Event Notification Report for October 05, 2007

LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMPS

"On October 5, 2007, at approximately 0408, while attempting to open 480 VAC breaker 1B4234A/B for preplanned maintenance, a loss of bus 1B42 occurred. The preliminary cause of the bus trip was arcing of the bucket stabs/bus bars when opening the door to breaker 1B4234A/B. The arcing was a result of the breaker bucket inadvertently pulling away from the bus. At the time of this event, the 'A' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump was out of service for preplanned maintenance. The loss of 1B42 resulted in a loss of the 'B' ESW pump. The 'A' ESW pump was subsequently returned to service at 0458 on October 5, 2007. Note that power was conservatively lowered approximately 4% at 0512. At the time of this power reduction, the plant was not in a Technical Specification that would require a plant shutdown.

"In addition to the loss of the 'B' ESW pump, the loss of 1B42 resulted in invalid Group 1-5 isolations on the 'B' side of PCIS (not including Main Steam Line Isolation Valves).

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee has not yet determined if this is a mechanical failure of the breaker or a human error. However, they are looking at OE associated with this issue.

* * * UPDATE AT 1324 EDT ON 10/26/07 FROM BOB MURRELL TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided the following information as an update:

"In addition to the ESW loss of safety function that occurred, it has been determined that from 0408 till approximately 0715 on 10/05/07, a loss of both onsite emergency AC power sources occurred. Specifically, at the time of the event, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was out of service for preplanned maintenance. When bus 1B42 was lost, this resulted in a loss of 'B' ESW. The loss of 'B' ESW resulted in the 'B' EDG being incapable of performing its safety function. Therefore, this is another example of an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).

* * * UPDATE AT 1619 ON 12/4/2007 FROM BOB MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On 10/05/07, this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident due to the loss of both ESW pumps. Further reviews have determined that the 'A' ESW pump was available at the time of the event and therefore, this event is not reportable for a loss of the ESW safety function. This event is still reportable for a loss of the on-site emergency AC power safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Lara).

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to Byron, Limerick, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom, and Three Mile Island has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector at the affected plants.

POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL WHILE OFFLOADING A TANKER TRUCK

"At 17:20 the Brunswick Station control room was notified of a sodium hypochlorite spill. Approximately 300 gallons of a 15% solution was released to the environment through a faulty hose fitting at a tanker truck before it could be isolated. The state is required to be notified of any hazardous chemical release greater than or equal to 100 pounds (64 gallons of a 15% sodium hypochlorite solution corresponds to 100 pounds). The North Carolina State Division of Water Quality was notified of the event at 18:47 as required by 40 CFR 355.40. The US Coast Guard (report number 850864) and Brunswick County were also notified of the event.

"Minimal impact to the environment. No impact to the health and safety of the public. No impact to plant safety or operations."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION (PGLD) SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 1643 CDST, on 10-05-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received for the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 8 UF6 [Process Gas Leak] Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded and found that the READY and MANUAL lights for this system were not illuminated. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-333 Unit 6 Cell 8 and Section 4 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this alarm, unit 6 cell 8 and some areas of Section 4 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure."

Electricians are currently troubleshooting to determine the source of the potential short circuit that caused the problem.

"[Technical Safety Requirement] (TSR) 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 8 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Section 4 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.C.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour.

"Engineering has determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function when this alarm came in. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when:

"a. The equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident;

"b. the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand; and

"c. no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-2655; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-15; Responsible Division: Operations."