Event Notification Report for February 22, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/21/2008 - 02/22/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44002
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN POPIELARSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN POPIELARSKI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/22/2008
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 05:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2008
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 05:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
RAY POWELL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMERCIAL AND EMERGENCY PHONE SYSTEMS
The licensee experienced a loss of the onsite phone systems including ENS phones at 0530 EST. Offsite communications capability was maintained with the "Omni" phone circuit. The ENS and onsite phone system were restored at 0821 EST. It appears that the onsite phone system computer locked up. When the computer was rebooted, phone systems returned to normal.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN POPIELARSKI TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1602 EST ON 02/22/08 * * *
At 1430 EST the licensee determined the ENS line is inoperable but the commercial line is operable. At 1602, the ENS line is operable. The licensee, however, is still troubleshooting system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
* * * UPDATE FROM BARRY HEDRICK TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2045 EST ON 02/22/08 * * *
Licensee stated the computer system was found to have a corrupted hard drive, and that has been replaced. The main computer is now back in operation. The backup computer was found to have outdated hardware and that will be addressed at a later date.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
* * * UPDATE FROM JIM VASH TO JOE O'HARA AT 2130 EST ON 02/23/08 * * *
All repairs to both computers are complete and the phone line has been tested SAT.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Powell).
The licensee experienced a loss of the onsite phone systems including ENS phones at 0530 EST. Offsite communications capability was maintained with the "Omni" phone circuit. The ENS and onsite phone system were restored at 0821 EST. It appears that the onsite phone system computer locked up. When the computer was rebooted, phone systems returned to normal.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN POPIELARSKI TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1602 EST ON 02/22/08 * * *
At 1430 EST the licensee determined the ENS line is inoperable but the commercial line is operable. At 1602, the ENS line is operable. The licensee, however, is still troubleshooting system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
* * * UPDATE FROM BARRY HEDRICK TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2045 EST ON 02/22/08 * * *
Licensee stated the computer system was found to have a corrupted hard drive, and that has been replaced. The main computer is now back in operation. The backup computer was found to have outdated hardware and that will be addressed at a later date.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
* * * UPDATE FROM JIM VASH TO JOE O'HARA AT 2130 EST ON 02/23/08 * * *
All repairs to both computers are complete and the phone line has been tested SAT.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Powell).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44008
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: OHMART/VEGA CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 03214310020
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES STEPHEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: OHMART/VEGA CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #: 03214310020
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES STEPHEN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2008
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/27/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS
The following information was obtained from the Ohio Department of Health via email:
"Initial Notification: The Bureau [Ohio Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Health] was notified via e-mail at approximately 4:00 PM on Friday, 2/22/08 that the licensee experienced a contamination incident in their source handling facilities. The e-mail was sent to a Bureau staff member who was out of the office until Monday, 2/25/08. The e-mail was retrieved by the Bureau staff member at approximately 6:00 AM on Monday, 2/25/08.
"The contamination incident involved two (2) employees who were working in the source disposal room. One employee was attempting to retrieve a source from one of the licensee's own SR-1 source holders (vintage 1972) using the saw. In doing so, he breached the 300 mCi Cs-137 source and contaminated the area with microspheres. The licensee's emergency procedures were immediately activated. Employees verified that there was no floor contamination outside of the disposal room through use of a pancake probe and then maslin wipes. The ventilation system was turned off. No activity was found outside the doors to the disposal room. A third employee went into the disposal room to do surveys and wipes and confirmed that contamination is present in the room.
"The first employee involved in the contamination incident was removed from the disposal room, dressed in two Tyvek suits, and moved from the disposal room to the enclosed area outside that room where he could be frisked. He exhibited contamination on one hand and on one leg. The second employee, having taken additional wipes and surveys to determine the locations of contamination, was then removed. Contamination was detected on his hands as well as his shirt and pants. Decontamination commenced on both individuals. This information was contained in the initial e-mail notification from the licensee and was current as of 2/22/08.
"Follow-up: The Bureau initiated a phone call with licensee management at approximately 8:15 AM on Monday, 2/25/08. During this call the licensee stated that the facility contamination is limited to the source handling room, which has been isolated and sealed with tape. The licensee further stated that no further decontamination work was done over the weekend once the individuals involved were decontaminated and the source handling room was secured. The licensee stated that the determination was made that the contamination on the two individuals involved was limited primarily to the clothing worn. This clothing was removed, and any areas of their body showing contamination were successfully decontaminated. One of the individuals had shown contamination near his nose. Surveys of tissues used by him to blow his nose during decontamination indicated no contamination, but nasal swabs of this individual were not done by the licensee. The licensee stated that bioassays of the contaminated individuals were not planned at this time. The Bureau informed the licensee that bioassays would be necessary for these individuals.
"The Bureau has dispatched two inspectors to the licensee's facility in Cincinnati, Ohio, to arrive there late morning Monday, 2/25/08. The licensee has been instructed not to take any further actions regarding clean-up of the contaminated areas until the Bureau inspectors arrive. The Bureau will require a written action plan from the licensee for the decontamination process, which the licensee stated will be performed by an outside contractor."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STATE OF OHIO VIA EMAIL (STEPHEN JAMES) TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1207 EST ON 02/27/08 * * *
The following information was provided by the state via email:
"UPDATE TO INITIAL REPORT: Two inspectors from the Bureau visited the licensee's facilities on Monday, 2/25/08. The inspectors verified that the licensee had secured ventilation and sealed off the sealed source disposal room where the incident occurred to prevent the spread of contamination. The licensee sealed off the room using duct tape around the doors and along the floor of the doorways. The inspectors also interviewed the individuals involved in the operations that resulted in the breaching of the source to determine the steps taken once the individuals became aware that the source had been cut into. The Bureau inspectors conducted confirmatory surveys, including wipe tests, of the area around the contaminated room and of the ventilation system discharges. These surveys indicated no evidence of contamination outside of the source disposal room. The Bureau also issued an order to the licensee on Monday, 2/25/08, prohibiting any additional sealed source removal operations by the licensee until further notice.
"The Bureau contacted the licensee via telephone on Tuesday, 2/26/08, to discuss ongoing dose reconstruction efforts and the licensee's plans for decontamination of the sealed source disposal room. The licensee stated that the two individuals involved were scheduled for whole-body counting at the University of Cincinnati later in the week, which was the first available time this could be done. The licensee is also working on dose estimates from the incident, which will be provided to the Bureau as soon as they are completed. The licensee is in the process of selecting a contractor to perform the clean-up activities and will inform the Bureau once a contractor has been selected and a start date established. The licensee was informed that the Bureau will send representatives to attend the initial meeting with the licensee and the clean-up contractor to discuss the plan of action and timeline. The licensee was also informed that the Bureau would send inspectors to the facility periodically during the clean-up to perform confirmatory measurements and review the progress to date. The licensee was reminded that they were subject to the NRC M&D security orders and may need to address those as it related to the escorting of contractor personnel."
Ohio Incident Reference number: OH2008-011
Notified R3DO (Kozak) and FSME EO (Michele Burgess).
The following information was obtained from the Ohio Department of Health via email:
"Initial Notification: The Bureau [Ohio Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Health] was notified via e-mail at approximately 4:00 PM on Friday, 2/22/08 that the licensee experienced a contamination incident in their source handling facilities. The e-mail was sent to a Bureau staff member who was out of the office until Monday, 2/25/08. The e-mail was retrieved by the Bureau staff member at approximately 6:00 AM on Monday, 2/25/08.
"The contamination incident involved two (2) employees who were working in the source disposal room. One employee was attempting to retrieve a source from one of the licensee's own SR-1 source holders (vintage 1972) using the saw. In doing so, he breached the 300 mCi Cs-137 source and contaminated the area with microspheres. The licensee's emergency procedures were immediately activated. Employees verified that there was no floor contamination outside of the disposal room through use of a pancake probe and then maslin wipes. The ventilation system was turned off. No activity was found outside the doors to the disposal room. A third employee went into the disposal room to do surveys and wipes and confirmed that contamination is present in the room.
"The first employee involved in the contamination incident was removed from the disposal room, dressed in two Tyvek suits, and moved from the disposal room to the enclosed area outside that room where he could be frisked. He exhibited contamination on one hand and on one leg. The second employee, having taken additional wipes and surveys to determine the locations of contamination, was then removed. Contamination was detected on his hands as well as his shirt and pants. Decontamination commenced on both individuals. This information was contained in the initial e-mail notification from the licensee and was current as of 2/22/08.
"Follow-up: The Bureau initiated a phone call with licensee management at approximately 8:15 AM on Monday, 2/25/08. During this call the licensee stated that the facility contamination is limited to the source handling room, which has been isolated and sealed with tape. The licensee further stated that no further decontamination work was done over the weekend once the individuals involved were decontaminated and the source handling room was secured. The licensee stated that the determination was made that the contamination on the two individuals involved was limited primarily to the clothing worn. This clothing was removed, and any areas of their body showing contamination were successfully decontaminated. One of the individuals had shown contamination near his nose. Surveys of tissues used by him to blow his nose during decontamination indicated no contamination, but nasal swabs of this individual were not done by the licensee. The licensee stated that bioassays of the contaminated individuals were not planned at this time. The Bureau informed the licensee that bioassays would be necessary for these individuals.
"The Bureau has dispatched two inspectors to the licensee's facility in Cincinnati, Ohio, to arrive there late morning Monday, 2/25/08. The licensee has been instructed not to take any further actions regarding clean-up of the contaminated areas until the Bureau inspectors arrive. The Bureau will require a written action plan from the licensee for the decontamination process, which the licensee stated will be performed by an outside contractor."
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STATE OF OHIO VIA EMAIL (STEPHEN JAMES) TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1207 EST ON 02/27/08 * * *
The following information was provided by the state via email:
"UPDATE TO INITIAL REPORT: Two inspectors from the Bureau visited the licensee's facilities on Monday, 2/25/08. The inspectors verified that the licensee had secured ventilation and sealed off the sealed source disposal room where the incident occurred to prevent the spread of contamination. The licensee sealed off the room using duct tape around the doors and along the floor of the doorways. The inspectors also interviewed the individuals involved in the operations that resulted in the breaching of the source to determine the steps taken once the individuals became aware that the source had been cut into. The Bureau inspectors conducted confirmatory surveys, including wipe tests, of the area around the contaminated room and of the ventilation system discharges. These surveys indicated no evidence of contamination outside of the source disposal room. The Bureau also issued an order to the licensee on Monday, 2/25/08, prohibiting any additional sealed source removal operations by the licensee until further notice.
"The Bureau contacted the licensee via telephone on Tuesday, 2/26/08, to discuss ongoing dose reconstruction efforts and the licensee's plans for decontamination of the sealed source disposal room. The licensee stated that the two individuals involved were scheduled for whole-body counting at the University of Cincinnati later in the week, which was the first available time this could be done. The licensee is also working on dose estimates from the incident, which will be provided to the Bureau as soon as they are completed. The licensee is in the process of selecting a contractor to perform the clean-up activities and will inform the Bureau once a contractor has been selected and a start date established. The licensee was informed that the Bureau will send representatives to attend the initial meeting with the licensee and the clean-up contractor to discuss the plan of action and timeline. The licensee was also informed that the Bureau would send inspectors to the facility periodically during the clean-up to perform confirmatory measurements and review the progress to date. The licensee was reminded that they were subject to the NRC M&D security orders and may need to address those as it related to the escorting of contractor personnel."
Ohio Incident Reference number: OH2008-011
Notified R3DO (Kozak) and FSME EO (Michele Burgess).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44018
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: LOUISIANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2467-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: LOUISIANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2467-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/29/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via email:
"A Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) van was involved, in an accident while carrying a Humboldt 5001 soil moisture density gauge. The gauge contained 10 mCi of Cs-137 (s/n9733GQ) and 40 mCi of Am-241 (s/nNJ03934). The Louisiana State Police notified LA DEQ of the accident and stated that the overpack was not breached and that readings at the surface were 0.9 mR/hr. The gauge and overpack were inspected at the DOTD district laboratory that was 0.5 miles from the accident. The overpack was in overall excellent condition except for a small hole (approximately 1 inch in circumference) which had been punched through the exterior wall but did not puncture the interior wall of the overpack. The overpack and gauge were surveyed by a DEQ inspector and recorded readings of 0.2 mR/hr at 1 meter which, correspond to the transportation index. A leak test has been sent off for the gauge and the results are pending. Will update with further information when it becomes available."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA080005
The following report was received via email:
"A Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) van was involved, in an accident while carrying a Humboldt 5001 soil moisture density gauge. The gauge contained 10 mCi of Cs-137 (s/n9733GQ) and 40 mCi of Am-241 (s/nNJ03934). The Louisiana State Police notified LA DEQ of the accident and stated that the overpack was not breached and that readings at the surface were 0.9 mR/hr. The gauge and overpack were inspected at the DOTD district laboratory that was 0.5 miles from the accident. The overpack was in overall excellent condition except for a small hole (approximately 1 inch in circumference) which had been punched through the exterior wall but did not puncture the interior wall of the overpack. The overpack and gauge were surveyed by a DEQ inspector and recorded readings of 0.2 mR/hr at 1 meter which, correspond to the transportation index. A leak test has been sent off for the gauge and the results are pending. Will update with further information when it becomes available."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA080005