Event Notification Report for February 01, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF METAL THICKNESS GAUGE MALFUNCTION

The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (MRCP) reported that a licensee, Allegheny Rodney (metal foil manufacturer), informed the MRCP of a malfunction in a metal thickness measuring gauge. The process gauge is supplied by Integrated Industrial Systems and contains a 1000 milliCurie Am-241source (Serial #1225). The licensee stated that the gauge is not functioning for unknown reasons and a technician from Integrated Industrial Systems will be responding to investigate the problem. There is no evidence at this time of a missing or leaking source.

MRCP intends to follow-up with the licensee early next week after the cause of the gauge malfunction has been determined.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEPLETED CESIUM-131 SEEDS LOST FROM DAMAGED PACKAGE DURING SHIPMENT

The State provided the following information via email:

"The Licensee reported by phone that at 2:30 PST today a package of returned and depleted implant seeds containing Cs-131 with a 9.7 day half-life was found damaged upon receipt with some of the contents missing. The package was to have contained 15 seeds that were returned from a customer on the east coast. When the package arrived, the licensee upon receipt inspection noted the package had a hole in it that had been repaired with tape. The receipt inspection also detected higher than expected dose rates at slightly less than 1 mr/hr contact with the package. The package was taken to a controlled area suitable for bio-hazard work and opened by the RSO. The package was opened and discovered with loose seeds in the box. 11 seeds were recovered, 4 seeds are missing. An Isoray facility survey was performed between the receiving area and the controlled area where the package was opened. No additional seeds were located. The sender of the package is being contacted as well as the RSO for FedEx. Highest dose rate on contact with a single seed was 1 mr/hr. The seeds were reported to have aged seven half-lives as of this day and at 1/100th of original strength. The Licensee will update our office [the State of Washington] with additional information when it comes available."

The State does not know who originated the shipment or the initial strength of the CS-131 before the seven half-life decay.

Washington State Report Number: WA-08-007


* * * UPDATE FROM ARDEN SCROOGS TO BILL HUFFMAN ON 2/4/08 AT 1504 EST VIA E-MAIL * * *

The shipment originated from Geisenger Health in Danville, PA, and was shipped by FedEx.

The original strength of the seeds was nominally 4 to 5 millicuries each, or 14 to 20 for the four missing seeds. At seven half-lives, the strength would be approximately 1/100th of the original strength, or 40 to 50 microcuries.

R4DO (Mike Shannon), FSME EO (Larry Camper), ILTAB (Matt Hahn), and R1DO (Christopher Cahill) informed.


* * * UPDATE FROM ARDEN SCROOGS TO KARL DIEDERICH ON 2/11/08 AT 1134 EST VIA E-MAIL * * *

"The receipt inspection detected higher than expected dose rates at ~1.7 mR/hr contact with the package.

"Detailed Carrier Information from with delivery route and timeframe.
Jan 29, 2008:
4:15 PM - Picked up in Montoursville, PA.
7:51 PM - left Montoursville, PA.
11:46PM - Arrived FedEx location in Newark, NJ.
Jan 30, 2008:
8:38 AM - Departed FedEx location in Newark, NJ.
10:41AM - Arrived FedEx location in Memphis, TN.
3:36 PM - Departed FedEx location in Memphis, TN.
6:35 PM - At sort facility in Spokane, WA.
8:49 PM - At local FedEx facility in Spokane, WA.
Jan 31, 2008:
9:52 AM - On FedEx vehicle for delivery Pasco, WA.
11:46AM - Delivered."

R4DO (Dale Powers), FSME EO (Michelle Burgess), ILTAB (Jim Whitney), and R1DO (Glenn Dentel) informed.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

AUTOMATIC SCRAM AS A RESULT OF TURBINE TRIP

"Unit 2 automatically scrammed [at] 0445 as a result of an RPS actuation due to a turbine trip. All rods inserted. The plant is stable. No ECCS or SRV actuation occurred. This report is made pursuant to 50.72(B)(iv)(B). An investigation into the cause is currently in progress. "

Primary plant pressure is 900 psig. with the decay heat path to the condenser via turbine bypass valves. All safety related systems are operable, and the licensee is investigating a potential issue with the EHC system.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local government agency will be informed. The licensee will issue a press release.

LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING

Millstone Unit 1 is in a decommissioning status but still maintains spent fuel in the spent fuel pool. On January 30, 2008, the normal power to the Unit 1 spent fuel pool was lost due to a fault (overcurrent trip) in the "Trayer Switch" (an auto disconnect switch) in the electrical supply line to the spent fuel pool cooling bus. A backup diesel generator was started and was being used to power the spent fuel pool cooling system until the "Trayer Switch" was repaired. At approximately 0840 EST today (2/01/08), alarms were received indicating low decay heat pump low flow and low spent fuel pool cooling pump low flow and discharge pressure. Investigation revealed that the backup diesel generator was operating at a frequency of 57.5 Hz rather than the normal 60 Hz. The technical staff was unable to get the diesel generator to maintain the normal 60 Hz output frequency. The licensee elected to secure the spent fuel pool cooling system pumps at 1024 EST based on concerns that the pumps could be damaged if operated at under frequency for an extended period of time.

Licensee technicians are currently engaged in repairing the diesel generator frequency controls and estimate that it could be returned to service this afternoon. The licensee has also ordered a temporary skid mounted diesel generator which should also arrive this afternoon. The repairs to the normal power source are not anticipated to be completed until Monday (2/04/08).

The spent fuel pool temperature has increased 1 degree to 86 F in approximately 4 hours. The tech spec limit on spent fuel pool temperature is 150 F. The licensee states that other unit electrical systems powered off the diesel, such as lighting and rad monitors, continue to operate normally at the reduced output frequency of the diesel. One security tower has been slightly impacted but appropriate compensatory measures were implemented.

A Millstone Unit 2/3 Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee has attempted to contact the Regional Inspector.

SCHEDULED LOSS OF ALL MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS TO SUPPORT PLANT MAINTENANCE

"At 01:45 PM CST on 2/1/2008, the Main Control Room annunciator system has been removed from service to support maintenance at River Bend Station. The duration of the work is expected to be completed in less than one (1) hour.

"During this time, other Main Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available to implement the Emergency Plan. Since the Main Control Room annunciator system will be unavailable, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"A follow-up notification will be made to the NRC after the Main Control Room annunciator system is returned to service.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The reactor is defueled and there are no major evolutions scheduled to occur during this period.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY TIM SCHENK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1530 EST ON 02/01/08 * * *

"Main Control Room annunciator system has been restored to service at 1528 EST."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Hay).

CONTAMINATION DETECTED IN SOURCE STORAGE ROOM IN 2008

The following is excerpted from statements recorded by the RSO on Aug 26th, 2009, concerning contamination discovered by the licensee in [the source storage room] Feb/Mar 2008, of their facility:

"1. A source being held in storage was discovered to have external contamination about Feb/Mar 2008. The source was being prepared for an upcoming disposal of sources. The source was in storage in a vault in the [source storage room at their facility]. This room is primarily used to do survey meter calibrations.

"2. When the contamination was discovered the techs were directed to not use the room. Any activities (detector calibrations) requiring that area were conducted by the RSO. The area was evaluated for contamination. Spots of contamination were found and found to exist only in the back room area. Decontamination of the area was done. The room was back into use for all techs to use by the summer of 2008.

"3. [The RSO] was made aware of the question of personnel contamination the spring of 2009. A device to assess such contamination is not readily available. A scanner to assess any such contamination does exist at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center. [The RSO] has recently made contact with the Commander in charge of the unit and have obtained information necessary to have access to the device. The basic detail for access is a cost of $1200 to have a scan performed.

"4. There are policies and procedures in place to deal with contamination.

"5. The question of contamination has only been raised recently and through the union as a grievance. An assessment of any contamination requires the availability of the device to obtain the information. Access to a scanner has been found and steps are to be taken to schedule the scan. The initial step will be the approval and allocation of funds to pay for the scan. Then arrangements can be made to have access to the Bethesda Naval Medical Center in order to do the scan."