Event Notification Report for March 31, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/30/2008 - 03/31/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
44113441084410944111
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44113
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TIGUE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: GLENWOOD State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0867
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: TIGUE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: GLENWOOD State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0867
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/01/2008
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
RYAN LANTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from the State of Arkansas via email (quotations omitted for readability):
The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, is reporting that one of their licensees, Tigue Construction Company, Inc., has a Troxler moisture/density gauge that is stolen/missing from a pickup truck some time during the day in or near Brinkley, Arkansas. The licensee became aware of the missing gauge at 15:30 on March 31, 2008 after loading the gauge in the truck at the office in Glenwood, Arkansas that morning. The licensee has stated that the gauge, transport case and chains are missing. The licensee made one stop in Little Rock and observed that gauge in the truck during that stop. The licensee has filed a police report with the Brinkley Police Department.
The Troxler gauge is a Model 3440, S/N 27381, and contains 40 milliCuries of Am-241:Be and 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137.
The Arkansas Department of Health prepared a press release on the event.
The licensee verbally indicated that the gauge was properly secured in the truck at the time. The Arkansas Department of Health is investigating the circumstances surrounding this event.
Arkansas Department of Health notified Brinkley Police Department, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management (Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Highway Patrol), State of Mississippi, State of Tennessee [and] NRC Region IV.
Arkansas has assigned Event Report ID No: AR-03-08-01
* * * UPDATE AT 1250 EDT ON 4/25/08 FROM MACK TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL * * *
"On April 17, 2008, the stolen Troxler Model 3440, Serial Number 27381, belonging to Tigue Construction, Inc., was retrieved from the Van Buren County Courthouse in Clinton, AR.
"The gauge had been found in a ditch, by a citizen, approximately 2 weeks prior to April 17, 2008, and retrieved by the County Emergency Management Staff. Due to significant storms and flooding in the county the notification to Arkansas Dept. of Health was delayed. The gauge and transport case were found without any locks.
"It is unclear how the gauge arrived in Clinton, AR. After being stolen in Brinkley, AR. The distance is 140 miles.
"Health Physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health retrieved the gauge and stored it in the Department's Radioactive Material storage area. Field analysis indicated the gauge was not leaking.
"On April 21, 2008, a representative from Tigue Construction, Inc., retrieved the gauge from the Arkansas Department of Health and will conduct a leak test prior to returning the gauge to service.
The Department considers this event closed."
R4DO (Cain), FSME (Zelac) and ILTAB (via e-mail) were notified.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following information was received from the State of Arkansas via email (quotations omitted for readability):
The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, is reporting that one of their licensees, Tigue Construction Company, Inc., has a Troxler moisture/density gauge that is stolen/missing from a pickup truck some time during the day in or near Brinkley, Arkansas. The licensee became aware of the missing gauge at 15:30 on March 31, 2008 after loading the gauge in the truck at the office in Glenwood, Arkansas that morning. The licensee has stated that the gauge, transport case and chains are missing. The licensee made one stop in Little Rock and observed that gauge in the truck during that stop. The licensee has filed a police report with the Brinkley Police Department.
The Troxler gauge is a Model 3440, S/N 27381, and contains 40 milliCuries of Am-241:Be and 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137.
The Arkansas Department of Health prepared a press release on the event.
The licensee verbally indicated that the gauge was properly secured in the truck at the time. The Arkansas Department of Health is investigating the circumstances surrounding this event.
Arkansas Department of Health notified Brinkley Police Department, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management (Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Highway Patrol), State of Mississippi, State of Tennessee [and] NRC Region IV.
Arkansas has assigned Event Report ID No: AR-03-08-01
* * * UPDATE AT 1250 EDT ON 4/25/08 FROM MACK TO HUFFMAN VIA E-MAIL * * *
"On April 17, 2008, the stolen Troxler Model 3440, Serial Number 27381, belonging to Tigue Construction, Inc., was retrieved from the Van Buren County Courthouse in Clinton, AR.
"The gauge had been found in a ditch, by a citizen, approximately 2 weeks prior to April 17, 2008, and retrieved by the County Emergency Management Staff. Due to significant storms and flooding in the county the notification to Arkansas Dept. of Health was delayed. The gauge and transport case were found without any locks.
"It is unclear how the gauge arrived in Clinton, AR. After being stolen in Brinkley, AR. The distance is 140 miles.
"Health Physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health retrieved the gauge and stored it in the Department's Radioactive Material storage area. Field analysis indicated the gauge was not leaking.
"On April 21, 2008, a representative from Tigue Construction, Inc., retrieved the gauge from the Arkansas Department of Health and will conduct a leak test prior to returning the gauge to service.
The Department considers this event closed."
R4DO (Cain), FSME (Zelac) and ILTAB (via e-mail) were notified.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44108
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/31/2008
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2008
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO MINOR GAS SPILL
"At or about 0800 on 3/31/08 it was reported that a petroleum sheen was observed in the parking lot headed for the creek. Upon investigation from the responding spill team and Maintenance, the source of the sheen was found to be coming from an employee's vehicle. It was a very minor drip of petroleum (less than 1/2 cup) that was pushed by the rain to the soil and storm catch basin. A boom was put in place to avoid the sheen from entering the creek. The parking lot and soil were cleaned and a catch device was placed under the vehicle. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) - Avon Spill Unit- was notified and assigned spill number 0751599 to the event. No further action is required."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At or about 0800 on 3/31/08 it was reported that a petroleum sheen was observed in the parking lot headed for the creek. Upon investigation from the responding spill team and Maintenance, the source of the sheen was found to be coming from an employee's vehicle. It was a very minor drip of petroleum (less than 1/2 cup) that was pushed by the rain to the soil and storm catch basin. A boom was put in place to avoid the sheen from entering the creek. The parking lot and soil were cleaned and a catch device was placed under the vehicle. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) - Avon Spill Unit- was notified and assigned spill number 0751599 to the event. No further action is required."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44109
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD TODD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD TODD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/31/2008
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 13:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2008
Notification Time: 17:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 13:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
"Event: At 1352 hours, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes.
"In an apparently unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours.
"Initial Safety Significance: There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable until the Lee gas turbine was aligned. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event.
"Corrective Action(s): Investigations are in progress as to the cause of the Reactor Trip and the KHU 1 lock out. Alignment of KHU 2 to the underground is currently on hold, pending evaluation of the problem which led to the KHU 1 lockout."
All control rods fully inserted with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1055 EDT ON 04/02/08 FROM COREY GRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
The licensee is retracting a portion of the original report identified under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on the following:
"Event: UPDATE:
"At 1352 hours, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes.
"In an unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker, ACB-1, failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed KHU 1 and the Overhead Power Path from service due to the failed ACB. Because KHU 1 was the unit aligned to the Underground Power Path, Operations declared that path inoperable also.
"This condition was initially reported as making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours. In this alignment, the Lee gas turbine provides the on-site emergency power function.
"A design feature allows a KHU to automatically align to the Underground Path when the unit originally aligned to that path has been locked out, the overhead path is locked out and an emergency start signal exists. Keowee Operations confirmed that during the lockout event the required lockout signals were present on KHU 1 such that KHU 2 would have aligned to the Underground Power Path if an emergency start demand had occurred. As a result, the Underground Power Path remained available during this event and there was no loss of safety function. Therefore the portion of the event related to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is RETRACTED.
"The Underground Power Path was administratively inoperable because a surveillance (SR 3.8.1.3) to verify operability of KHU 2 to the underground path, required per TS 3.8.1 Condition C.1, could not be performed. The surveillance procedure utilizes a normal start signal, which was inhibited by the lockout on the overhead path. The surveillance procedure does not include provisions for using an emergency start signal. At 1906 hours, after the overhead lockout had been reset, KHU 2 successfully completed an Operability test aligned to the Underground Power Path.
"Investigation determined that the failure of ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, was due to a terminal strip sliding link in the trip circuit being in an intermediate position. It was damaged during repair so the entire sliding link block was replaced. The unit was successfully tested connected to each power path and was declared Operable on 4-1-08 at approximately 0600 hours. At 0930 hours on 4-1-08 the standby bus was disconnected from Lee.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed the Overhead Power Path from service. The Lee gas turbine was aligned to energize the standby bus. Operations and Engineering subsequently confirmed that on-site emergency power remained available via KHU 2 and the Underground Power Path. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event.
"Corrective Action(s):
"Investigation as to the cause of the Reactor Trip continues. Unit 2 is now on-line at low power and is in the process of returning to full power.
"ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, terminal strip sliding link has been repaired/replaced; both KHUs have been tested and declared operable; the Lee gas turbine has been secured."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Evans).
"Event: At 1352 hours, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes.
"In an apparently unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours.
"Initial Safety Significance: There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed both the Overhead and Underground Power Paths from service, making on-site emergency power unavailable until the Lee gas turbine was aligned. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event.
"Corrective Action(s): Investigations are in progress as to the cause of the Reactor Trip and the KHU 1 lock out. Alignment of KHU 2 to the underground is currently on hold, pending evaluation of the problem which led to the KHU 1 lockout."
All control rods fully inserted with decay heat being removed via the turbine bypass valves.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1055 EDT ON 04/02/08 FROM COREY GRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
The licensee is retracting a portion of the original report identified under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on the following:
"Event: UPDATE:
"At 1352 hours, Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Trip due to a turbine trip. The indicated cause was low condenser vacuum. The exact cause is still under investigation but is believed to be related to a maintenance procedure in progress on the condenser vacuum instrumentation. Post-trip response was normal. Auxiliary power transferred to the start-up source (switchyard) as expected. Main Feedwater was not affected so there was no demand for Emergency Feedwater. A second High Pressure Injection pump was manually started per procedure to maintain Pressurizer level indication on scale. This is a routine action to compensate for post-trip RCS temperature and volume changes.
"In an unrelated event, Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) 1 and 2 were shutdown from commercial operation at approximately 1425 hours. During the shutdown, the KHU 1 output breaker, ACB-1, failed to open as expected and KHU 1 was manually locked out. The lockout removed KHU 1 and the Overhead Power Path from service due to the failed ACB. Because KHU 1 was the unit aligned to the Underground Power Path, Operations declared that path inoperable also.
"This condition was initially reported as making on-site emergency power unavailable to all three Oconee units. Per Tech Specs, a gas turbine unit at Lee Steam Station was started and used to energize the Oconee Standby Bus at 1518 hours. In this alignment, the Lee gas turbine provides the on-site emergency power function.
"A design feature allows a KHU to automatically align to the Underground Path when the unit originally aligned to that path has been locked out, the overhead path is locked out and an emergency start signal exists. Keowee Operations confirmed that during the lockout event the required lockout signals were present on KHU 1 such that KHU 2 would have aligned to the Underground Power Path if an emergency start demand had occurred. As a result, the Underground Power Path remained available during this event and there was no loss of safety function. Therefore the portion of the event related to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is RETRACTED.
"The Underground Power Path was administratively inoperable because a surveillance (SR 3.8.1.3) to verify operability of KHU 2 to the underground path, required per TS 3.8.1 Condition C.1, could not be performed. The surveillance procedure utilizes a normal start signal, which was inhibited by the lockout on the overhead path. The surveillance procedure does not include provisions for using an emergency start signal. At 1906 hours, after the overhead lockout had been reset, KHU 2 successfully completed an Operability test aligned to the Underground Power Path.
"Investigation determined that the failure of ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, was due to a terminal strip sliding link in the trip circuit being in an intermediate position. It was damaged during repair so the entire sliding link block was replaced. The unit was successfully tested connected to each power path and was declared Operable on 4-1-08 at approximately 0600 hours. At 0930 hours on 4-1-08 the standby bus was disconnected from Lee.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"There is little or no safety significance to the Unit trip. The subsequent KHU 1 lockout removed the Overhead Power Path from service. The Lee gas turbine was aligned to energize the standby bus. Operations and Engineering subsequently confirmed that on-site emergency power remained available via KHU 2 and the Underground Power Path. There was no demand for the Keowee emergency power function during either event.
"Corrective Action(s):
"Investigation as to the cause of the Reactor Trip continues. Unit 2 is now on-line at low power and is in the process of returning to full power.
"ACB-1, the output breaker for KHU 1, terminal strip sliding link has been repaired/replaced; both KHUs have been tested and declared operable; the Lee gas turbine has been secured."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Evans).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44111
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KIDDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT KIDDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/31/2008
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 15:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2008
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2008
Event Time: 15:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OHIO EPA CONCERNING NON-COMPLIANCE WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS
"At 1550 hours, a self identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), offices in Columbus, Ohio to inform them of the recent discovery of non-compliance issues relating to the accumulation, storage, and shipment (i.e., 90 days to ship) of hazardous waste (reference 40 CFR 261, 'Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste'). Guidance was requested from the state EPA for remediation and reporting of the condition. The Perry Nuclear Power Plant personnel were advised by the Ohio EPA to properly identify, package and ship the waste as soon as possible. The waste consists of three drums of floor grinding waste generated during the resurfacing of the Auxiliary Building floor in 2005, and approximately 100 bags of miscellaneous trash generated during disassembly of plant equipment in 2007. This issue was discovered during activities to prepare the waste for shipment off site. The waste will be shipped per the direction of the Ohio EPA and an out-of-cycle hazardous waste annual report will be made to the Ohio EPA.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency has been made. The resident inspector has been notified."
The hazardous material contains low level rad waste.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD O'CONNOR TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1334 HRS EDT ON 6/03/08 * * *
"On March 31, 2008, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification was made for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency was made. This report was made when a self-identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offices in Columbus, Ohio, for the discovery of potential non-compliance issues with 40 CFR 261 requirements for the accumulation, storage, and shipment of hazardous waste. Based on further investigation using a Toxicity Characterization Leachate Procedure analysis of the waste, it was determined that the waste was, in fact, non-hazardous and could be shipped for off-site disposal. The requirements of 40 CFR 261 had been and continue to be met."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Ohio. Notified R3DO ( Pelke).
"At 1550 hours, a self identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), offices in Columbus, Ohio to inform them of the recent discovery of non-compliance issues relating to the accumulation, storage, and shipment (i.e., 90 days to ship) of hazardous waste (reference 40 CFR 261, 'Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste'). Guidance was requested from the state EPA for remediation and reporting of the condition. The Perry Nuclear Power Plant personnel were advised by the Ohio EPA to properly identify, package and ship the waste as soon as possible. The waste consists of three drums of floor grinding waste generated during the resurfacing of the Auxiliary Building floor in 2005, and approximately 100 bags of miscellaneous trash generated during disassembly of plant equipment in 2007. This issue was discovered during activities to prepare the waste for shipment off site. The waste will be shipped per the direction of the Ohio EPA and an out-of-cycle hazardous waste annual report will be made to the Ohio EPA.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency has been made. The resident inspector has been notified."
The hazardous material contains low level rad waste.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICHARD O'CONNOR TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1334 HRS EDT ON 6/03/08 * * *
"On March 31, 2008, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), notification was made for an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to another government agency was made. This report was made when a self-identification call was made to the State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offices in Columbus, Ohio, for the discovery of potential non-compliance issues with 40 CFR 261 requirements for the accumulation, storage, and shipment of hazardous waste. Based on further investigation using a Toxicity Characterization Leachate Procedure analysis of the waste, it was determined that the waste was, in fact, non-hazardous and could be shipped for off-site disposal. The requirements of 40 CFR 261 had been and continue to be met."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Ohio. Notified R3DO ( Pelke).