oil was substituted for the quenching medium, no snubber valves showed any signs of micro-cracking. The heat treatment process documentation has been updated to specify the quenching medium as oil. Oil has been used exclusively in the heat treatment process of all snubber valves produced by FME since March 1, 2008.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. FME is notifying Entergy (Indian Point) of the twelve (12) suspect pieces."
The reporting organization provided the following information via facsimile:
"Name and address the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Mr. Dominic Dedolph, Manager, Quality Assurance, Fairbanks Morse Engine, 701 White Avenue, Beloit, WI 53511.
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Facility- Entergy (Indian Point).
"Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: ALCO Fuel Snubber Valve P/N 2402466-1. The snubber valves in the Emergency Diesel Generator are installed in the high pressure fuel line between the fuel injection pump and the injection nozzle and serve as a pulsation dampener.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nature of defect: Fairbanks Morse Engine (FME) evaluation has determined that a potential safety hazard exists for ALCO fuel injection snubber valves due to micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve created during the material surface hardening process when the tips of the snubber valve were quenched in water.
"Safety hazard which could be created by such defect: Micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve could potentially lead to material flaking . It has been postulated that the flakes (or particles) could be flushed downstream and become lodged in the nozzle, causing excessive fuel to enter the combustion space and wash the cylinder liner dry and lead to a piston seizure.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. Deviation discovered on February 29, 2008. Evaluation completed on April 28, 2008.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. Root cause analysis was performed and found that water quenching during the heat treatment process resulted in approximately 40% of the tips of the snubber valves to have micro-cracking present. When oil was substituted for the quenching medium, no snubber valves showed any signs of micro-cracking. The heat treatment process documentation has been updated to specify the quenching medium as oil. Oil has been used exclusively in the heat treatment process of all snubber valves produced by FME since March 1, 2008.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. FME is notifying Entergy (Indian Point) of the twelve (12) suspect pieces."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44179
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 04/30/2008
Notification Time: 05:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 23:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Notification Time: 05:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 23:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 32 | Power Operation | 32 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO SEAL LEAK
"On 04/29/08 at approximately 2313 during testing of the Unit 1 HPCI system, a main pump seal developed a leak requiring the HPCI system to be secured. HPCI testing was in progress per OPT 09.2, HPCI System Operability Test, following recent Unit 1 refueling outage. At the time of discovery, the Unit 1 HPCI system had been declared inoperable due to surveillance testing activities which removed HPCI from the standby lineup. When the pump seal leak developed, operators secured HPCI and isolated the leak by closing the pump suction isolation valves and the keep fill supply valves. Investigation into the cause of the pump seal leakage is underway and the Unit 1 HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system as well as the other Unit 1 ECCS systems are operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"The Unit 1 HPCI system has been removed from service and secured. Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the HPCI main pump leakage. The HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 7/31/08 AT 1447 EDT FROM TURKAL TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The HPCI pump uses seal purge water piping in combination with mechanical seals to limit shaft leakage. Investigation of this event found that inadequate post-maintenance venting of piping between the discharge of the HPCI booster pump and the suction of the HPCI main pump led to the seal faces overheating and subsequent failure. The failure of the seal and the leakage associated with it would not have prevented HPCI from performing its required functions. Water intrusion into the oil system is the limiting impact of the seal failure. The HPCI main pump seal failure event has been evaluated and it was determined that, given a worst-case seal failure, the HPCI pump would be able to operate for greater than the required 4.1 hours and, thereby, satisfy its accident, as well as transient, response requirements. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 277188.
"The NRC resident was notified of this retraction."
The R2DO (Henson) has been notified.
"On 04/29/08 at approximately 2313 during testing of the Unit 1 HPCI system, a main pump seal developed a leak requiring the HPCI system to be secured. HPCI testing was in progress per OPT 09.2, HPCI System Operability Test, following recent Unit 1 refueling outage. At the time of discovery, the Unit 1 HPCI system had been declared inoperable due to surveillance testing activities which removed HPCI from the standby lineup. When the pump seal leak developed, operators secured HPCI and isolated the leak by closing the pump suction isolation valves and the keep fill supply valves. Investigation into the cause of the pump seal leakage is underway and the Unit 1 HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system as well as the other Unit 1 ECCS systems are operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"The Unit 1 HPCI system has been removed from service and secured. Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the HPCI main pump leakage. The HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 7/31/08 AT 1447 EDT FROM TURKAL TO HUFFMAN * * *
"The HPCI pump uses seal purge water piping in combination with mechanical seals to limit shaft leakage. Investigation of this event found that inadequate post-maintenance venting of piping between the discharge of the HPCI booster pump and the suction of the HPCI main pump led to the seal faces overheating and subsequent failure. The failure of the seal and the leakage associated with it would not have prevented HPCI from performing its required functions. Water intrusion into the oil system is the limiting impact of the seal failure. The HPCI main pump seal failure event has been evaluated and it was determined that, given a worst-case seal failure, the HPCI pump would be able to operate for greater than the required 4.1 hours and, thereby, satisfy its accident, as well as transient, response requirements. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Investigation of this condition is documented in the corrective action program in Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 277188.
"The NRC resident was notified of this retraction."
The R2DO (Henson) has been notified.