Event Notification Report for March 13, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/12/2008 - 03/13/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
4406244059440604407344150
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44062
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: D. DUNCAN / M. HIMEBAUCH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: D. DUNCAN / M. HIMEBAUCH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 14:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 14:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR BUILDING TO TORUS VACUUM BREAKER PRESSURE SWITCHES MAY NOT PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION
"March 13, 2008 at 1445 hours, engineering analysis identified that the pressure switches that operate to open the Reactor Building (RB) to Suppression Chamber (Torus) vacuum breaker isolation valves would not perform their design function. The condition impacted the function of both RB to Torus vacuum breaker isolation valves. One vacuum breaker isolation valve has been opened to maintain the function of the vacuum breaker in that line. A plan is being implemented to correct the deficiency and is expected to be completed within the required 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation expiration time for the current condition. This is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"March 13, 2008 at 1445 hours, engineering analysis identified that the pressure switches that operate to open the Reactor Building (RB) to Suppression Chamber (Torus) vacuum breaker isolation valves would not perform their design function. The condition impacted the function of both RB to Torus vacuum breaker isolation valves. One vacuum breaker isolation valve has been opened to maintain the function of the vacuum breaker in that line. A plan is being implemented to correct the deficiency and is expected to be completed within the required 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation expiration time for the current condition. This is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44059
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: LAURIE LAHTY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: LAURIE LAHTY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
RAY LORSON (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
MARK RING (R3)
RAY LORSON (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL DEFECT IN FAIRBANKS MORSE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SNUBBER VALVE MATERIAL AND HEAT TREATMENT
Abstract:
"Palisades has experienced failures of two snubber valves on an emergency diesel generator since November 2005. These valves were made from AISI E 52100 material. Entergy has determined through destructive metallurgical analysis that the material was incorrectly heat-treated. Not all of the install snubber valves were constructed of this material. The defect in the material of the snubber valves may allow the snubber valves to crack under operation, resulting in fuel oil leakage and loss of fuel oil supply to the affected cylinder on the engine.
Component information:
"Manufacturer: Fairbanks Morse
Model: ALCO Model 251F
ALCO Part Number: 2402466
Description:
"Palisades has experienced failures of two snubber valves on the 1-2 emergency diesel generator since November 2005 due to incorrectly heat treated material of the snubber valves. Both snubber valves failed soon after being initially installed in the engine or after being re-installed in the engine after maintenance. The first snubber valve failed after operating for approximately 10 hours of operation. The second snubber valve was installed in the engine and had approximately 135 hours of run time on it before it was removed, inspected and re-installed in the engine. After reinstallation into the engine, the snubber valve failed after approximately 2 hours of operation. Review of the purchasing history of the snubber valves could not identify when these failed snubber valves were originally purchased.
"On February 27, 2008, Entergy determined, through destructive metallurgical analysis, that the material that was incorrectly heat-treated was AISI E52100 material. Not all snubber valves were constructed of this material. Subsequently, the receipt inspection practices were revised to include testing of the snubber valves for the suspect material. This is accomplished by using a Niton XLT 800 chemical analyzer to identify (non-destructively) the chemical content of the snubber valves. Snubber valves with manganese contents <0.5% are rejected as they are most likely to be constructed of E52100 material.
"In January 2008, five snubber valves were rejected due to not meeting Palisades material requirements. Subsequently, one of the snubber valves was destructively tested and confirmed to have been incorrectly heat treated. These snubber valves were identified to have been purchased in 2004.
"A Part 21 evaluation was performed and it was concluded that this is a substantial safety hazard because the defect may allow the snubber valves to crack under operation, resulting in fuel oil leakage and loss of fuel oil supply to the affected cylinder on the engine. The loss of fuel oil supply to a cylinder may affect the ability of the emergency diesel generator to meet its design basis load rating; the external leakage of fuel may result in the potential for a fire to develop and render the diesel generator inoperable; and the leakage of fuel may affect the ability of the fuel oil system to supply adequate fuel oil to the diesel generator throughout its mission time.
Causes:
"Snubber valves constructed from AISI E52100 material may be incorrectly heat-treated. The cause of this is not known.
Corrective Actions:
"Palisades experienced two failures, which were reported in Licensee Event Reports 2005-007 and 2007-006. Entergy identified the improper heat treatment following the second failure. Entergy has subsequently replaced all snubber valves on the 1-1 emergency diesel generator. Entergy replaced the defective snubber valve and the remaining snubber valves on the 1-2 emergency diesel generator that had been replaced at the same time the defective snubber was installed. Since the replacement snubber valves on 1-2 emergency diesel generator did not have their material composition verified, eight additional snubber valves were sub replaced after verifying E52100 was not present. Entergy plans to replace the remaining 10 snubber valves on 1-2 emergency diesel generator. Based on the amount of in-service time of these snubber valves and verification of 26 acceptable snubber valves, there is reasonable expectation of operability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Palisades has been in contact with Fairbanks Morse concerning this issue.
Abstract:
"Palisades has experienced failures of two snubber valves on an emergency diesel generator since November 2005. These valves were made from AISI E 52100 material. Entergy has determined through destructive metallurgical analysis that the material was incorrectly heat-treated. Not all of the install snubber valves were constructed of this material. The defect in the material of the snubber valves may allow the snubber valves to crack under operation, resulting in fuel oil leakage and loss of fuel oil supply to the affected cylinder on the engine.
Component information:
"Manufacturer: Fairbanks Morse
Model: ALCO Model 251F
ALCO Part Number: 2402466
Description:
"Palisades has experienced failures of two snubber valves on the 1-2 emergency diesel generator since November 2005 due to incorrectly heat treated material of the snubber valves. Both snubber valves failed soon after being initially installed in the engine or after being re-installed in the engine after maintenance. The first snubber valve failed after operating for approximately 10 hours of operation. The second snubber valve was installed in the engine and had approximately 135 hours of run time on it before it was removed, inspected and re-installed in the engine. After reinstallation into the engine, the snubber valve failed after approximately 2 hours of operation. Review of the purchasing history of the snubber valves could not identify when these failed snubber valves were originally purchased.
"On February 27, 2008, Entergy determined, through destructive metallurgical analysis, that the material that was incorrectly heat-treated was AISI E52100 material. Not all snubber valves were constructed of this material. Subsequently, the receipt inspection practices were revised to include testing of the snubber valves for the suspect material. This is accomplished by using a Niton XLT 800 chemical analyzer to identify (non-destructively) the chemical content of the snubber valves. Snubber valves with manganese contents <0.5% are rejected as they are most likely to be constructed of E52100 material.
"In January 2008, five snubber valves were rejected due to not meeting Palisades material requirements. Subsequently, one of the snubber valves was destructively tested and confirmed to have been incorrectly heat treated. These snubber valves were identified to have been purchased in 2004.
"A Part 21 evaluation was performed and it was concluded that this is a substantial safety hazard because the defect may allow the snubber valves to crack under operation, resulting in fuel oil leakage and loss of fuel oil supply to the affected cylinder on the engine. The loss of fuel oil supply to a cylinder may affect the ability of the emergency diesel generator to meet its design basis load rating; the external leakage of fuel may result in the potential for a fire to develop and render the diesel generator inoperable; and the leakage of fuel may affect the ability of the fuel oil system to supply adequate fuel oil to the diesel generator throughout its mission time.
Causes:
"Snubber valves constructed from AISI E52100 material may be incorrectly heat-treated. The cause of this is not known.
Corrective Actions:
"Palisades experienced two failures, which were reported in Licensee Event Reports 2005-007 and 2007-006. Entergy identified the improper heat treatment following the second failure. Entergy has subsequently replaced all snubber valves on the 1-1 emergency diesel generator. Entergy replaced the defective snubber valve and the remaining snubber valves on the 1-2 emergency diesel generator that had been replaced at the same time the defective snubber was installed. Since the replacement snubber valves on 1-2 emergency diesel generator did not have their material composition verified, eight additional snubber valves were sub replaced after verifying E52100 was not present. Entergy plans to replace the remaining 10 snubber valves on 1-2 emergency diesel generator. Based on the amount of in-service time of these snubber valves and verification of 26 acceptable snubber valves, there is reasonable expectation of operability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Palisades has been in contact with Fairbanks Morse concerning this issue.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44060
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN McCORY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN McCORY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 16:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 16:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2008
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (NRR)
MARK LESSER (R2)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
JIM WIGGINS (NRR)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
CATHY HANEY (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ALERT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS DISCHARGE INTO THE 1B EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING
"During the 1B diesel generator surveillance run, the control room received fire alarms for the 1B diesel generator room. The system operator reported the room was full of smoke and the CO2 system had discharged. The control room manually shutdown the 1B diesel generator due to the event. An Alert classification was declared based on EAL #HA3 - Report or Detection of Toxic or Asphyxiant Gas within the Vital Area in Concentration that May Result in an Atmosphere Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health. No Radiological Release has occurred or is in progress."
The licensee stated that all personnel were accounted for and that no injuries had occurred. The 1B emergency diesel generator building is being ventilated to re-establish habitability. The licensee stated that there is no fire.
During discussions between NRC management and the licensee it was noted that the exhaust header on the 1B EDG had been recently replaced and that a failure of this exhaust header introduced smoke and exhaust gas into the building which actuated the CO2.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. A press release will also be issued.
* * * UPDATE FROM McCORY TO HUFFMAN AT 1945 EDT ON 3/13/08 * * *
The Alert was terminated at 1836 CDT based on ventilation of the room and re-establishment of habitability.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. R2 (McCree), R2DO (Lesser), NRR (Wiggins), NRR EO (Haney) and IRD (Cruz) notified.
Notifications to DHS, FEMA, DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS were also made by the NRC Operations Center.
"During the 1B diesel generator surveillance run, the control room received fire alarms for the 1B diesel generator room. The system operator reported the room was full of smoke and the CO2 system had discharged. The control room manually shutdown the 1B diesel generator due to the event. An Alert classification was declared based on EAL #HA3 - Report or Detection of Toxic or Asphyxiant Gas within the Vital Area in Concentration that May Result in an Atmosphere Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health. No Radiological Release has occurred or is in progress."
The licensee stated that all personnel were accounted for and that no injuries had occurred. The 1B emergency diesel generator building is being ventilated to re-establish habitability. The licensee stated that there is no fire.
During discussions between NRC management and the licensee it was noted that the exhaust header on the 1B EDG had been recently replaced and that a failure of this exhaust header introduced smoke and exhaust gas into the building which actuated the CO2.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. A press release will also be issued.
* * * UPDATE FROM McCORY TO HUFFMAN AT 1945 EDT ON 3/13/08 * * *
The Alert was terminated at 1836 CDT based on ventilation of the room and re-establishment of habitability.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. R2 (McCree), R2DO (Lesser), NRR (Wiggins), NRR EO (Haney) and IRD (Cruz) notified.
Notifications to DHS, FEMA, DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS were also made by the NRC Operations Center.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44073
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WHIDBEY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: COUPEVILLE State: WA
County:
License #: WM-M0217-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: WHIDBEY GENERAL HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: COUPEVILLE State: WA
County:
License #: WM-M0217-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2008
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
ANNA BRADFORD (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF LEAKING IODINE-125 SEED
The State of Washington Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection, provided the following information via e-mail:
"On 10 March 2008 a patient was implanted with approximately 80 I-125 seeds. On 12 March 2008 (or 13 March 2008, it remains unclear as of this writing), the patient complained of pain and difficulty urinating. A cauterization was performed via the urethra. Upon removal of the cauterization equipment, some seeds also exited via the urethra. One seed, in particular, was visibly different from the rest. This seed was, upon closer observation, noted to be shorter than the others and, in fact, had been damaged. Cause of the damage (shear force during insertion or perhaps a result of the cauterization) has yet to be determined.
"A survey of the area including the patient using a Technical Associates TBM-3 showed contamination of the equipment and bodily fluids, while an external reading directly over the thyroid showed levels above background."
The activity of the damaged I-125 seed was less than 300 microcuries. Licensee is assessing possible overexposure to the patient, organ dose calculations underway by licensee consultant.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/21/2008 FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"On 10 March 2008 a patient was implanted with 102 I-125 seeds. On 13 March 2008 the patient complained of pain and difficulty urinating. A cauterization was performed via the urethra. Upon removal of the cauterization equipment, 'some' seeds also exited via the urethra. One seed, in particular, was visibly different from the rest. This seed was, upon closer observation, noted to perhaps be shorter than the others and, in fact, had been damaged. Cause of the damage (shear force during insertion or perhaps a result of the cauterization) has yet to be determined, although as of this writing the most logical conclusion would be over-heating from the cauterization procedure.
"A survey by the licensee of the area including the patient using a Technical Associates TBM-3 showed contamination of the equipment and bodily fluids, while an external reading directly over the thyroid showed levels above background.
"A CT scan was performed on 19 March 2008 to determine the number of seeds remaining in the patient. Results of that scan show the proper number, 92 seeds, remain in the patient of the total 102 implanted.
"Seed was damaged, probably from heat, but if not, then from some other mechanism. These were seeds from Best Medical International, Model 2301.
"Wipes of the remaining seeds showed contamination levels up to 500 nCi. While all seeds exhibited some detectable counts from the wipes, it is thought that one was actually leaking and had cross-contaminated the others while in storage together.
"Bioassay of the patient on 19 March 2008 showed a thyroid burden of 0.8 microcuries, a dose less than 1 Rem to the organ itself."
Notified the R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (Delligatti).
The State of Washington Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection, provided the following information via e-mail:
"On 10 March 2008 a patient was implanted with approximately 80 I-125 seeds. On 12 March 2008 (or 13 March 2008, it remains unclear as of this writing), the patient complained of pain and difficulty urinating. A cauterization was performed via the urethra. Upon removal of the cauterization equipment, some seeds also exited via the urethra. One seed, in particular, was visibly different from the rest. This seed was, upon closer observation, noted to be shorter than the others and, in fact, had been damaged. Cause of the damage (shear force during insertion or perhaps a result of the cauterization) has yet to be determined.
"A survey of the area including the patient using a Technical Associates TBM-3 showed contamination of the equipment and bodily fluids, while an external reading directly over the thyroid showed levels above background."
The activity of the damaged I-125 seed was less than 300 microcuries. Licensee is assessing possible overexposure to the patient, organ dose calculations underway by licensee consultant.
* * * UPDATE ON 3/21/2008 FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"On 10 March 2008 a patient was implanted with 102 I-125 seeds. On 13 March 2008 the patient complained of pain and difficulty urinating. A cauterization was performed via the urethra. Upon removal of the cauterization equipment, 'some' seeds also exited via the urethra. One seed, in particular, was visibly different from the rest. This seed was, upon closer observation, noted to perhaps be shorter than the others and, in fact, had been damaged. Cause of the damage (shear force during insertion or perhaps a result of the cauterization) has yet to be determined, although as of this writing the most logical conclusion would be over-heating from the cauterization procedure.
"A survey by the licensee of the area including the patient using a Technical Associates TBM-3 showed contamination of the equipment and bodily fluids, while an external reading directly over the thyroid showed levels above background.
"A CT scan was performed on 19 March 2008 to determine the number of seeds remaining in the patient. Results of that scan show the proper number, 92 seeds, remain in the patient of the total 102 implanted.
"Seed was damaged, probably from heat, but if not, then from some other mechanism. These were seeds from Best Medical International, Model 2301.
"Wipes of the remaining seeds showed contamination levels up to 500 nCi. While all seeds exhibited some detectable counts from the wipes, it is thought that one was actually leaking and had cross-contaminated the others while in storage together.
"Bioassay of the patient on 19 March 2008 showed a thyroid burden of 0.8 microcuries, a dose less than 1 Rem to the organ itself."
Notified the R4DO (Whitten) and FSME (Delligatti).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44150
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 4
City: CYPRESS State: TX
County:
License #: GLA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 4
City: CYPRESS State: TX
County:
License #: GLA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 04/18/2008
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2008
Notification Time: 11:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
MICHELLE BURGESS (FSME)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
MICHELLE BURGESS (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - BROKEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The State provided the following information via email:
"On April 17, 2008, the agency received written notification from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), reporting that during their routine inventory check they, accompanied by two of their health physics consultants, found the one tritium (H-3) exit signs in a non-public receiving area in their Cypress, Texas store, had a missing face plate, frame and label, red 'EXIT' cover and several H-3 tubes. The RSO reported that the remaining H-3 tubes were intact.
"The RSO reported that they conducted informal interviews with store managers and associates that revealed no additional information as to the date or circumstances of the damage to the sign. The RSO and their consultants stated that because available information does not suggest that the H-3 exit sign (TES) was recently damaged, Wal-Mart believes that no significant contamination currently exists at the site. Additionally, he stated that Wal-Mart reached this conclusion in consultation with consultant Certified Health Physicists (CHPs).
"The RSO stated that their long term corrective actions included: implementing protocols, which have been communicated to employees, for the proper handling of TES to ensure public health and safety and the protection of its employees. They report that they are in the process of inventorying all of the TES at its sites across the country to re-establish the accuracy of its records and to track the current locations of the TES, with the intent of ensuring that all TES are accounted for and handled properly.
"The RSO stated that the damaged TES will be packaged for shipment according to protocols established by their consultants and consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines. Wal-Mart anticipates shipping the remnants of the damaged TES to a specific licensee or arranging for a waste broker to ship the TES to a specific licensee authorized to receive it within thirty-days of their report to the agency, which was dated April 10, 2008."
Texas report I-8507
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY LATISCHA HANSON VIA E-MAIL TO JASON KOZAL ON 04/23/08 AT 1449 * * *
"On 04/22/08:
"The agency received written notifications each dated April 17, 2008 that three more exit signs were found damaged at the following locations:
"1) 4700 East Palm Valley Blvd., Round Rock, Texas 78665-2580; Store # 5480
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
- approximately 11.5 Ci; Serial # unknown
- one damaged exit sign with the tubes in the letter "T" broken.
"2) 620 S IH-35, Georgetown, Texas 78628-4157; Store # 1303
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/18/08
- 20 Ci; Serial #289930
- one damaged exit sign uninstalled and stored in the manager's office, missing it's face plate, it's red "EXIT" cover and all H-3 tubes.
"3) 1030 Norwood Park Blvd., Austin, Texas 78753-6600; Store # 1185
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
- 20.0 Ci; Serial #274828
- one damaged exit sign with broken tubes, installed in the non-public receiving section of the store."
Notified R4DO (Cain), FSME EO (Hsueh).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ART TUCKER TO JASON KOZAL ON 4/30/08 AT 1029 * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"The State of Texas received notification of nine additional exit signs which had either damaged (4) or missing (5) vials containing tritium (H-3.) The RSO for Wal-Mart stated that the information gather in the inspections conducted throughout the United States was being entered into a database and that they would supply the State of Texas with the results of their inspections conducted in Texas as soon as it was available. No estimate of the number of vials involved or the total activity released has been determined as of today's date. He also stated that he had been in contact with the NRC. "
Notified R4DO (Pick), FSME (Burgess).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The State provided the following information via email:
"On April 17, 2008, the agency received written notification from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), reporting that during their routine inventory check they, accompanied by two of their health physics consultants, found the one tritium (H-3) exit signs in a non-public receiving area in their Cypress, Texas store, had a missing face plate, frame and label, red 'EXIT' cover and several H-3 tubes. The RSO reported that the remaining H-3 tubes were intact.
"The RSO reported that they conducted informal interviews with store managers and associates that revealed no additional information as to the date or circumstances of the damage to the sign. The RSO and their consultants stated that because available information does not suggest that the H-3 exit sign (TES) was recently damaged, Wal-Mart believes that no significant contamination currently exists at the site. Additionally, he stated that Wal-Mart reached this conclusion in consultation with consultant Certified Health Physicists (CHPs).
"The RSO stated that their long term corrective actions included: implementing protocols, which have been communicated to employees, for the proper handling of TES to ensure public health and safety and the protection of its employees. They report that they are in the process of inventorying all of the TES at its sites across the country to re-establish the accuracy of its records and to track the current locations of the TES, with the intent of ensuring that all TES are accounted for and handled properly.
"The RSO stated that the damaged TES will be packaged for shipment according to protocols established by their consultants and consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines. Wal-Mart anticipates shipping the remnants of the damaged TES to a specific licensee or arranging for a waste broker to ship the TES to a specific licensee authorized to receive it within thirty-days of their report to the agency, which was dated April 10, 2008."
Texas report I-8507
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY LATISCHA HANSON VIA E-MAIL TO JASON KOZAL ON 04/23/08 AT 1449 * * *
"On 04/22/08:
"The agency received written notifications each dated April 17, 2008 that three more exit signs were found damaged at the following locations:
"1) 4700 East Palm Valley Blvd., Round Rock, Texas 78665-2580; Store # 5480
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
- approximately 11.5 Ci; Serial # unknown
- one damaged exit sign with the tubes in the letter "T" broken.
"2) 620 S IH-35, Georgetown, Texas 78628-4157; Store # 1303
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/18/08
- 20 Ci; Serial #289930
- one damaged exit sign uninstalled and stored in the manager's office, missing it's face plate, it's red "EXIT" cover and all H-3 tubes.
"3) 1030 Norwood Park Blvd., Austin, Texas 78753-6600; Store # 1185
- Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
- 20.0 Ci; Serial #274828
- one damaged exit sign with broken tubes, installed in the non-public receiving section of the store."
Notified R4DO (Cain), FSME EO (Hsueh).
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ART TUCKER TO JASON KOZAL ON 4/30/08 AT 1029 * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"The State of Texas received notification of nine additional exit signs which had either damaged (4) or missing (5) vials containing tritium (H-3.) The RSO for Wal-Mart stated that the information gather in the inspections conducted throughout the United States was being entered into a database and that they would supply the State of Texas with the results of their inspections conducted in Texas as soon as it was available. No estimate of the number of vials involved or the total activity released has been determined as of today's date. He also stated that he had been in contact with the NRC. "
Notified R4DO (Pick), FSME (Burgess).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source