Event Notification Report for March 17, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/16/2008 - 03/17/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
44072440754407044071
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44072
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAMASHEK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL DUE TO THE LOSS OF 'B' MAIN FEED WATER PUMP
"While operating at 100% rated thermal power in Mode 1, a Manual Reactor Trip was initiated due to the lowering of Steam Generator (S/G) level due to the loss of 'B' Main Feed Water Pump. Initial investigation indicates that the loss of XPB03 transformer caused the loss of Non-Class 1E 4160VAC PB03 and PB04. At the time of the event, bus PB04 was cross-tied with bus PB03 for scheduled maintenance of transformer XPB04. This caused loss of all condensate and heater drain pumps. A manual reactor trip was actuated in anticipation of an automatic reactor trip. Aux Feed auto actuation did occur as required. The Non-Safety Related Charging pump was lost due to the loss of PB03 and charging flow was re-established to the Reactor Coolant System by starting 'A' Charging pump. All other plant equipment functioned as required. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at 560 degrees F and 2235 psig. Continuing to investigate.
"At 15:03 CDT, plant experienced an auto Feed Water Isolation signal due to Low-Low S/G level. Feed Water Isolation had already occurred with the initial event but the signal had been previously been reset. Manual feed water flow control has been established from Aux Feed Water."
All control rods inserted into the core during the trip. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser using AFW to feed the steam generators. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads via the normal path.
NRC Resident has been notified.
"While operating at 100% rated thermal power in Mode 1, a Manual Reactor Trip was initiated due to the lowering of Steam Generator (S/G) level due to the loss of 'B' Main Feed Water Pump. Initial investigation indicates that the loss of XPB03 transformer caused the loss of Non-Class 1E 4160VAC PB03 and PB04. At the time of the event, bus PB04 was cross-tied with bus PB03 for scheduled maintenance of transformer XPB04. This caused loss of all condensate and heater drain pumps. A manual reactor trip was actuated in anticipation of an automatic reactor trip. Aux Feed auto actuation did occur as required. The Non-Safety Related Charging pump was lost due to the loss of PB03 and charging flow was re-established to the Reactor Coolant System by starting 'A' Charging pump. All other plant equipment functioned as required. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at 560 degrees F and 2235 psig. Continuing to investigate.
"At 15:03 CDT, plant experienced an auto Feed Water Isolation signal due to Low-Low S/G level. Feed Water Isolation had already occurred with the initial event but the signal had been previously been reset. Manual feed water flow control has been established from Aux Feed Water."
All control rods inserted into the core during the trip. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser using AFW to feed the steam generators. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. The electrical grid is stable and supplying plant safety loads via the normal path.
NRC Resident has been notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44075
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PARAMOUNT State: CA
County:
License #: 5474-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PARAMOUNT State: CA
County:
License #: 5474-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/18/2008
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2008
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
MARK DELLIGATTI (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHIPPING CONTAINER ARRIVED DAMAGED WITH SOURCE OUTSIDE OF PIG AND CONTAINER
The State of California Radiologic Health Branch provided the following information via email:
"The licensee shipped a nominal 123 mCi Co-60 source via FedEx in a Type A package from a temporary job site in the State of Washington to their office in Paramount, CA. Upon arrival at the Paramount office, the Type A shipping container was observed to have been damaged, and the Co-60 source was found out of its shielded pig, and outside of the Type A container. Calculation assuming a point source shows that the radiation levels would have been ~170 mr/hr at one meter, ~1.8 R/hr at one foot, and ~1700 R/hr at one centimeter from the source.
"The Type A container is constructed of steel, with an inner lead storage pig, and was secured to a wooden shipping pallet. The Type A container has a collar that extends above the lead pig. The cover for the lead pig is secured by a rod that fits through the steel collar. The rod is secured in place by a lock on the rod. Upon receipt of the Type A container at the Paramount, CA facility, the wooden pallet was missing, the lock on the securing rod was missing, the securing rod was not inserted in the holes in the steel collar (therefore it was not securing the cover to the lead pig), and although the inner lead pig cover was in place, the source was found lying on top of the lead pig within the steel collar portion of the Type A container. It is surmised that the Type A container was dropped on the lock during transportation, such that the lock broke, the securing rod was displaced, the cover came off the lead pig, and the source came out of the lead pig. Either the Co-60 source lodged in the steel collar at that time, or the source fell out and someone picked it up and placed it on top of the lead pig within the steel collar of the Type A container (the latter appears more likely). The source is located at one end of an ~3 inch long rod.
"The licensee notified FedEx of the event. FedEx's consultant is investigating to determine where and how the damage to the Type A container occurred, and to evaluate the exposures to FedEx personnel. Transportation occurred exclusively on FedEx conveyances, so no significant non-FedEx personnel exposure is expected to have resulted during transportation. A licensee employee reinserted the source in the lead pig before removing the Type A container from the FedEx delivery truck. In doing so he handled the non-source end of the source rod with his bare fingers, while wearing extremity dosimetry. Calculated extremity dose is 100 to 200 mrem based on a 5-10 second handling time."
CA Report Number 031708
The State of California Radiologic Health Branch provided the following information via email:
"The licensee shipped a nominal 123 mCi Co-60 source via FedEx in a Type A package from a temporary job site in the State of Washington to their office in Paramount, CA. Upon arrival at the Paramount office, the Type A shipping container was observed to have been damaged, and the Co-60 source was found out of its shielded pig, and outside of the Type A container. Calculation assuming a point source shows that the radiation levels would have been ~170 mr/hr at one meter, ~1.8 R/hr at one foot, and ~1700 R/hr at one centimeter from the source.
"The Type A container is constructed of steel, with an inner lead storage pig, and was secured to a wooden shipping pallet. The Type A container has a collar that extends above the lead pig. The cover for the lead pig is secured by a rod that fits through the steel collar. The rod is secured in place by a lock on the rod. Upon receipt of the Type A container at the Paramount, CA facility, the wooden pallet was missing, the lock on the securing rod was missing, the securing rod was not inserted in the holes in the steel collar (therefore it was not securing the cover to the lead pig), and although the inner lead pig cover was in place, the source was found lying on top of the lead pig within the steel collar portion of the Type A container. It is surmised that the Type A container was dropped on the lock during transportation, such that the lock broke, the securing rod was displaced, the cover came off the lead pig, and the source came out of the lead pig. Either the Co-60 source lodged in the steel collar at that time, or the source fell out and someone picked it up and placed it on top of the lead pig within the steel collar of the Type A container (the latter appears more likely). The source is located at one end of an ~3 inch long rod.
"The licensee notified FedEx of the event. FedEx's consultant is investigating to determine where and how the damage to the Type A container occurred, and to evaluate the exposures to FedEx personnel. Transportation occurred exclusively on FedEx conveyances, so no significant non-FedEx personnel exposure is expected to have resulted during transportation. A licensee employee reinserted the source in the lead pig before removing the Type A container from the FedEx delivery truck. In doing so he handled the non-source end of the source rod with his bare fingers, while wearing extremity dosimetry. Calculated extremity dose is 100 to 200 mrem based on a 5-10 second handling time."
CA Report Number 031708
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44070
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 11:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2008
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 11:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
NEIL PERRY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At approximately 1200 hours, on 03/17/2008, the Unit 1 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to connect a temporary power supply to support a planned maintenance outage on the PICSY [Plant Indication Computer System] computer normal power supply. The installation of temporary power is expected to have a duration greater than 8 hours, but less than 24. During this time, control room hardwire indications will be available. An update will be provided when SPDS/ERDS becomes available.
"Since the Unit 1 SPDS/ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1222 HRS. EDT ON 03/18/08 * * *
"This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. Unit 1 ERDS has been restored as PICSY is now on temporary power. Restoration to normal power is expected to occur on 3/21/08. SPDS remains out of service due to other planned outage activities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Perry).
* * * UPDATE FROM JIM HUFFORD TO JOHN KNOKE @ 0530 HRS. EDT ON 03/21/08 * * *
"This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. As at 0513, on 03/21/08, Unit I ERDS and PICSY are now fully restored. The planned outage activities are now complete."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Neil Perry)
"At approximately 1200 hours, on 03/17/2008, the Unit 1 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to connect a temporary power supply to support a planned maintenance outage on the PICSY [Plant Indication Computer System] computer normal power supply. The installation of temporary power is expected to have a duration greater than 8 hours, but less than 24. During this time, control room hardwire indications will be available. An update will be provided when SPDS/ERDS becomes available.
"Since the Unit 1 SPDS/ERDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM RICH KLINEFELTER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1222 HRS. EDT ON 03/18/08 * * *
"This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. Unit 1 ERDS has been restored as PICSY is now on temporary power. Restoration to normal power is expected to occur on 3/21/08. SPDS remains out of service due to other planned outage activities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Perry).
* * * UPDATE FROM JIM HUFFORD TO JOHN KNOKE @ 0530 HRS. EDT ON 03/21/08 * * *
"This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN# 44070. As at 0513, on 03/21/08, Unit I ERDS and PICSY are now fully restored. The planned outage activities are now complete."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Neil Perry)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44071
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG LARIMER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG LARIMER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2008
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3)
STEVE ORTH (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DEGRADED HABITABILITY CONTROL
"At approximately 0800 CDT on 3/17/08, operations personnel identified and investigated an issue with excessive noise/vibration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) cleanup fan. Investigation revealed that the TSC cleanup fan exhaust damper set screws, which attach the positioner to the damper shaft, had become loose and were slipping on the damper shaft. With this damper not adequately attached to the positioner the damper cannot be controlled and therefore flow through the cleanup filter cannot be controlled. Without adequate flow rates through the TSC cleanup filter, the TSC ventilation system is considered non-functional.
"As of 1400 CDT, repair and testing of the damper has been completed and the TSC ventilation is now functional. Had an emergency condition occurred during the time the repairs took place, contingency plans were in place to utilize the TSC as long as radiological conditions allowed. Procedure F3-6, 'Activation and Operation of the TSC,' Section 7.6, directs TSC management to relocate TSC activities to a radiological safe area if necessary."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 0800 CDT on 3/17/08, operations personnel identified and investigated an issue with excessive noise/vibration of the Technical Support Center (TSC) cleanup fan. Investigation revealed that the TSC cleanup fan exhaust damper set screws, which attach the positioner to the damper shaft, had become loose and were slipping on the damper shaft. With this damper not adequately attached to the positioner the damper cannot be controlled and therefore flow through the cleanup filter cannot be controlled. Without adequate flow rates through the TSC cleanup filter, the TSC ventilation system is considered non-functional.
"As of 1400 CDT, repair and testing of the damper has been completed and the TSC ventilation is now functional. Had an emergency condition occurred during the time the repairs took place, contingency plans were in place to utilize the TSC as long as radiological conditions allowed. Procedure F3-6, 'Activation and Operation of the TSC,' Section 7.6, directs TSC management to relocate TSC activities to a radiological safe area if necessary."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.