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Event Notification Report for October 10, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/09/2007 - 10/10/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
4371143709437054370643766

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43711
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/11/2007
Notification Time: 05:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 22:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BEINOY DESAI (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNIT 2 HPCI PUMP SEAL FAILURE

"On 10/10/2007 a 2245, the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump developed a leak of approximately 5 gpm due to a suspected pump seal failure.

"HPCI was in service for a scheduled surveillance test per plant procedure OPT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test.

"When the leak was identified, operators secured HPCI. The leak was isolated by securing the pump, closing the pump suction isolation valves, isolating the keep fill supply valves. Operators declared the Unit 2 HPCI System inoperable when the keep fill system was isolated.

"No automatic system isolation or actuation set points were reached.

"Safety significance is minimal due to the operability and availability of redundant systems. If a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) were to occur the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System would automatically inject and if necessary the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) would depressurize the reactor pressure vessel allowing low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) to inject. All low pressure ECCS are operable.

"Plant risk has been evaluated and remains 'Green'.

"The Unit 2 HPCI system has been removed from service. The pump suction isolation valves have been closed. Injection piping keep fill connections have been isolated. These actions were taken to stop the leakage of system water out of the failed pump seal.

"Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems, including the RCIC System and ADS.

"In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1 Required Actions: RCIC has been verified to be operable, and HPCI must be restored to operable status within 14 days.

"HPCI pump seal replacement is being planned in accordance with the site's Work Management process. This event has been entered into the sites Corrective Action Program and an investigation into the cause of the seal failure will be performed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM LEE GRZEK TO JOE O'HARA AT 1045 EST ON 1/30/08 * * *

"On October 11, 2007, at 0520 hours, the control room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 43711) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident). The notification was made as a result of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system being declared inoperable due to indications of a main pump seal leak. Specifically, water was discovered leaking an approximate five gallons per minute from the main pump turbine side seal during performance of OPT-09.2, 'HPCI System Operability Test.'

"Basis for Retraction

"Unit 2 HPCI was declared inoperable when the main pump seal leak was first identified. Upon further detailed engineering evaluation, it has been determined that the HPCI system was not rendered inoperable as a result of the condition identified on October 10, 2007, and was able to fulfill its safety functions in the degraded condition.

"The HPCI pump uses seal purge water piping in combination with mechanical seals to limit shaft leakage. The investigation found debris blocking the seal purge piping, which led to the seal faces overheating and subsequent failure. Water intrusion into the oil system was determined to be the limiting impact of the seal failure. The limiting event for HPCI was determined to be 4.1 hours of operation during a loss of Feedwater event with HPCI only, due to the short runtimes followed by long idle times which maximize water intrusion. The evaluation concluded that the HPCI pump would be able to operate for 4.1 hours, as required for the limiting event, and would be available for 8 hours. Thus, Unit 2 HPCI was degraded but able to meet all required safety functions.

"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety functions to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction."

Notified R2DO(Bonner)


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43709
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DAVE PRECHT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/10/2007
Notification Time: 20:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BEINOY DESAI (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (FSME)
Event Text
PLANNED SHUTDOWN DUE TO WATER MAIN BREAK

The licensee initiated a planned shutdown of the fuel fabrication processes, following notification from the City of Columbia (SC) of a water main break offsite from the facility. The City of Columbia will shut off the water supply from the facility at 2100 EDT to conduct repairs on the water main. This water outage is anticipated to last a few hours. The licensee can remain in this condition indefinitely. The licensee has verified that fire fighting and cooling water tanks are at capacity.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43705
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: EDDIE NEVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 10/10/2007
Notification Time: 05:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF ERDADS AND ERDS LINK

"The Emergency Response and Data Acquisition System (ERDADS) was out of service at 0000 EST on 10/10/2007. This resulted in a loss of the ERDS link of plant data to the NRC. This is an 8-hour reportable event pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The cause of the loss appears to be a computer malfunction, there is no evidence of tampering. Follow-up notification to the NRC will be given once Unit 4 ERDS is returned to service."

As of 0515 ERDADS was available in the licensee control room, but the ERDS link was not available with the NRC.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM NIELSEN TO HUFFMAN AT 1341 EDT ON 10/12/07 * * *

"Repairs are complete and the Unit 4 ERDADS system was tested Sat. at 1216 EDT on 10/12/07. The ERDS link of plant data to the NRC has been restored on Unit 4."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Desai) notified.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43706
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK RAWLS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/10/2007
Notification Time: 14:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 13:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BEINOY DESAI (R2)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
PRESSURIZER PORV OPENED MOMENTARILY WITH RCS DISCHARGE OF APPROXIMATELY 10 GALLONS

"On 10/10/2007 at 1312, Crystal River Unit 3 was performing maintenance on its Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV). The I&C technicians were replacing a circuit board card in the circuitry for the PORV. The PORV had been selected to close during the replacement of the card. When the PORV was selected to its auto position, the PORV opened and was immediately closed by the reactor operator. It was estimated that the PORV was opened for 2 second with a total flow of 10 gallons. This rate is in excess of the 25 gpm as found in the EAL. The event was quickly terminated with the closing of the PORV and PORV block valve. The plant remains stable with the PORV and PORV block valve closed. CR3 briefly met the conditions of an Unusual Event, however declaration was not required."

The licensee is still trouble-shooting the cause of the event. The reactor is stable at full power and the technical specification action statement requirement for an inoperable PORV valve (TS 3.4.10) have been satisfied. The licensee reported this event for information based on the guidance of NUREG 1022 concerning reporting an event that was rapidly terminated that may have met the criteria of an emergency based on an after the fact review.

The licensee notified the State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.


Hospital
Event Number: 43766
Rep Org: PENN STATE HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER
Licensee: PENN STATE HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: HERSHEY   State: PA
County:
License #: 37-13831-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENNETH L. MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 11/02/2007
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
JANET SCHLUETER (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
Event Text
MISSING I-131 GEL CAPSULE

"To assist the Hot Lab Tech, at 9:20 AM on October 10, 2007, another Nuclear Medicine Technologist placed a gel capsule containing 55 microCuries of I-131 into a Leucite thyroid neck phantom and oriented the phantom for an anterior projection to calibrate the thyroid uptake counting system for dosimetry measurements needed on a thyroid treatment patient . After setting the counter for a ten-minute count she informed the Hot Lab Tech that the sample was counting. She did not stay with the thyroid neck phantom and counting system which was located in an alcove approximately twenty feet from the door to the Hot Lab. While the neck phantom was visible from the doorway of the Hot Lab, the Hot Lab Tech did not have it under constant observation. However, there were Nuclear Medicine personnel in the corridor between the Hot Lab and this alcove almost continuously during the counting procedure.

"At 9:38 AM, the Hot Lab Tech oriented the neck phantom for a posterior projection and set the system for a second ten-minute count. When the Hot Lab Tech returned to the Thyroid counter at 10:15 AM, she discovered that only background counts had been recorded for the ten-minute counting period. A check of the neck phantom revealed that it contained no radioiodine capsule.

"After an extensive but unsuccessful search by Nuclear Medicine personnel, Health Physics was called for assistance at 11:30 AM. A Health Physics team spent several hours searching all conceivable areas but, no capsule was found.

"Security was notified along with the local police. The local police responded, took fingerprints but, as of yet, have not responded further.

"A review of the DVD from the security camera located outside the Hot Lab and Injections rooms failed to determine the fate of the radioiodine capsule but did confirm that there were Nuclear Medicine personnel in sight of the neck phantom for essentially the entire procedure and especially for the 18 minute window (from the end of the first count to the beginning of the second count) when the capsule went missing.

"An investigative Committee was formed to query all Nuclear Medicine Technical personnel and Nuclear Medicine nurses and to determine the fate of the lost capsule and/or the root cause of the event. This committee was chaired by the Radiation Safety Officer and included the Assistant Manager of Radiology, the Chief of Nuclear Medicine, the Operations Director for Radiology, the Associate RSO and the Director of Human Resources.

"The investigation failed to determine the fate of the missing radioiodine capsule.

"The investigation revealed that the Chief Technologist had approved the calibration of the thyroid uptake counting system in the alcove rather than a locked room because he considered the capsule in the neck phantom to constitute 'secure.'

"The investigation revealed some attitude problems on the part of the technical staff and some deviations from required 'good radiation safety practices' unrelated to the missing capsule.

"Corrective actions implemented include:

"1. Dismissal of the Chief technologist.
2. Dismissal of the Hot Lab technologist responsible for the calibration of the thyroid uptake counting system.
3. Year long probation for all remaining Nuclear Medicine Technologists.
4. Increased training sessions for all Nuclear Medicine technologists.
5. Relocation of the office of the Assistant Manager of Radiology to the Nuclear Medicine area.
6. Additional security cameras ordered for other areas of Nuclear Medicine.
7. Random review of recordings from security cameras by Health Physics to verify adherence to good radiation safety practices.
8. Changes to the door locks to severely restrict traffic flow in and access to the Nuclear Medicine areas.
9. Increase observation of Nuclear Medicine activities by Health Physics.
10. Increased observation of Nuclear Medicine activities by physicians and residents.
11. Relocation of the Thyroid uptake counting system to a room that can be locked when no-one is in attendance during a calibration procedure.
12. Requiring that sources being used outside of the Hot Lab will be under the control and responsibility of a single individual for the entire time that the source is out of the Hot Lab.

"This incident has been thoroughly reviewed with our Radiation Safety Committee and our Subcommittee on Human Use of Radioisotopes.

"The licensee will continue to search for the missing source and will continue close scrutiny of all Nuclear Medicine operations. As of this date, the fate of the capsule is still unknown. The current activity, due to decay, would be approximately 8 microcuries."

The licensee notified NRC Region I (Pam Henderson), Dairy Township Police Department, and Director, PA Bureau of Radiation Protection.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.