Event Notification Report for November 14, 2007

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL SPILL ONSITE

"During Construction Activities for a new Security Training facility, an earth mover overturned resulting in a spill of diesel fuel, hydraulic fluid, and engine coolant. The magnitude of the spill is not positively known at this time, but is believed to be less than 50 gallons. The event occurred outside the Protected Area. No personnel were injured during the event. The New York State Department of Environment Conservation (NY DEC) has been notified per plant procedures (Avon Office DEC Spill #75111)." At the time of this report, the earth mover was still overturned and the licensee is taking actions to resolve. No media interest is anticipated as a result of this incident.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - AREVA 4kV CUTLER HAMMER BREAKERS

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"In accordance with 10CFR21.21(d)(3), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is making notification of a defect in a basic component supplied to Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (Farley). A 10CFR21 report regarding a defect associated with Model MA-VR-350 4160 V circuit breakers supplied by AREVA was made by AREVA to SNC on October 3, 2007. The breaker design incorporates the use of a C-clip which may not have been properly installed or that can become dislodged from its groove on the Main Link Assembly pin which holds the Banana Link in place. If the Banana Link becomes disengaged from the Main link Assembly pin, the breaker will charge, but not close or it will leave the breaker in a 'trip-free' condition.

"The Model MA-VR-350 4160 V circuit breakers are used in the plant safety related 4160 V switchgear and serve as pump motor supply breakers for multiple safety related applications, e.g., component cooling water, low-head and high-head safety injection, containment spray, auxiliary feedwater, as well as the emergency diesel generator output breakers. Currently, there are breakers in stock and installed. Consequentially, their postulated failure in these critical applications could create a substantial safety hazard.

"Existing plant procedures already included pre-installation inspection steps for the Model MA-VCR-350 4160 V circuit breakers to identify loose nuts, bolts, retaining rings, or other hardware. In response to this concern, SNC revised plant procedures to add the C-clips to the inspection list to verify they are properly seated on the main link. Given the multiple examinations that were being conducted on the breakers in accordance with existing procedures, and the subsequent procedure enhancements that have been made to examine the C-clips, SNC determined that the installed breakers would continue to operate as designed on demand.

"As recommended by AREVA, a visual inspection, of the Model MA-VR-350 4160 V circuit breakers should be performed at regular maintenance intervals to insure proper installation of the C-clip on the main link assembly."

SNC has been in contact with NRC Region II (Scott Shaffer, Chuck Casto) and has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

24-HR INCIDENT REPORT - SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION

"At 0830 hours, Autoclave #5 in the X-343 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarm (B) actuating. The autoclave was in TSR applicable Mode IV 'Feeding, Transfer or Sampling' when the actuation occurred. This is considered a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System. The autoclave was placed in Mode VII 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuation. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This is being reported in accordance with UE-RA-RE1030 Appendix D.J.2. 'Safety Equipment Actuations.'"

The licensee notified the NRC Program Manager and will notify the DOE site representative.

* * * RETRACTION FROM G. SALYERS TO P. SNYDER AT 1553 ON 11/20/07 * * *

"Following an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident by PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Engineering, a recommendation was made to the PSS Office that this event be retracted. The recommendation was based upon the determination that 'Steam Shutdown' occurred as a result of an invalid signal to 'B' condensate level alarm. The follow-up testing of the redundant 'A' condensate level probe and condensate drain system confirmed a high condensate level condition was not present when 'B' condensate level alarm actuated. Per the reporting criteria as stated in PORTS SAR section 6.9, Table 1, criteria J.2, this is not a reportable event due to the 'Q' system actuation being caused by an invalid signal. Based upon the information provided, the PORTS PSS Office is retracting this event."

Notified R2DO (Henson) and FSME EO (Morell).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST Cs-137 SOURCE HOLDER

"Ohmart-VEGA RSO was informed on 11/14/07 that a shipment of SR-1A source holders sent to Gibraltar Mines in McLeese Lake, BC, Canada has been lost in transit. The missing consignment consists of 5 devices, each containing 100 mCi of Cs-137. The shipment left the Ohmart facility on 10/25/07. The Ohmart representative in Canada [DELETED] is leading the effort to locate the missing shipment. [DELETED] of the CNSC was notified by Canadian Freightways personnel on 11/14/07.

"TST Overland confirms turning over (2) skids to Canadian Freightways on Oct 29, 2007 in Burnaby, BC for furtherance to McLeese Lake, BC. One skid containing detectors was delivered to the customer in McLeese Lake. [DELETED] was unaware of this missing item until he received a phone call from the customer. He is pressing the trucking company to locate the equipment.

"Timeline as currently known:
TST-Overland picked up two skids at Ohmart-Vega in Cincinnati, OH on 10/25/07; TST signed for them on waybill 766-4148797.
TST-Overland moved the shipment through Sarnia, ON for delivery to TST-Porter Burnaby, BC.
TST-Porter in Burnaby verified receipt of two skids.
CFL was called to pick up 2 skids from TST-Porter in Burnaby on waybill 354-982526 per the attached copy.
CFL delivered the shipment of one pallet only to Williams Lake November 2.
Trace started with CFL November 9."

Devices are five Sealed Source Fixed Gauges activity of 100 mCi each Serial Numbers (5943CN, 5950CN, 6157CN, 6160CN, 6165CN).

Ohio report number: OH070006

* * * UPDATE AT 0845 ON 11/23/07 FROM B. BEAUDIN TO P. SNYDER * * *

Mr. Beaudin from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission called with information that the missing sources were found intact in Burnaby, B.C. The sources were never lost. They were misplaced and located in a warehouse at a different location than expected.

Notified Ohio (S. James), R3DO (M. Ring) and FSME EO (A. Mohseni). Notified via email R4DO (J. Clark), FSME NMED PM (Burgess), R3 SLO (via M. Ring), R4 SLO (McLean, Erickson), OIP (Baker, Dembeck) and ILTAB.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.