Event Notification Report for March 07, 2008

NUCLEAR POWERED PACEMAKER POTENTIALLY UNACCOUNTED FOR

After recently determining that an individual with a nuclear powered pacemaker was due for a six month check-up, the licensee attempted to reach the individual on March 5, 2008. Later the licensee determined that the individual was deceased. The licensee contacted the funeral director in an attempt to recover the pacemaker. The licensee also contacted Medtronic Corp. in an attempt to determine if the funeral director had returned the pacemaker to Medtronic but the licensee has still been unable to account for the pacemaker.

On March 7, 2008, after attempts to locate the device, an official from Kennedy Health System determined that a Coreatomic Inc. nuclear powered pacemaker is missing and perhaps lost.

The pacemaker is a Coreatomic model C-101-P nuclear powered cardiac pacemaker serial number 1168. Typically these pacemakers contain 2 to 4 curies of Pu-238 which is about 250 milligrams of material or less.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM WITH HPCI/RCIC ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSATE FEEDWATER

"Unit 2 RPS actuation / unplanned scram with subsequent ECCS discharge to the RCS at 1446 hrs. on 3/07/08. Unit 2 scrammed on Low RPV water level of 3 inches above instrument zero as a result of a loss of condensate feedwater. Water level decreased to approximately 60 inches below instrument zero as a result of the loss of feedwater. [Top of active fuel is approximately 150 inches below instrument zero.] The cause of the loss of feedwater is presently under investigation. At 35 inches below instrument zero, HPCI and RCIC actuated and restored water level. HPCI oscillations were experienced and the system was taken to manual control, at which time the flow oscillations abated. All other systems functioned as required.

"A team has been assembled to investigate and determine the cause of the initiating event of the loss of feedwater."

During the scram, all rods inserted into the core. There were no safety relief valve actuations as a result of the transient. RPV level was restored and is being maintained using control rod drive flow. The electrical grid is stable with normal offsite power supplying safety loads. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves to condenser.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM

"At 1914 on 3/07/08, the Unit 4 RCO noted that the ERDADS OPCON displays in control room and computer room stopped updating. This rendered the Unit 4 ERDS link to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (NRCOC) to be inoperable for greater than 30 minutes, as the link can not be initialized if required.

"Attempts to reboot the OPCON displays and the PEDS Computers were initially performed per plant procedure, but did not correct the issue. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time. No estimated return to service is available at this time.

"8-hour notification being performed to NRCOC under event classification 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MARK JONES TO PETE SNYDER ON 3/12/08 @ 1431 hrs. * * *

A CPU board had been replaced. At 1420 the ERDS link to the NRC has been restored and is considered operable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lesser).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO TRITIUM IN ONSITE WATER SAMPLES

"Brunswick previously reported detection of tritium in excess of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) reporting criteria on June 13, 2007, i.e., EN 43420, as a result of water samples taken from an onsite shallow groundwater well (i.e., ESS 1BC) near the Storm Drain Stabilization Pond (SDSP). As previously indicated in EN 43420, the storm drain system routes tritiated water into the SDSP. Overflow from the Turbine Building air-wash system was identified as the primary contributor to the effluent of the storm drain system. The air-wash is no longer routed into the storm drains, which eliminated the main source of the tritium into the storm drain system.

"On March 6, 2008, an ongoing investigation determined that tritium levels in excess of NEI voluntary reporting criteria present in an onsite shallow groundwater well (i.e., ESS-2C), resulted from a condition not previously reported. Though elevated levels of tritium for each incident are most likely a result of the same source (i.e., effluent routed in the storm drain system,) subsequent investigations indicate that the storm drain piping may allow an inadvertent pathway to groundwater in close proximity to ESS-2C.

"The monitoring well ESS-2C is well within the boundaries of the site owner controlled area and there is no indication that tritium has migrated into any drinking water.

"The following agencies will be updated on the status of the onsite tritium samples and informed of the pending press release: State Officials, City of Southport, Brunswick County, NEI, INPO, and ANI.

"The Licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

TELEPHONE OUTAGE ONSITE

"On 3/7/08, at 1045, Vermont Yankee experienced a telephone service interruption that resulted in a loss of the dedicated phone line used to contact the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) - FTS phone as well as a loss of the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) from the control room.

"Alternate phone communications remain available from the control room to both the NRC Operations Center as well as the states of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.

"The Emergency Planning organization has verified proper ENS - FTS and NAS communications from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM KRITZER TO SNYDER ON 3/7/08 AT 1552 * * *

Vermont Yankee's ENS and other phone lines are back in service.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Caruso).

STOLEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The licensee reported that on the night of 3/7/08 the church was broken into and vandalized. As part of the vandalism, 2 self-illuminating exit signs were stolen. The signs were not recovered. The licensee did not discover that the theft of the signs was reportable until 4/29/08. It is not known if the signs were broken during the vandalism. The areas around both signs have been cleaned since the theft.

The manufacturer is SRB Technologies (Canada), Inc.

Model: BetaLux-E/Luminexit, Activity: 20 Ci each, the serial numbers are not known.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source