Event Notification Report for January 06, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/05/2008 - 01/06/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
43884
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43884
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/06/2008
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
STEVEN VIAS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST
"During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds. The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION BY K. LONG TO R. ALEXANDER AT 1109 EST ON 03/04/2008 * * *
"The initial notification was made as a result of the failure of HPCI to meet its response time of 50 seconds as defined in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) due to a degraded component. Failure to meet the operability procedure requirements resulted in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system being considered inoperable. Since HPCl is a single train system, its inoperability was the event that warranted a notification to meet the following reporting requirement:
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"An additional review and evaluation of the licensing basis was performed and demonstrated that the procedural required response time was set conservatively. As expected, the licensing basis does not require or assume any specific start time and HPCl is not credited in the accident analyses. The acceptance criterion contained in the TRM is within licensee control via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Consequently, the TRM criterion was revised to 75 seconds to retain a value to assure continued monitoring and trending of HPCl performance in order to recognize and prevent continued performance degradation. Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that HPCl would have completed its mission time of 4 hours despite the degraded condition of the EGR [Electronic Governor Remote] that caused the initial slower response time. This is based on the fact that HPCl started and ran at rated flow and pressure for approximately 39 minutes prior to shutdown with no problems identified. This removes any questions regarding its ability to restart and run based on demand during its mission time of 4 hours. An industry expert on this system and the engineer from the vendor that supports this system concurred with that conclusion.
"Since this subsequent review and evaluation determined that the slower response time did not render HPCl inoperable, no single train failure of HPCl occurred. The system was fully capable of performing its intended safety functions during the event timeline. Based on this information this notification serves to retract notification # 43884 made on 1/06/08."
The licensee notified the Resident Inspector of this retraction.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
"During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds. The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION BY K. LONG TO R. ALEXANDER AT 1109 EST ON 03/04/2008 * * *
"The initial notification was made as a result of the failure of HPCI to meet its response time of 50 seconds as defined in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) due to a degraded component. Failure to meet the operability procedure requirements resulted in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system being considered inoperable. Since HPCl is a single train system, its inoperability was the event that warranted a notification to meet the following reporting requirement:
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"An additional review and evaluation of the licensing basis was performed and demonstrated that the procedural required response time was set conservatively. As expected, the licensing basis does not require or assume any specific start time and HPCl is not credited in the accident analyses. The acceptance criterion contained in the TRM is within licensee control via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Consequently, the TRM criterion was revised to 75 seconds to retain a value to assure continued monitoring and trending of HPCl performance in order to recognize and prevent continued performance degradation. Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that HPCl would have completed its mission time of 4 hours despite the degraded condition of the EGR [Electronic Governor Remote] that caused the initial slower response time. This is based on the fact that HPCl started and ran at rated flow and pressure for approximately 39 minutes prior to shutdown with no problems identified. This removes any questions regarding its ability to restart and run based on demand during its mission time of 4 hours. An industry expert on this system and the engineer from the vendor that supports this system concurred with that conclusion.
"Since this subsequent review and evaluation determined that the slower response time did not render HPCl inoperable, no single train failure of HPCl occurred. The system was fully capable of performing its intended safety functions during the event timeline. Based on this information this notification serves to retract notification # 43884 made on 1/06/08."
The licensee notified the Resident Inspector of this retraction.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).