Event Notification Report for November 20, 2007

FAILURE OF UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM

"At 2028 CDST, on 11-20-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System failed to function when performing the twice per shift test firing. The test firing of the PGLD detector heads is required per TSR-SR 2.4.4.1-1. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7, Section 3, and Section 4 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this failure, unit 6 cell 7 and some areas of Section 3 and Section 4 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 7 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Section 3 and Section 4 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 and 2.4.4.1.C.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. Troubleshooting indicated the failure was not similar to writing failures recently experienced on other PGLD systems. The two components most susceptible to failure have been replaced and investigations continue into root cause. The system had functioned correctly when the previous test firing was performed at 1430 hours on 11-20-07. However, since the failure potentially occurred prior to the test firing at 2028 hours the event is being reported as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when (a) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; (b) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and (c) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

TAMPER SEALS BROKEN ON UF6 SHIPPING CANISTER

"A regularly scheduled shipment of Uranium Hexaflouride from an overseas supplier arrived at the Columbia site. During routine inspection for receipt it was noted that one of the overpacks had both tamper indicating devices compromised. The shipment was not accepted. On November 20 at approximately 1130 Westinghouse notified Law Enforcement and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control.

"Notification is being made based on the potential for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made, shall be reported to the NRC Operations Center concurrent to the news release or other notification', reference Appendix A, Section (c) to Part 70 of 10CFR70.

"At no time has the integrity of the overpack or container been challenged, nor has it been removed from the conveyance. The loaded trailer is located where plant security personnel can maintain visual and video surveillance.

"Cylinder remains in the overpack, which is located on the transport conveyance in a secure location at the entrance to the Site Property.

"The Columbia Site, the shipper and transport company are evaluating the appropriate path forward for disposition."

* * * UPDATE FROM G. COUTURE TO P. SNYDER AT 1514 ON 11/21/07 * * *

Local law enforcement came to the site and surveyed the overpack with an explosive detection canine unit. The surveys were clean.

Notified R2DO (Henson), ILTAB (Hahn) and NSIR (Giantelli), FSME EO (Mohseni).

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"On November 20, 2007, at 0505 hours, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to an inoperable Air Filtration Unit (AFU). During monthly testing it was discovered that the AFU heater failed to operate as required. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven days. This notification is being made in accordance with I0CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function, because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Troubleshooting is in progress to determine the cause of the AFU heater failure to start."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA).

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECT INOPERABLE

"On November 20, 2007 at 0630 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, a power supply failure was discovered in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) flow controller circuitry that may have precluded the system from performing its design basis function. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(v) an eight-hour notification is being made.

"As background, on November 18, 2007, at 2145 hours, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The required risk analysis was performed and the appropriate 14 day limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.C. Later on November 19, 2007 at approximately 2100 hours the planned maintenance had been completed and HPCI was restored to the normal standby line-up in preparation for post maintenance testing (PMT). The HPCI valve quarterly operability and HPCI pump and valve quarterly operability tests were performed as the prescribed PMT. Upon initiation, the HPCI turbine was observed to come up to expected rated speed (~4,200 rpm) and expected HPCI pump discharge pressure (~1,300 psig). However HPCI pump indicated discharge flow was observed to be ~2,300 gpm, which is less than the Technical Specification requirement of 4,250 gpm. The HPCI system was secured and remained in the original TS 3.5.C LCO and a troubleshooting plan was initiated.

"On November 20, 2007, at 0630 hours, troubleshooting identified a power supply failure in the HPCI flow control circuitry. A replacement flow controller was identified and installed and it is anticipated that appropriate PMT will be initiated by 1600 hours. The impact of the power supply failure for the design basis operability for HPCl could not be definitively established before the eight-hour notification requirement of 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(v) was exceeded."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE NOYES TO JOE O'HARA AT 1751 ON 1/14/08 * * *

"NRC Notification 43794 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met pending the evaluation of an atypical condition (low reading) observed with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Flow Controller while performing scheduled surveillance testing for the HPCI System.

"During surveillance testing on 11/18/07, the HPCI System was started and met or exceeded the Technical Specification minimum requirements designed to demonstrate HPCI System Operability. While testing the specific components of the system, the HPCI Flow Controller was observed to be behaving erratically. Although the HPCI System was still capable of performing its required design safety function, the Shift Manager declared the system inoperable since he did not have definitive indication that the turbine was providing the required flow.

"Troubleshooting of the flow controller determined that the low flow indication was due to a degraded transmitter power supply located internal to flow controller FIC-2340-1. FIC-2340-1 is located in the main control room and is used to control HPCI system flow rate, and provide power to flow transmitter FT-2358. Although indicated flow rate was only 2300 gpm due to the degraded power supply, actual flow rate was approximately 5400 gpm based on pump hydraulic curves.

"The power supply in question only supplies power to FT-2358. Normal required supply voltage from this power supply is 28VDC to 36VDC. The degraded power supply could only supply 22.4VDC at the transmitter FT-2358 terminals. The degraded power supply voltage caused transmitter to output a lower than normal current for the actual measured flow rate giving a false low flow rate to FIC-2340-1.

"An Apparent Cause Evaluation and Past Operability Evaluation were performed in response to this event. These evaluations concluded that HPCI System was capable of performing its intended safety functions with the transmitter power supply degraded. HPCI system was capable of performing its intended safety functions during the time when FIC-2340-1 transmitter power supply exhibited low output voltage. HPCI would have started and supplied design basis flow to reactor vessel under design basis conditions. Thus there would have no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"ENS Event Number 43794, made on 11/20/2007, is being retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority.

Notified R1DO(Cobey)