Event Notification Report for April 03, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/02/2008 - 04/03/2008
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 44117
Rep Org: PONZE I&M ENGINEERING LAB, INC.
Licensee: PONZE I&M ENGINEERING LAB, INC.
Region: 1
City: COTO LAUREL State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24908-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSE IRIZARRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: PONZE I&M ENGINEERING LAB, INC.
Region: 1
City: COTO LAUREL State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24908-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSE IRIZARRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/03/2008
Notification Time: 08:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2008
Notification Time: 08:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail)
SAM HANSELL (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail)
STOLEN CPN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The licensee Radiation Safety Officer reported that a company pick-up truck, that had a moisture density gauge stored in the bed, was stolen from in front of the apartment complex of the Authorized User. The apartment was located in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, which is remotely located from the licensee home office located in Coto Laurel, Puerto Rico.
The gauge is a CPN Model MC-1DRP, S/N 60703285, which contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am: Be. The gauge was last leak checked on October 15, 2007. The gauge was secured to the truck in a metal case mounted to the chassis of the truck and secured with the gauge lock, the gauge case lock and two locks on the metal storage case.
The stolen truck was a white 1996 Ford Ranger pick-up with Puerto Rican tag number 557-167.
The licensee notified the Puerto Rico State Police of the theft of the truck and gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOSE IRIZARRY TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 04/05/08 @ 0809 HRS EDT * * *
Mr. Jose Irizarry, RSO for Ponze, reported that at 0430 EDT he was notified by Puerto Rico State Police that they had recovered the moisture density gauge in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The gauge was still locked in its storage container and was returned to the Authorized User.
Notified R1DO (Hansell), FSME (White) and ILTAB (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The licensee Radiation Safety Officer reported that a company pick-up truck, that had a moisture density gauge stored in the bed, was stolen from in front of the apartment complex of the Authorized User. The apartment was located in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, which is remotely located from the licensee home office located in Coto Laurel, Puerto Rico.
The gauge is a CPN Model MC-1DRP, S/N 60703285, which contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am: Be. The gauge was last leak checked on October 15, 2007. The gauge was secured to the truck in a metal case mounted to the chassis of the truck and secured with the gauge lock, the gauge case lock and two locks on the metal storage case.
The stolen truck was a white 1996 Ford Ranger pick-up with Puerto Rican tag number 557-167.
The licensee notified the Puerto Rico State Police of the theft of the truck and gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOSE IRIZARRY TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 04/05/08 @ 0809 HRS EDT * * *
Mr. Jose Irizarry, RSO for Ponze, reported that at 0430 EDT he was notified by Puerto Rico State Police that they had recovered the moisture density gauge in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The gauge was still locked in its storage container and was returned to the Authorized User.
Notified R1DO (Hansell), FSME (White) and ILTAB (via e-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44118
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/03/2008
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2008
Notification Time: 14:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1)
SAM HANSELL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ABILITY TO TELEPHONE OUT OF STATE
"When it was discovered that numerous plant personnel could not make telephone calls out of state, attempts were made to contact the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, as well as the NRC through the FTS phone. The NRC, as well as the state of Vermont were contacted but the NAS phone system was inoperable as well as the land lines to the states of NH and MA. Alternate means to contact the states were available via the microwave system."
At 1430 all communications that were lost were restored. At 1445 all testing of communications were completed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"When it was discovered that numerous plant personnel could not make telephone calls out of state, attempts were made to contact the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, as well as the NRC through the FTS phone. The NRC, as well as the state of Vermont were contacted but the NAS phone system was inoperable as well as the land lines to the states of NH and MA. Alternate means to contact the states were available via the microwave system."
At 1430 all communications that were lost were restored. At 1445 all testing of communications were completed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44211
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 05/13/2008
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 06:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2008
Notification Time: 19:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/03/2008
Event Time: 06:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF A SBGT DURING ANNUNCIATOR TEST
"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is making a telephone report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) Invalid Partial Actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment and Secondary Containment Isolation Systems due to an inappropriate operator action. This report is being made in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report.
"At 0825 on 04/03/2008, an operator was performing an annunciator test of the Control Room panels and inappropriately pushed the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment system 'Test' pushbutton instead of the 'Lamp Test' pushbutton. He then immediately pushed the 'Reset' pushbutton which reset the Standby Gas Treatment train. The inappropriate actuation of the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment System resulted in the 'A' train momentarily starting, causing ventilation fans V-EF-10 and V-MZ-6 to trip. The immediate resetting of the system by depressing the 'Reset' pushbutton prevented a full secondary containment isolation.
"All systems started and functioned successfully.
"The cause of the invalid signal was the operator actuating the system by depressing the 'Test' pushbutton instead of the 'Lamp Test' pushbutton.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event report."
After the invalid actuation was completed, all systems affected were reset and returned to normal lineup.
"Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is making a telephone report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) Invalid Partial Actuation of the Standby Gas Treatment and Secondary Containment Isolation Systems due to an inappropriate operator action. This report is being made in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report.
"At 0825 on 04/03/2008, an operator was performing an annunciator test of the Control Room panels and inappropriately pushed the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment system 'Test' pushbutton instead of the 'Lamp Test' pushbutton. He then immediately pushed the 'Reset' pushbutton which reset the Standby Gas Treatment train. The inappropriate actuation of the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment System resulted in the 'A' train momentarily starting, causing ventilation fans V-EF-10 and V-MZ-6 to trip. The immediate resetting of the system by depressing the 'Reset' pushbutton prevented a full secondary containment isolation.
"All systems started and functioned successfully.
"The cause of the invalid signal was the operator actuating the system by depressing the 'Test' pushbutton instead of the 'Lamp Test' pushbutton.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event report."
After the invalid actuation was completed, all systems affected were reset and returned to normal lineup.