Event Notification Report for April 25, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/24/2008 - 04/25/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
4417644167441684416944170441714416544166
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44176
Rep Org: WALMART
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 1
City: COLONIAL HEIGHTS State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICH DAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 1
City: COLONIAL HEIGHTS State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICH DAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
MARIE MILLER (R1)
TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS CRUSHED IN TRASH COMPACTOR
The licensee reported that one of their employees placed two tritium exit signs in a trash compactor at one of their stores and compacted them. The licensee has tagged out the affected trash compactor and notified representatives of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Region I. The signs are approximately 11.5 Curies each. The Commonwealth is sending representatives to evaluate the radiological condition and assist in the removal and disposal of the devices.
The licensee notified Region 1(Joustra).
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The licensee reported that one of their employees placed two tritium exit signs in a trash compactor at one of their stores and compacted them. The licensee has tagged out the affected trash compactor and notified representatives of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Region I. The signs are approximately 11.5 Curies each. The Commonwealth is sending representatives to evaluate the radiological condition and assist in the removal and disposal of the devices.
The licensee notified Region 1(Joustra).
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44167
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: APPLIED TESTING AND GEOTESTING
Region: 1
City: BRIDGEPORT State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30701-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: APPLIED TESTING AND GEOTESTING
Region: 1
City: BRIDGEPORT State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30701-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2008
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
ILTAB via email
JOHN WHITE (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
ILTAB via email
PENNSYLVANIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"The RSO for Applied Testing and Authorities (37-30701-01), Bridgeport, [PA] reported [to the State of PA] that their Troxler Model 3411 portable moisture-density gauge, containing about Cs-137 (44mCi) and Am-241 (9 mCi), was stolen from a street outside an employee's home at 502 Dickinson Street in Philadelphia. It was stolen between 8:30 last night and 6:45 this morning. The RSO indicated that the gauge was stolen from a locked box which was double-chained to a flat-bed truck. It was noticed that the gauge was missing this morning.
"The Philadelphia Police Department was notified of the incident by the licensee and has responded to the area.
"[State of PA] will be doing an inspection of the licensee this afternoon."
** UPDATE FROM DAVID ALLARD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 10:16 EDT ON 05/23/08 **
State connected with Philadelphia Police detective and licensee's RP Manager. The police have the Troxler gauge. Licensee's staff will go into town to make sure the gauge isn't damaged and leaking, and then take it back to their shop and secure it.
Notified R1DO (Mel Gray) FSME DO (Patrice Bubar), ILTAB (Matt Hahn) via email
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The State provided the following information via email:
"The RSO for Applied Testing and Authorities (37-30701-01), Bridgeport, [PA] reported [to the State of PA] that their Troxler Model 3411 portable moisture-density gauge, containing about Cs-137 (44mCi) and Am-241 (9 mCi), was stolen from a street outside an employee's home at 502 Dickinson Street in Philadelphia. It was stolen between 8:30 last night and 6:45 this morning. The RSO indicated that the gauge was stolen from a locked box which was double-chained to a flat-bed truck. It was noticed that the gauge was missing this morning.
"The Philadelphia Police Department was notified of the incident by the licensee and has responded to the area.
"[State of PA] will be doing an inspection of the licensee this afternoon."
** UPDATE FROM DAVID ALLARD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 10:16 EDT ON 05/23/08 **
State connected with Philadelphia Police detective and licensee's RP Manager. The police have the Troxler gauge. Licensee's staff will go into town to make sure the gauge isn't damaged and leaking, and then take it back to their shop and secure it.
Notified R1DO (Mel Gray) FSME DO (Patrice Bubar), ILTAB (Matt Hahn) via email
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44168
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN FEIGL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN FEIGL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
NON-CONSERVATIVE CORE SPRAY FLOW IN DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION LOCA ANALYSIS
"Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has been informed of a change in the vendor calculation of Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 2. On April 24, 2008, Westinghouse initially notified EGC of a potential non-conservatism with respect to the assumed core spray (CS) flow in the Westinghouse 10 CFR 50, Appendix K LOCA analysis for DNPS Unit 2. Based on further discussions with Westinghouse, EGC confirmed the error on April 25, 2008, at 1130. In selecting the limiting plant configuration for the DNPS Appendix K LOCA model, Westinghouse used the net flow at the CS sparger, instead of the runout flow minus leakage outside the shroud. As a result, Westinghouse used an incorrect input for CS flow for the ECCS LOCA analysis.
"Westinghouse has evaluated the impact of correcting the assumed CS flow on the DNPS Unit 2 limiting large break LOCA analysis. Preliminary results indicate an increase of 80 degrees F in the PCT value. This results in a final PCT value of 2230 degrees F, which is in excess of 10 CFR 50.46 (b)(1) limits. However, preliminary calculation results also indicate that a 3 percent reduction in the MAPLGHR limit would offset the 80 degree F increase in the limiting PCT. Dresden Unit 2 has been operating with more than 3 percent margin in MAPLHGR since November 2007 (i.e., the start of the current operating cycle - D2C21).
"Administrative limits wilt be established to maintain these margins.
"The LOCA analysis of record for DNPS Unit 3 utilizes the correct CS shroud leakage and CS flow delivered to the vessel through the CS sparger. Therefore, this non-conservatism does not affect DNPS Unit 3.
"Currently, there is sufficient operating margin for DNPS Unit 2 to ensure the PCT limit would not be exceeded. There are no other 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS criteria for DNPS Unit 2 that are impacted.
"This notification is being made as a result of the 10 CFR 50.45 (a)(3)(ii) requirement to report this issue in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (i.e., 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has been informed of a change in the vendor calculation of Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 2. On April 24, 2008, Westinghouse initially notified EGC of a potential non-conservatism with respect to the assumed core spray (CS) flow in the Westinghouse 10 CFR 50, Appendix K LOCA analysis for DNPS Unit 2. Based on further discussions with Westinghouse, EGC confirmed the error on April 25, 2008, at 1130. In selecting the limiting plant configuration for the DNPS Appendix K LOCA model, Westinghouse used the net flow at the CS sparger, instead of the runout flow minus leakage outside the shroud. As a result, Westinghouse used an incorrect input for CS flow for the ECCS LOCA analysis.
"Westinghouse has evaluated the impact of correcting the assumed CS flow on the DNPS Unit 2 limiting large break LOCA analysis. Preliminary results indicate an increase of 80 degrees F in the PCT value. This results in a final PCT value of 2230 degrees F, which is in excess of 10 CFR 50.46 (b)(1) limits. However, preliminary calculation results also indicate that a 3 percent reduction in the MAPLGHR limit would offset the 80 degree F increase in the limiting PCT. Dresden Unit 2 has been operating with more than 3 percent margin in MAPLHGR since November 2007 (i.e., the start of the current operating cycle - D2C21).
"Administrative limits wilt be established to maintain these margins.
"The LOCA analysis of record for DNPS Unit 3 utilizes the correct CS shroud leakage and CS flow delivered to the vessel through the CS sparger. Therefore, this non-conservatism does not affect DNPS Unit 3.
"Currently, there is sufficient operating margin for DNPS Unit 2 to ensure the PCT limit would not be exceeded. There are no other 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS criteria for DNPS Unit 2 that are impacted.
"This notification is being made as a result of the 10 CFR 50.45 (a)(3)(ii) requirement to report this issue in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (i.e., 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)).
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44169
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SEMETER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 22:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 17:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM OUTAGE
"Limerick Generating Station experienced a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which provides real time plant data to the NRC Operations Center, from approximately 17:30 until 21:30 on 4/25/08. The plant monitoring system (PMS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) in the main control room were functional for the duration that ERDS was out of service, providing the Limerick Operators with all required data for monitoring the plant had an actual event occurred. In addition, all external phone lines were functioning to allow contact with the NRC Operations Center had an actual event occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Limerick Generating Station experienced a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), which provides real time plant data to the NRC Operations Center, from approximately 17:30 until 21:30 on 4/25/08. The plant monitoring system (PMS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) in the main control room were functional for the duration that ERDS was out of service, providing the Limerick Operators with all required data for monitoring the plant had an actual event occurred. In addition, all external phone lines were functioning to allow contact with the NRC Operations Center had an actual event occurred."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44170
Rep Org: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABS
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABS
Region: 4
City: PEARL CITY State: HI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RONALD PICKERING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING LABS
Region: 4
City: PEARL CITY State: HI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RONALD PICKERING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 22:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2008
Notification Time: 22:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
LOST TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE
A technician for the licensee was taking asphalt density measurements at the Lua Lua Lei Naval Magazine Base in Hawaii. He was using a Troxler 3450 gauge (nominal 8 mCuries Cs-137 and 40 mCuries Am-241/Be) which was placed in the back of his pickup truck in anticipation of taking additional measurements. He was subsequently informed that no additional density measurements were needed. He completed his paper work and got into his truck and drove off the site. He drove about 1 mile before he realized that he had not secured the gauge in the back of the truck. He stopped and discovered the gauge was missing and had apparently fallen out of the truck bed. He retraced his route but was not able to locate the gauge.
The RSO is in the process of requesting assistance from local authorities in helping to locate the missing gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM R. PICKERING TO JOE O'HARA AT 1646 ON 4/28/08 * * *
The Troxler gauge was found in a brush area near the side of the road. The case is damaged, and the RSO will be performing a radiological assessment of the damaged case and reporting the results to Troxler for further shipping instructions.
Notified R4DO(Pick), FSME(Hsueh), and ILTAB (e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
A technician for the licensee was taking asphalt density measurements at the Lua Lua Lei Naval Magazine Base in Hawaii. He was using a Troxler 3450 gauge (nominal 8 mCuries Cs-137 and 40 mCuries Am-241/Be) which was placed in the back of his pickup truck in anticipation of taking additional measurements. He was subsequently informed that no additional density measurements were needed. He completed his paper work and got into his truck and drove off the site. He drove about 1 mile before he realized that he had not secured the gauge in the back of the truck. He stopped and discovered the gauge was missing and had apparently fallen out of the truck bed. He retraced his route but was not able to locate the gauge.
The RSO is in the process of requesting assistance from local authorities in helping to locate the missing gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM R. PICKERING TO JOE O'HARA AT 1646 ON 4/28/08 * * *
The Troxler gauge was found in a brush area near the side of the road. The case is damaged, and the RSO will be performing a radiological assessment of the damaged case and reporting the results to Troxler for further shipping instructions.
Notified R4DO(Pick), FSME(Hsueh), and ILTAB (e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44171
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN BRUCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN BRUCK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/26/2008
Notification Time: 05:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2008
Notification Time: 05:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
NON-ISOLABLE RCS BOUNDARY LEAKAGE FROM INSTRUMENT LINE
"On April 25, 2008, DC Cook Unit 1 was in Mode 4 heating up the RCS after a refueling outage. Personnel were performing a containment walkdown, with the RCS at 1000 psig, looking for leakage. Wisps of steam were seen coming from a 3/4 inch RCS flow instrument line weld, between the RCS loop piping and the instrument isolation valve. The leakage is less than 0.1 gpm. The leakage can not be isolated from the RCS and has been declared to be RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage. Entry into the RCS Operational Leakage Technical Specification, 3.4.13, was made at 2210 on April 25, 2008. This Technical Specification requires being in Mode 5 within 36 hours.
"The plant is cooling down and depressurizing as required by Technical Specifications.
"The plant is currently evaluating the appropriate repair method for this condition.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"On April 25, 2008, DC Cook Unit 1 was in Mode 4 heating up the RCS after a refueling outage. Personnel were performing a containment walkdown, with the RCS at 1000 psig, looking for leakage. Wisps of steam were seen coming from a 3/4 inch RCS flow instrument line weld, between the RCS loop piping and the instrument isolation valve. The leakage is less than 0.1 gpm. The leakage can not be isolated from the RCS and has been declared to be RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage. Entry into the RCS Operational Leakage Technical Specification, 3.4.13, was made at 2210 on April 25, 2008. This Technical Specification requires being in Mode 5 within 36 hours.
"The plant is cooling down and depressurizing as required by Technical Specifications.
"The plant is currently evaluating the appropriate repair method for this condition.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44165
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 02:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 02:56 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 4/24/2008 at 0110 CDT, a concern with the flexible connection alignment between heat exchangers on the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was identified. At the time this condition was identified the 'A' Diesel was out of service for outage maintenance activities. During evaluation of this condition, and discussions with the vendor supplier for this flexible connection, additional questions arose and the condition of the identical connections on the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was questioned. Inspection of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator identified a similar problem, and at 0256 CDT on 4/25/2008, the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable, and the Plant entered TS 3.8.2, Condition B, for one required Diesel Generator being inoperable. All required actions regarding TS 3.8.2 have been complied with.
"The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator is still considered to be functional, and remains aligned for automatic start. The 'A' EDG is currently tagged out and work is ongoing to correct the alignment issue. Upon completion of repair to the 'A' EDG it will be restored to operation and the 'B' EDG will be removed from service to correct the alignment issue.
"The plant is currently in Mode 6, with RCS level greater than 23 feet above the Reactor Vessel Flange, and both required Offsite Power Sources remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LANCE LANE TO JASON KOZAL AT 1254 ON 6/22/08 * * *
"Testing, conducted by the vendor, was performed on the flexible connections in the configuration found at Wolf Creek and in a worst case configuration. The joints were tested, up to design pressure with a joint movement equivalent to a design bases earthquake, without failing. Additionally, the joints were pressurized to burst pressure, which was determined to be greater than 5 times the design pressure of the connection. The testing showed that even though the joints were not installed in accordance with the vendor's recommendation they would have fulfilled their safety function as installed. Therefore, a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function did not exist. Wolf Creek is retracting the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).
"On 4/24/2008 at 0110 CDT, a concern with the flexible connection alignment between heat exchangers on the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator was identified. At the time this condition was identified the 'A' Diesel was out of service for outage maintenance activities. During evaluation of this condition, and discussions with the vendor supplier for this flexible connection, additional questions arose and the condition of the identical connections on the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was questioned. Inspection of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator identified a similar problem, and at 0256 CDT on 4/25/2008, the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable, and the Plant entered TS 3.8.2, Condition B, for one required Diesel Generator being inoperable. All required actions regarding TS 3.8.2 have been complied with.
"The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator is still considered to be functional, and remains aligned for automatic start. The 'A' EDG is currently tagged out and work is ongoing to correct the alignment issue. Upon completion of repair to the 'A' EDG it will be restored to operation and the 'B' EDG will be removed from service to correct the alignment issue.
"The plant is currently in Mode 6, with RCS level greater than 23 feet above the Reactor Vessel Flange, and both required Offsite Power Sources remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LANCE LANE TO JASON KOZAL AT 1254 ON 6/22/08 * * *
"Testing, conducted by the vendor, was performed on the flexible connections in the configuration found at Wolf Creek and in a worst case configuration. The joints were tested, up to design pressure with a joint movement equivalent to a design bases earthquake, without failing. Additionally, the joints were pressurized to burst pressure, which was determined to be greater than 5 times the design pressure of the connection. The testing showed that even though the joints were not installed in accordance with the vendor's recommendation they would have fulfilled their safety function as installed. Therefore, a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function did not exist. Wolf Creek is retracting the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44166
Rep Org: HIGH MOUNTAIN INSPECTION SERVICES
Licensee: HIGH MOUNTAIN INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: CASPER State: WY
County:
License #: 49-26808-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MCMANUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: HIGH MOUNTAIN INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 4
City: CASPER State: WY
County:
License #: 49-26808-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MCMANUS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DURING MONTH OF FEBRUARY 2008
Landauer notified licensee today at 0840 MDT that a dosimetry badge worn by one of their employees in the month of February 2008 read 6429 mR. The employee only worked for 3 days on several jobs where he could have received radiation exposure during the month. The employee has been suspended from any further work that could cause additional exposure until the investigation is completed. The licensee's exposure records show that the employee only received 50 mR from pocket dosimeter. The licensee is launching an investigation as to where the potential overexposure may have occurred and compare to other personnel that worked on the same jobs. The licensee notified NRC Region IV personnel (V. Campbell).
Landauer notified licensee today at 0840 MDT that a dosimetry badge worn by one of their employees in the month of February 2008 read 6429 mR. The employee only worked for 3 days on several jobs where he could have received radiation exposure during the month. The employee has been suspended from any further work that could cause additional exposure until the investigation is completed. The licensee's exposure records show that the employee only received 50 mR from pocket dosimeter. The licensee is launching an investigation as to where the potential overexposure may have occurred and compare to other personnel that worked on the same jobs. The licensee notified NRC Region IV personnel (V. Campbell).