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Event Notification Report for January 12, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2008 - 01/12/2008

EVENT NUMBERS
43896438974389843899

Power Reactor
Event Number: 43896
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID FUNK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/12/2008
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2008
Event Time: 05:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TWO ROD POSITION INDICATORS (RPIs) OUT IN ONE ROD BANK

"At 0451 [EST, the licensee] entered into [Technical Specification (TS)] 3.0.3 due to observed RPI B-10 erratic indication. This RPI is in the same bank as currently inoperable F-2 RPI. TS 3.1.3.2 has actions for a maximum of one RPI per bank inoperable. Since there are two [RPIs inoperable] in one bank, an entry into TS 3.0.3 is required.

"Power reduction was initiated at 0541.

"Repairs are currently in progress and [the licensee] anticipates correction prior to completion of the power reduction."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

See event notification #43888 for similar report.

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID FUNK TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 01/12/08 AT 1049 EST * * *

Repairs have been completed and B-10 Rod Position Indicator has been returned to service. At 1010 EST, the licensee exited TS 3.0.3 and power ascension to 100% is in progress.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann).


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43897
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/12/2008
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
Event Text
BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS

"During a project review for the recovery of uranium generated by the chemical laboratory in the Fuel Manufacturing/Operations (FMO) complex, it was discovered that ten (10) laboratory generated cans of material had been improperly stored on a conveyor system. The cans of material came from the FMO chemical laboratory that generated them from its process. The material consisted of both dry uranium powder/pellets and wet ammonium diurinate (ADU). Each can contained approximately 16kg of uranium.

"After the material was placed in the cans, it was given an incorrect material type indicating it contained only dry material. When the material was moved from the chemical lab to a storage area in preparation for processing, it was improperly stored on a conveyor which was only authorized for dry material. The second controlled parameter (mass of uranium in each can) was maintained at all times.

"Upon discovery of this condition, the ten (10) cans were immediately placed on skids on the conveyor to provide the necessary spacing between each can.

"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 within 24 hours of discovery.

"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS:

"The basis of criticality safety relies on spacing of cans (geometry) and mass as independent criticality safety controls.

"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS:

"1 - Mass control remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed.

"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION:

"1 - Control on can spacing was lost since skids were not used to separate moderated cans on the conveyor.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:

"Low Safety Significance - independent control on mass remained intact - additional failure
modes required before a criticality accident could occur. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe.

"SAFETY EOUIPMENT STATUS:

"All ten (10) cans were placed on skids on the conveyor system and will await further processing.

"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

"Corrective and preventative actions will be identified as part of the incident investigation."

The cans were improperly stored for several weeks. The licensee will be making notifications to NRC Region 2, the State of North Carolina and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43898
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRANDON SHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/12/2008
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2008
Event Time: 09:04 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
VALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING EDG GOVERNOR TESTING

"An overvoltage condition occurred on the D23 Safeguards 4kv bus during planned system outage window EDG governor testing. The EDG output breaker was immediately opened and the engine secured per test direction. Due to the output breaker being opened, the D23 bus then experienced an undervoltage condition. Bus voltage monitoring instrumentation automatically initiated automatic closure of the 201-D23 Bus Offsite Supply Feed Breaker after a 1 second time delay and re-energized the D23 Safeguards Bus per design.

"The remaining three 4kv buses and Emergency Diesel Generators were unaffected and remain operable."

The voltage regulation circuit is being investigated at this time to assist in determining the cause of the overvoltage condition. The EDG was out of service and inoperable during the testing. The EDG governor was replaced during the outage window and was being fine tuned when the event occurred. The licensee is currently in day 6 of a 30 day LCO (3.8.1.1).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43899
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4     State: MS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: FRANK WEAVER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/12/2008
Notification Time: 20:57 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2008
Event Time: 16:26 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 98 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DEGRADED COOLING TO MAIN TRANSFORMERS

"On 1/12/08 at 1626 hours a manual scram was inserted due to degraded cooling on the main transformers. All control rods fully inserted and all systems actuated and/or operated as designed. No safety relief valves opened during the event and reactor pressure is currently being controlled within normal bands with bypass valves. Reactor water level is also being controlled within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. Group 2 and 3 isolation signals were received however, no valve movement occurred since these valves are normally closed."

The licensee is investigating a potential electrical fault which may have caused the event, but it appears that there was an electrical fault in the transformer cooling system. The grid is normal with no transmission system warnings in effect. All feeds are available. Reactor vessel level is 32.6 inches stable with normal condensate system feeding the vessel. Primary plant pressure is 815 psig. All safety and BOP electrical buses are energized normally. No bus power was lost. Decay heat path is via bypass valves to the main condenser.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.