Event Notification Report for January 14, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/13/2008 - 01/14/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43904
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/14/2008
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2008
Event Time: 16:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2008
Event Time: 16:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
PLANNED LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM
"At 1610 hours, on 1/14/2008, the Main Control Room annunciator system will be removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage at River Bend Station. The duration of the work is expected to be completed in less than 1 hour.
"During this time, other Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available to implement the Emergency Plan. Since the Main Control Room annunciator System will be unavailable, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"A follow-up notification will be made to the NRC after the Main Control Room annunciator system is returned to service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
No major systems in LCOs at this time and the only major ongoing activity is Fuel Handling.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GARY HUSTON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1809 ON 01/14/08 * * *
"Main control room annunciator system has been restored to service at 1708 CST."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
"At 1610 hours, on 1/14/2008, the Main Control Room annunciator system will be removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage at River Bend Station. The duration of the work is expected to be completed in less than 1 hour.
"During this time, other Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available to implement the Emergency Plan. Since the Main Control Room annunciator System will be unavailable, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"A follow-up notification will be made to the NRC after the Main Control Room annunciator system is returned to service.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
No major systems in LCOs at this time and the only major ongoing activity is Fuel Handling.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GARY HUSTON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1809 ON 01/14/08 * * *
"Main control room annunciator system has been restored to service at 1708 CST."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43923
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 01/22/2008
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2008
Event Time: 13:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2008
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2008
Event Time: 13:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF GROUP 5 AND GROUP 10 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VALVES DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"This is not an LER. The reports being made to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), and the 60 day telephone notification option under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). The event included invalid '. . .general isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. . .' as discussed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"The following information is provided as requested in NUREG-1022:
"(a) The specific train(s) and systems that were actuated?
"On January 14, 2008 at 13:41 hours. Unit 2 received invalid Division 1 Primary Containment isolation signals to both Group 5 (RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation valves) and Group 10 (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] system isolation valves) during Division 1 instrumentation surveillance testing. While performing testing, an incorrect lead was lifted causing this invalid actuation.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The event resulted in closure of the RCIC steam supply header outboard containment isolation valve. The Division 1 RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation valves were already closed at the time of the isolation signal.
"(b) Whether or not the system started and functioned as designed.
"The Primary Containment isolation instrumentation logic and associated valve closure function (for RCIC) actuated as designed."
The licensee took prompt actions to recover the RCIC and RHR systems.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is not an LER. The reports being made to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), and the 60 day telephone notification option under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). The event included invalid '. . .general isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. . .' as discussed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).
"The following information is provided as requested in NUREG-1022:
"(a) The specific train(s) and systems that were actuated?
"On January 14, 2008 at 13:41 hours. Unit 2 received invalid Division 1 Primary Containment isolation signals to both Group 5 (RHR Shutdown Cooling Isolation valves) and Group 10 (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] system isolation valves) during Division 1 instrumentation surveillance testing. While performing testing, an incorrect lead was lifted causing this invalid actuation.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The event resulted in closure of the RCIC steam supply header outboard containment isolation valve. The Division 1 RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation valves were already closed at the time of the isolation signal.
"(b) Whether or not the system started and functioned as designed.
"The Primary Containment isolation instrumentation logic and associated valve closure function (for RCIC) actuated as designed."
The licensee took prompt actions to recover the RCIC and RHR systems.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.