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Event Notification Report for February 23, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/22/2008 - 02/23/2008

EVENT NUMBERS
440044400544160

Power Reactor
Event Number: 44004
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1     State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES GROOMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/23/2008
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2008
Event Time: 03:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2008
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
BILL BATEMAN (NRR)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
JIM DYER (NRR)
SAM COLLINS (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HIGH DOSE EQUIVALENT IODINE GREATER THAN TECH SPEC REQUIREMENT

Unit 1 was performing a plant shutdown in preparation for a refueling outage. RCS sampling indicated a dose equivalent Iodine-131 reading of 1.41 microCurie/gram with a Technical Specification limit of 1.0 microCurie/gram. As a result, the licensee declared an Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) under EAL AU121.

To reduce the dose equivalent iodine, the licensee placed maximum purification into service. Actions required to exit the NOUE include reducing dose equivalent iodine to below Technical Specification limits.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1 (Collins), R1DO (Powell), IRD (Cruz), NRREO (Batemen), NRR (Dyer), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Fuller).

* * * UPDATE FROM AMY CORDENER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0612 EST ON 02/23/08 * * *

The licensee is still in the NOUE. As of 0600, the last RCS sample indicated 1.15 microCurie/gm. NOUE exit criteria will be met when two successive samples indicate less than 1.0 microCurie/gm.

Notified R1DO (Powell)

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL SAUL TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0927 EST ON 02/23/08 * * *

At 0908 EST, three consecutive Reactor Coolant System I-131 activity samples indicated approximately 0.9 microCuries/gm which is less than the Technical Specification limit. The licensee is still in the NOUE and will exit when at least one more sample indicates less than the Technical Specification limit.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).

* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL SAUL TO PETE SNYDER @ 1043 EST ON 02/23/08 * * *

At 1035 EST, the licensee exited the NOUE based on four consecutive samples at less than 1.0 microCuries/gm of I-131.

Notified R1DO (Powell), NRREO (Bateman), IRD (Cruz), DHS (Inzer) and FEMA (Sweetser).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44005
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/23/2008
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2008
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
UNACCEPTABLE FLAW IN RPV CAP-TO-PIPE WELD

"At 1600 EST, it was determined by a phased array ultrasonic examination that an unacceptable flaw existed in reactor pressure vessel penetration N9. This penetration leads to a capped line and the flaw is in the cap-to-pipe weld. The flaw is 2.3 inches in length and reaches a maximum depth of 43.6 percent through-wall on a 5.75 inch OD pipe. The flaw was discovered during the routine ISI [In-service Inspection] examination of this penetration. The flaw has been found unacceptable per paragraph IWB-3514.4 of the 2003 Addenda of ASME Section XI and is therefore reportable. Upon discovery of the flaw, all penetrations of this type were examined with no further findings.

"A weld overlay repair is planned and should be completed by 3/6/08."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. ANDERSON TO P. SNYDER ON 3/20/08 AT 0943 * * *

"On 2/23/2008 event number 44005 was made to report an unacceptable flaw in reactor pressure vessel penetration N9. The assumption made at that time was that the flaw seriously degraded the affected control rod drive (CRD) return line that was capped. This was based on the fact that the flaw was unacceptable from an ASME Section XI perspective and therefore reportable. Based on this assumption the event was reported in accordance with the following reporting requirement.

"'10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded;'

"The depth of the flaw was initially reported to be 43.6% through wall and the thickness of the wall was measured to be 0.75 inches. Phased array ultrasonic examinations in accordance with Appendix VIII of Section XI were used to fully interrogate and characterize the circumferentially oriented flaw. The final dimensions were 2.3 inches in length on the inner diameter and a maximum depth of 60% through wall. A flaw evaluation of the Unit 1 CRD return line nozzle cap weld was subsequently performed by Structural Integrity Associates, Inc., to evaluate the 'as-found' condition and to determine the implications of the flaw on the affected system at the time of shutdown. The evaluation considered the flaw size and the appropriate stresses for operation. No crack growth was required to be assumed since the 'as-found' flaw was compared against the allowable flaw size which was used to determine the acceptability of the flaw during plant operation. Since the weld is associated with the capped CRD return line nozzle, the applied stress at the affected location was due to pressure loading only.

"The flaw evaluation concluded that the requirements of Section IWB-3640 were satisfied for a flaw less than 75% through-wall. The 'as-found' depth of 60% through wall is less than the allowable depth of 75%. Based on this information, the Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. evaluation demonstrated that the flaw was acceptable per the ASME Code Section Xl, 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda requirements. Since the as- found flaw depth at the N9 weld is less than the allowable flaw depth, the required safety factors were met at all times during plant operation.

"Based on this updated information the conclusion has been reached that this flaw did not seriously degrade the plant or its principal safety barriers. Since the condition does not meet a reporting requirement, this notification serves to retract Notification # 44005 made on 2/23/2008."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 44160
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2     State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRANDON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/23/2008
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
60-DAY VERBAL NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"On February 23, 2008, a control room operator was aligning the Containment Purge system for Train B operation and triggered an invalid Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) and Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI). The operator was removing Train A of the system from operation in accordance with system Operating Instruction (SOI) 30.02, 'Containment Purge System'. The operator made an incorrect assumption that a portion of SOI 90.02, 'Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors', that would have properly blocked and aligned power to the Purge Radiation Monitors had been performed. Therefore, when the operator proceeded with the next step in realigning the radiation monitors, a spike occurred on Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-131. This caused an invalid actuation of Train B of the CVI and ABI systems. Operators verified the isolation and its cause, and suspended movement of irradiated fuel within the Spent Fuel Pool in response to the Train B CVI/ABI signal. The ABI/CVI signal was reset and Auxiliary Building ventilation was restored in accordance with SOI 30.05, 'Auxiliary Bldg HVAC Systems'.

"The following information addresses the criteria for a 60 day verbal report defined in Section 3.2.6, 'System Actuation' of NUREG 1022, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73'. This telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The spike on the Radiation Monitor initiated an invalid actuation of Train B of the CVI system and ABI system.
(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The Train B CVI and ABI actuation was complete.
(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The system started and functioned successfully, and all components operated as expected."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.