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Event Notification Report for April 22, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/21/2008 - 04/22/2008

EVENT NUMBERS
441544415544158

Power Reactor
Event Number: 44154
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1     State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL REED
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 04/22/2008
Notification Time: 12:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2008
Event Time: 08:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION DUE TO BLOWN FUSE

"At 0841, the Control Room received an alarm indicating an issue with the CD481 1E inverter. Upon walkdown, it was noted that the main power fuse had failed and the inverter channel was powered from a backup non-1E AC source. IAW HCGS procedures, the C EDG was declared inoperable because it would not start in response to a LOCA signal. Electrical output of the CD 481 inverter was available through the event and no transient or actuations occurred.

"All require Technical Specification surveillance tests for TS 3.8.1 were completed within the required time-frame.

"Additional equipment that was tagged for scheduled maintenance included the D EDG which is currently in an outage window and inoperable. This resulted in 2 of the 4 HCGS EDGs inoperable. With the C and D EDGs inoperable, both Control Room Emergency Filtration Systems (CREF) would be without diesel back-up power supplies in the event of a LOCA and thus inoperable. With no operable CREF systems, Technical specification 3.0.3 applies. A loss of both CREF systems would constitute a loss of function of a safety system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)).

"Replacement of the CD481 1E inverter main power fuse and assessment of inverter function was completed at 10:36. The inverter was placed back in its normal alignment. All related Technical Specification equipment is operable with the exception of the D EDG, which remains in the scheduled maintenance outage. "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44155
Rep Org: NTH CONSULTANTS
Licensee: NTH CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: GLASGOW   State: DE
County:
License #: 21-14894-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM PARSONS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 04/22/2008
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
Event Text
LOSS OF CONTROL OF TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The licensee employee transporting a Troxler moisture density gauge was transiting on DE 896 along Cobbler Creek Curve at approximately 2030 on 4/21/08 and was involved in a severe car accident. The State Police and emergency medical services responded to the scene. The employee was incapacitated and transported to the hospital. The responders were unaware of the presence of the Troxler and had the vehicle towed to a towing yard for storage.

The licensee RSO learned of the accident at approximately 1145 and immediately contacted the Delaware State Police and local law enforcement (Newcastle County Sheriff). The licensee was given the contact information of the towing yard and proceeded to contact the towing yard staff. The licensee informed the towing yard of the situation and requested that a visual inspection be performed of the external integrity of the container. The results of the inspection were that the gauge remains chained to the bed of the truck and the container appears to remain secure. The licensee requested that the towing yard keep the area around the vehicle clear of personnel. The company local RSO in Pennsylvania is enroute to the vehicle and will perform a field leak test on the gauge upon arrival.

Troxler information (SN 32643 - Source Strength 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am/Be).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 44158
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2     State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/23/2008
Notification Time: 08:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/22/2008
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
CHRISTOPHER REGAN (NMSS)
Event Text
IMPROPERLY INSTALLED STEEL ANGLE SUPPORTS ON FREEZER SUBLIMER VESSEL

"At 0900 CDT on 04-22-08, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the weight monitoring systems on vessels 2 on C-333 Unit 1 Cell 9, Unit 2 Cell 2, Unit 4 Cell 2 and Unit 4 Cell 9 freezer-sublimers showed weight changes when improperly installed steel angle supports welded to the vessel inlet piping were cut free. Each freezer sublimer vessel has a weight monitoring and trip system (high-high weight trip system) that prevents the over-filling of UF6 into the vessel. The high-high weight trip system is required by TSR 2.4.3.1 to prevent overfilling the freezer-sublimer vessels when in mode F/S 1 (freeze) or F/S 3 (cold standby). At the time of discovery, each freezer sublimer was in a non-applicable TSR mode F/S 6 (out-of-service). However, each freezer-sublimer has been routinely operated in TSR modes F/S 1 and F/S 3 over several years with the steel angle supports installed.

"The steel angle supports were likely installed to facilitate piping alignment during freezer-sublimer construction over fifteen years ago. The steel angle supports were not removed after construction. The presence of the steel angle supports may affect the performance the high-high weight trip system specified in TSR 2.4.3.1. All other installed freezer-sublimers were inspected and no additional steel angle supports were similarly connected. Engineering personnel are conducting a formal stress analysis to determine the stresses the steel supports may have had on the weight monitoring and trip system. There is no evidence that the weight limits specified in TSR 2.4.3.1 have been exceeded as a result of this issue.

"Pending further analysis, this event is conservatively being reported as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. "

PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-08-l 183; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-12; Worksheet No. 44158


The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

* * * RETRACTION ON 5/29/2008 AT 1815 FROM BILLY WALLACE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Retracted on 5/29/08, engineering calculations show that the error from the supports was less than the margin provided in the setpoint calculations."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Widman) and NMSS (Stablein).