Event Notification Report for January 29, 2008

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM NOT AVAILABLE FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY

"The D/C power supply for the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system instrumentation has failed resulting in the inability of HPCI to meet its requirement to support safely shutting down the reactor during a Station Blackout (Complete Loss of A/C Power) situation. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) function of HPCI is still available with the alternate A/C power supply."

The licensee is actively troubleshooting the power supply. The HPCI unavailability places the licensee in a 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation action statement.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM D. SEMETER TO P. SNYDER ON 3/27/08 AT 1300 * * *

"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 1/29/08 at 21:50 EST hours. This event (#43942) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The notification stated that the D.C. power supply for the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system instrumentation failed resulting in the inability of HPCI to meet its requirement to support safely shutting down the reactor during a Station Blackout (SBO) (Complete Loss of A/C Power) situation. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) function of HPCI is still available with the alternate A/C power supply.

"A review of the station's current licensing basis determined that HPCI is not credited with a safety function during a Station Blackout (SBO) event. Operating procedures direct securing HPCI early in an SBO event to minimize the discharge rate on the Class 1E batteries. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is credited with maintaining reactor inventory during a SBO event. HPCI remained capable of completing its safety function to inject coolant into the reactor pressure vessel during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) concurrent with loss of offsite power (LOOP) event. The Division 2 automatic initiation logic was inoperable but the Division 4 automatic initiation logic was unaffected by the Division 2 instrument power supply failure. Division 2 instrument power is required for HPCI automatic flow control and would not have been initially available during a LOOP event. However, the Division 2 instrument power would have been restored when the 480 VAC load center is re-energized approximately 13 seconds into the event. The 13 second delay in HPCl injection is offset by existing margin in HPCI's capability to meet the Technical Specification response time of 60 seconds.

"Therefore, a condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bellamy).

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP TO REPAIR RCP "2B1" SEAL PACKAGE

"St Lucie Plant, Unit 2, manually tripped the reactor at 0531 hrs. EST, as part of a controlled reactor plant shutdown, in response to an RCS leak rate of 0.28 gpm, indicated to be associated with the 2B1 Reactor Coolant Pump seal package. All systems functioned as expected, satisfactorily. All CEAs fully inserted. Decay Heat removal is with Steam Generators and Main Feedwater. This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."

Unit 2 will cooldown to Mode 5 for repairs.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ALAN HALL TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1218 EST ON 1/29/08 * * *

"St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, reported their manual reactor trip of 0531 hrs. EST, at 0630 hrs. EST, for an unidentified leak associated with the 2B1 RCP seal package (EN 43941). Subsequent investigation, reported to the STA [Shift Technical Advisor] at 1015 hrs. EST, determined that this leak constitutes an RCS Pressure Boundary Leak. This leak is at a pipe-to-flange weld on the outboard side of the first flanged coupling of the 2B1 RCP Upper Cavity Seal pressure sensing line. Investigation is in progress to determine the detailed configuration at the leak and root cause. There were NO ESFAS signals or actuations. Decay Heat Removal continues on Steam Generators, with MFW [Main Feedwater] and SBCS [Steam Bypass Control System]; Off-Site power continues [to be] available and stable; Unit 1 at 100% power with operations and conditions normal. This report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM SIGN

The State provided the following information via email:

"The general licensee reported a possible missing tritium sign on January 29, 2008. The sign (NRD, Inc, Model #3 T-4001, Serial # 91355) had been purchased in September of 1993. The licensee did a search for the missing sign. The search included questioning the electrical working crew leader and crew, electrical maintenance supervisor and a communication to the entire plant requesting information on the status of the sign. They also checked the area where bulbs and electrical material await recycling. The licensee believes the sign had been disposed of in the common trash."

Report NE080001

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source