Event Notification Report for April 17, 2008

24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING AN EXCESSIVELY LARGE CONTAINER FOUND IN A FISSILE CONTROL AREA

"An open and unattended Rad bag (greater than 5.5 gallon capacity), containing a valve stem fixture, was found in the C-400 G-17 valve disassembly FCA (Fissile Control Area) in violation of NCSA GEN-015. NCSA GEN-015 limits the volume of portable containers taken into an FCA to less than 5.5-gallons. The purpose of the requirement is to limit the accumulation of fissile waste to approved containers. Although NCSA GEN-029 allows the use of larger than 5.5-gallon containers for small equipment items, these containers are required to be fastened or taped closed or attended while open. This bag was not fastened / taped and was unattended.

"The valve stem fixture had been placed within the Rad bag for contamination control purposes while being transported into the area. The fixture contained no fissile material; there was no fissile equipment within the FCA; and no fissile work being performed within the FCA.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-1 147; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-11."

WASHINGTON AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION ON A TRANSPORT TRAILER

The following information was received from the State of Washington via e-mail:

"Tritium (H-3) contamination was found on a trailer in the outside storage area of Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW), a radioactive material licensee in Richland Washington on April 17. A DOH inspector noticed liquid dripping from a trailer that had just been unloaded. The trailer had hauled empty radioactive waste drums from Atomic Energy Limited Canada (Chalk River facility in Ontario). The transport vehicle entered the United States at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan under a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) import license and entered Washington at Spokane. The shipment had arrived at the PFNW facility in late February. It was manifested as a plastic fiber bag with drums inside. Initial surveys on February 28 noted tritium contamination inside the plastic fiber bag, but no contamination was noted outside the bag or on the trailer. Tritium was a primary radionuclide on the manifest. During off-loading of the drums and plastic liner on April 17, liquid was found in and on the drums (one drum is suspected of being at least partially filled with liquid). After off-loading, standing liquids were noticed by the licensee on the inside trailer bed, but not on the outer trailer floor and skin. After the truck was returned to the storage yard, liquid droplets were found dripping from the front of the trailer by the DOH inspector. Initial contamination levels (up to 1.8 million dpm of tritium) on the trailer front were substantially above the U.S. Dept of Transportation limits; but due to the limited quantity (less than one gallon of liquid), does not pose a health risk. There is no indication of leakage during the actual shipment.

"The manifest indicated the total shipment contained H-3 (6.59 mCi) and Cs-137 (7.79 mCi) as the predominant radionuclides. Only tritium contamination has been noted."

WA Report # WA-08-025

* * * UPDATE FROM MIKEL ELSEN TO KARL DIEDERICH VIA E-MAIL AT 1538 ON 6/11/08 * * *

The trailer was decontaminated and the associated waste will be disposed or processed. The soil under the trailer was removed and packaged for treatment or disposal. The shipper and broker were issued notices of violation. The cause of this incident was poor oversight during packaging.

Notified R4DO (G. Miller) and FSME EO (A. Mauer).

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MALFUNCTION

This "incident occurred on April 15, 2008 at about 8:20 PM at a new [non-nuclear] power plant under construction. Team Industrial Services was performing industrial radiography on Unit 1. The radiography was being performed on elevation 807 on a header approximately 4 foot off of the roof of the boiler.

"According to statements from the crew, they had exposed the source on their first shot of the pipe weld, and approximately 15 seconds into the shot they heard what they thought was the guide tube and collimator faillng off the pipe to the roof of the boiler. They then went to retract the source back into the exposure device and encountered an obstruction preventing the source from being retracted into a secured position in the exposure device. They attempted [to retract the source] three times with no success.

"The industrial radiographer contacted the facility radiation safety officer and advised him that he had a source he could not retract back into the exposure device. The industrial radiographer extended the radiation safety boundaries above and below the area. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) advised [the radiographer] that he was on his way to the site.

"The RSO arrived at the site at approximately 9:00 PM. At this time an initial assessment was made and a decision was made to bring in two more trained technicians to assist with boundary control and retrieval of the sealed source. After arrival of the extra technicians, a plan for retrieval was discussed with all technicians, including the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer.

"The industrial radiographer stated that his pocket dosimeter had gone 'off scale.' This means that he could have received a dose of at least 200 millirems of radiation. At this time he was advised that he would not be assisting with the retrieval but he continued to assist with boundary control. The licensee has estimated that the industrial radiographer received 630 mR.

"At approximately 11:35 PM, the shielding of the source and attempt to repair the guide tube commenced. Four lead shot bags were placed over the end of the guide tube where the sealed source was known to be. The radiation levels were reduced to 15 millirems per hour at five feet from the source under the lead shot bags. The RSO then approached the guide tube with a pair of pliers, located the distortion in the guide tube and rounded it with the pliers. He then returned to the crank assembly and retracted the source successfully back into the exposure device. The RSO is estimated to have received 32 mR from conducting the repair.

"A determination was made that there was not an equipment failure, it was a result of the guide tube falling from the pipe to the roof of the boiler that damaged the guide tube resulting in the obstruction. Boundaries were maintained throughout the incident to ensure that at no time any member of the general public could enter the incident area.

"DHFS plans to investigate this incident on the next inspection (to be conducted in the near future)."

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST TROXLER GAUGE

The licensee provided the following information via email:

After completing a job a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (Model number 3430, Serial Number 34618) was loaded into the back of the licensee's truck and not secured. The unsecured gauge fell out of the truck in transit from the job site. The licensee discovered the gauge missing and notified supervision.

The licensee notified the local police department and is actively searching for the gauge. The licensee plans to offer a reward for return of the missing gauge. The State of Florida is further investigating the incident.

* * * UPDATE FROM ADAMS TO CROUCH (VIA EMAIL) ON 04/21/08 @ 1334 EDT * * *

"Florida incident FL08-060 which was reported and occurred on April 17, 2008 involved a lost Troxler gauge. It was recovered today. A gentleman found it at the intersection of 40th St. and 38th Ave. in Coral Gables on Thursday, the day it was lost. He finally called the licensee today and the licensee took possession of it about 10:30 this morning. It is undamaged."

Notified R1DO (White) and FSME EO (Burgess).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.