Event Notification Report for November 08, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/07/2007 - 11/08/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43855
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43855
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/20/2007
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2007
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2007
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2007
Event Time: 10:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On November 8, 2007, at 1021 hours, with Unit 2 shutdown for a planned mid-cycle outage to remove a defective fuel bundle and conduct other maintenance activities, two primary containment isolation valves in different systems closed unexpectedly. The valves closed during application of a clearance section that inadvertently created a false primary containment isolation signal.
"None of the plant conditions which require PCIS Group 5 or 7 actuation (low reactor water level, high reactor pressure, high area temperature, etc.) existed; therefore, these actuations are considered invalid.
"The following two primary containment isolation valve isolations/actuations occurred:
- Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling supply inside isolation valve (2RHS*MOV112, Group 5)
- Reactor Water Cleanup supply from Reactor Coolant System and Reactor Pressure Vessel inside isolation valve (2WCS*MOV102, Group 7)
"The valves functioned successfully as they cycled completely from full open to full closed.
"The event was entered into NMP's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this report.
"Reference corrective action document CR 2007-6769."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On November 8, 2007, at 1021 hours, with Unit 2 shutdown for a planned mid-cycle outage to remove a defective fuel bundle and conduct other maintenance activities, two primary containment isolation valves in different systems closed unexpectedly. The valves closed during application of a clearance section that inadvertently created a false primary containment isolation signal.
"None of the plant conditions which require PCIS Group 5 or 7 actuation (low reactor water level, high reactor pressure, high area temperature, etc.) existed; therefore, these actuations are considered invalid.
"The following two primary containment isolation valve isolations/actuations occurred:
- Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling supply inside isolation valve (2RHS*MOV112, Group 5)
- Reactor Water Cleanup supply from Reactor Coolant System and Reactor Pressure Vessel inside isolation valve (2WCS*MOV102, Group 7)
"The valves functioned successfully as they cycled completely from full open to full closed.
"The event was entered into NMP's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this report.
"Reference corrective action document CR 2007-6769."