Event Notification Report for November 16, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/15/2007 - 11/16/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43800
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT, FISHER
Licensee: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT, FISHER DIVISION
Region: 3
City: MARSHALTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE A. SUK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT, FISHER DIVISION
Region: 3
City: MARSHALTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE A. SUK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/21/2007
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2007
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/21/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
JAMES DWYER (R1)
JAY HENSON (R2)
C. VERNON HODGE (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
MARK RING (R3)
JAMES DWYER (R1)
JAY HENSON (R2)
C. VERNON HODGE (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
PART 21 REPORT ON WELDING OF SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS
"SUBJECT: Welder Qualification
"PURPOSE: The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert customers that as of November 16, 2007, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation related to welding of safety-related components at the Fisher Controls Marshalltown facility.
"We are informing our customers of record of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21 because Fisher Controls International LLC is not aware of each and every application or system design utilized by our customers therefore cannot determine whether an anomaly could cause a defect or 'failure to comply', relating to a substantial safety hazard.
"Receipt of this notice does not necessarily mean that the recipient has been shipped any of the subject equipment. It is expected that the recipients of this notice will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and if required, take the appropriate action as described in the section at the end of this notice.
"APPLICABILITY: This notice applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher Controls International LLC identified [below].
"DISCUSSION: During an internal audit, it was determined that one welder was missing the necessary qualification documentation to weld repair ASME SA351-CF8M or ASME SA479-S31600 (P-No 8) material using ASME SFA-5.4 Grade E316L filler (categorized as an F-No. 5 filler in ASME Section IX), using the shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) process. Fisher has conducted a review of all applicable weld records and compiled a list of all applicable orders, based on a June 2005, date of hire.
"A Corrective Action Request (CAR) has been initiated to determine root cause and appropriate corrective actions.
"Fisher has not, as of the date of this notice, found any indication that the valves will not continue to function as designed. In order to support this position. Fisher submits the following facts:
"- Fisher has determined that all filler material used for these weld repairs were the correct ASME code material.
"- For pressure boundary parts, weld repaired material successfully completed a production hydro.
"- Once the issue was discovered, the welder successfully qualified for the missing process and filler combination.
"Note: Fisher is continuing to investigate. If necessary, updates will be made when more information becomes available.
"ACTIONS REQURED: No action is required for plants that do not have the subject equipment. If your plant has installed any of the equipment identified by this notice, based on the information gathered to date, Fisher has no reason to believe that the affected parts will not perform their intended valve function. If your plant has not installed any of the equipment identified by this notice, contact your local Fisher Representative Sales Office regarding appropriate corrective action.
"IMPLICATIONS: The recipient of this notice is requested to review the information contained in this notice to determine its applicability to his/her facility. If no equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been provided by Fisher Controls International LLC, then no further action is required. If equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been supplied and used in a safety-related application, Fisher Controls requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21."
The following are the plant sites to which this notice applies: Catawba, Davis-Besse, Oconee, Salem, St. Lucie.
"SUBJECT: Welder Qualification
"PURPOSE: The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert customers that as of November 16, 2007, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation related to welding of safety-related components at the Fisher Controls Marshalltown facility.
"We are informing our customers of record of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21 because Fisher Controls International LLC is not aware of each and every application or system design utilized by our customers therefore cannot determine whether an anomaly could cause a defect or 'failure to comply', relating to a substantial safety hazard.
"Receipt of this notice does not necessarily mean that the recipient has been shipped any of the subject equipment. It is expected that the recipients of this notice will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and if required, take the appropriate action as described in the section at the end of this notice.
"APPLICABILITY: This notice applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher Controls International LLC identified [below].
"DISCUSSION: During an internal audit, it was determined that one welder was missing the necessary qualification documentation to weld repair ASME SA351-CF8M or ASME SA479-S31600 (P-No 8) material using ASME SFA-5.4 Grade E316L filler (categorized as an F-No. 5 filler in ASME Section IX), using the shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) process. Fisher has conducted a review of all applicable weld records and compiled a list of all applicable orders, based on a June 2005, date of hire.
"A Corrective Action Request (CAR) has been initiated to determine root cause and appropriate corrective actions.
"Fisher has not, as of the date of this notice, found any indication that the valves will not continue to function as designed. In order to support this position. Fisher submits the following facts:
"- Fisher has determined that all filler material used for these weld repairs were the correct ASME code material.
"- For pressure boundary parts, weld repaired material successfully completed a production hydro.
"- Once the issue was discovered, the welder successfully qualified for the missing process and filler combination.
"Note: Fisher is continuing to investigate. If necessary, updates will be made when more information becomes available.
"ACTIONS REQURED: No action is required for plants that do not have the subject equipment. If your plant has installed any of the equipment identified by this notice, based on the information gathered to date, Fisher has no reason to believe that the affected parts will not perform their intended valve function. If your plant has not installed any of the equipment identified by this notice, contact your local Fisher Representative Sales Office regarding appropriate corrective action.
"IMPLICATIONS: The recipient of this notice is requested to review the information contained in this notice to determine its applicability to his/her facility. If no equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been provided by Fisher Controls International LLC, then no further action is required. If equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been supplied and used in a safety-related application, Fisher Controls requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21."
The following are the plant sites to which this notice applies: Catawba, Davis-Besse, Oconee, Salem, St. Lucie.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43788
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK KRUSE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/16/2007
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2007
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGREDATION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
"At approximately 1100 CST on Friday November 16, 2007, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant determined that there had been a degradation of the Emergency Preparedness response capabilities when the Emergency Response Data System, Offsite Dose Projection (MIDAS), Safety Data Parameter System, selected telephones, and site computer terminals became inoperable in the Technical Support Center (TSC). The loss of these systems is associated with a partial loss of power to the TSC. As a result of these conditions, the TSC was declared non-functional. Emergency Communications remain available with the Emergency Telecommunication System, and Health Physics Network being operable.
"Monticello has verified operability of the ERO notification system (pagers), and the communication circuit used to notify the state and local counties. The siren system for local counties was unaffected by loss of site systems. Plant page and radio systems remain operable. Adequate communications capabilities are operable at this time to implement the emergency plan.
"The site's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which is the back-up facility for the TSC, is fully operational and measures are being implemented to direct TSC personnel to the near site EOF in the event of an actual emergency condition.
"The station has informed Wright and Sherburne counties and the Minnesota State Duty Officer of this condition.
"Troubleshooting efforts are in progress. A return to service time for all systems is to be determined. Monticello has determined that this event is reportable to the NRC as an 8-hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM K. HAUGEN TO P. SNYDER AT 1253 ON 11/17/07 * * *
The TSC has been restored to an operable configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Passehl).
"At approximately 1100 CST on Friday November 16, 2007, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant determined that there had been a degradation of the Emergency Preparedness response capabilities when the Emergency Response Data System, Offsite Dose Projection (MIDAS), Safety Data Parameter System, selected telephones, and site computer terminals became inoperable in the Technical Support Center (TSC). The loss of these systems is associated with a partial loss of power to the TSC. As a result of these conditions, the TSC was declared non-functional. Emergency Communications remain available with the Emergency Telecommunication System, and Health Physics Network being operable.
"Monticello has verified operability of the ERO notification system (pagers), and the communication circuit used to notify the state and local counties. The siren system for local counties was unaffected by loss of site systems. Plant page and radio systems remain operable. Adequate communications capabilities are operable at this time to implement the emergency plan.
"The site's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), which is the back-up facility for the TSC, is fully operational and measures are being implemented to direct TSC personnel to the near site EOF in the event of an actual emergency condition.
"The station has informed Wright and Sherburne counties and the Minnesota State Duty Officer of this condition.
"Troubleshooting efforts are in progress. A return to service time for all systems is to be determined. Monticello has determined that this event is reportable to the NRC as an 8-hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM K. HAUGEN TO P. SNYDER AT 1253 ON 11/17/07 * * *
The TSC has been restored to an operable configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Passehl).
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 43789
Rep Org: CRAIG TESTING LABORATORYS
Licensee: CRAIG TESTING LABORATORYS
Region: 1
City: MAYS LANDING State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18018-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IAN CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: CRAIG TESTING LABORATORYS
Region: 1
City: MAYS LANDING State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-18018-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: IAN CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 11/17/2007
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2011
Notification Time: 09:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2007
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
ILTAB EMAIL
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (FSME)
ILTAB EMAIL
LOST TROXLER GAUGE MODEL 3430; S/N 33784
On 11/16/07 at 1830, an employee of Craig Testing Laboratory was traveling from a McDonald's restaurant to a Wawa convenience store. When the employee reached the convenience store, he noticed the tailgate of his truck was down, and the Troxler moisture density gauge model 3430; serial number 33784 was missing. The employee notified the company RSO and the Hamilton Township Police Department (Case No. 07-63766). A search of the traveled route near the intersection of route 40 and route 50 was conducted without success. The employee stated that when he was at the restaurant the gauge was present in the back of the pickup truck but not properly secured under lock and key. However, when the employee reached the convenience store (which was about a mile away) the gauge and other items were missing. Those other items included a box of concrete cylinder molds and a concrete pressure meter. The licensee does not believe the items were stolen. The licensee believes the gauge and items fell out of the truck. The activity of the sources are: Am-241 (40 millicuries) and Cs-137 (8 millicuries). The licensee has searched e-Bay and Craig's List and is placing reward ads in the local area and ads in the local newspaper.
* * * UPDATE FROM IAN CRAIG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1416 EDT ON 4/27/11 * * *
This morning, the licensee recovered the gauge from a private citizen. The citizen stated that he received the gauge from an acquaintance. The gauge was intact and in pristine condition. Radiation surveys were normal and the source was secure and shielded. The licensee is awaiting leak test results before placing the gauge back in service.
The State of New Jersey will be notified by the licensee as it is now an Agreement State. The licensee's New Jersey license is RAD110001-507930.
Notified R1DO (Schmidt), FSME EO (McIntosh) and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
On 11/16/07 at 1830, an employee of Craig Testing Laboratory was traveling from a McDonald's restaurant to a Wawa convenience store. When the employee reached the convenience store, he noticed the tailgate of his truck was down, and the Troxler moisture density gauge model 3430; serial number 33784 was missing. The employee notified the company RSO and the Hamilton Township Police Department (Case No. 07-63766). A search of the traveled route near the intersection of route 40 and route 50 was conducted without success. The employee stated that when he was at the restaurant the gauge was present in the back of the pickup truck but not properly secured under lock and key. However, when the employee reached the convenience store (which was about a mile away) the gauge and other items were missing. Those other items included a box of concrete cylinder molds and a concrete pressure meter. The licensee does not believe the items were stolen. The licensee believes the gauge and items fell out of the truck. The activity of the sources are: Am-241 (40 millicuries) and Cs-137 (8 millicuries). The licensee has searched e-Bay and Craig's List and is placing reward ads in the local area and ads in the local newspaper.
* * * UPDATE FROM IAN CRAIG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1416 EDT ON 4/27/11 * * *
This morning, the licensee recovered the gauge from a private citizen. The citizen stated that he received the gauge from an acquaintance. The gauge was intact and in pristine condition. Radiation surveys were normal and the source was secure and shielded. The licensee is awaiting leak test results before placing the gauge back in service.
The State of New Jersey will be notified by the licensee as it is now an Agreement State. The licensee's New Jersey license is RAD110001-507930.
Notified R1DO (Schmidt), FSME EO (McIntosh) and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source