Event Notification Report for October 22, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/21/2007 - 10/22/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43736
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/22/2007
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2007
Event Time: 03:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2007
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2007
Event Time: 03:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/22/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE STEAM DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP
"The following report is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On Monday October 22, 2007, at 0311 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 initiated a normal reactor shutdown to comply with condition C of Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5. At 0504 MST Mode 3 was entered.
"LCO 3.7.5 requires that three auxiliary feedwater (AF) pumps be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The shutdown was necessary due to an inoperable steam supply for the essential steam driven AF pump turbine. The steam supply had been declared inoperable on October 15, 2007, at 0904 MST and will not be restored to operable status within the TS required 7 day completion time. Efforts are in progress to correct the condition.
"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following report is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On Monday October 22, 2007, at 0311 Mountain Standard Time (MST) Palo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1 initiated a normal reactor shutdown to comply with condition C of Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5. At 0504 MST Mode 3 was entered.
"LCO 3.7.5 requires that three auxiliary feedwater (AF) pumps be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The shutdown was necessary due to an inoperable steam supply for the essential steam driven AF pump turbine. The steam supply had been declared inoperable on October 15, 2007, at 0904 MST and will not be restored to operable status within the TS required 7 day completion time. Efforts are in progress to correct the condition.
"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43850
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/18/2007
Notification Time: 10:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2007
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2007
Notification Time: 10:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2007
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of a 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system. NUREG 1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that is to be reported as discussed below.
"On October 22. 2007, at 1830 hours, Division 2 of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was being placed in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) following completion of a SDC outage. The plant was in Mode 5, Refueling. Reactor Protection System (RPS) A was deenergized for maintenance. RPS B was being supplied by the alternate supply because the B RPS Motor Generator was removed from service for maintenance. Upon start of the RHR D pump motor the RPS B Alternate Supply Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers tripped due to sensed undervoltage. The loss of the power supply to RPS B resulted in the following: A reactor scram (all rods were already fully inserted), RHR SDC outboard valve isolation, trip of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU), outboard valve isolation of the Torus Water Management System (TWMS).
"A secondary containment isolation also occurred resulting in a trip of Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), auto start of Division 2 of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), and shift of the Control Center HVAC system to recirculation mode. All actuations and isolations were as expected for existing plant conditions. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual plant parameter, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of a safety function. Due to the actuation of equipment in multiple systems that were not removed from service or otherwise prevented from changing states, this event is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an invalid actuation of one of the specified systems.
"The reactor scram actuation was complete because a half scram was already present due to RPS A being deenergized for maintenance. The Division 2 SGTS system automatically started, secondary containment fully isolated, Reactor Building HVAC system tripped, and the Control Center HVAC fully shifted into the recirculation mode. The following were partial isolations due to loss of RPS B, Division 2: RHR SDC isolation and TWMS isolation.
"All systems functioned properly in response to the RPS power loss based on refuel outage system configurations."
The licensee believes that the cause of the undervoltage was a result of the start of the RHR pump which caused an in-rush current. The licensee is considering a design change, and captured this event in their corrective action program system as CARD 07-26537.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of a 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system. NUREG 1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that is to be reported as discussed below.
"On October 22. 2007, at 1830 hours, Division 2 of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was being placed in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) following completion of a SDC outage. The plant was in Mode 5, Refueling. Reactor Protection System (RPS) A was deenergized for maintenance. RPS B was being supplied by the alternate supply because the B RPS Motor Generator was removed from service for maintenance. Upon start of the RHR D pump motor the RPS B Alternate Supply Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers tripped due to sensed undervoltage. The loss of the power supply to RPS B resulted in the following: A reactor scram (all rods were already fully inserted), RHR SDC outboard valve isolation, trip of the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU), outboard valve isolation of the Torus Water Management System (TWMS).
"A secondary containment isolation also occurred resulting in a trip of Reactor Building Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), auto start of Division 2 of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), and shift of the Control Center HVAC system to recirculation mode. All actuations and isolations were as expected for existing plant conditions. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual plant parameter, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of a safety function. Due to the actuation of equipment in multiple systems that were not removed from service or otherwise prevented from changing states, this event is reportable under 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an invalid actuation of one of the specified systems.
"The reactor scram actuation was complete because a half scram was already present due to RPS A being deenergized for maintenance. The Division 2 SGTS system automatically started, secondary containment fully isolated, Reactor Building HVAC system tripped, and the Control Center HVAC fully shifted into the recirculation mode. The following were partial isolations due to loss of RPS B, Division 2: RHR SDC isolation and TWMS isolation.
"All systems functioned properly in response to the RPS power loss based on refuel outage system configurations."
The licensee believes that the cause of the undervoltage was a result of the start of the RHR pump which caused an in-rush current. The licensee is considering a design change, and captured this event in their corrective action program system as CARD 07-26537.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.