Event Notification Report for October 03, 2007

REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF FORCED FLOW TO RCS LOOP "A"

"An emergency has not been declared and there has not been a release of radioactivity to the environment.

"Farley Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of forced flow in the 'A' Reactor Coolant System loop. The loss of flow resulted from de-energization of the 2A 4160V Reactor Coolant Pump Bus that provides power to the 2A Reactor Coolant Pump following the de-energization of the 2B Start Up Transformer. The loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer appears to have been the result of relay testing on Farley Unit 1. Farley Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 for a refueling outage.

"The loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer also de-energized the 2G 4160V Engineered Safeguards Feature Bus. This bus has been re-energized from the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator.

"All rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as required following the trip. Decay heat removal is being provided by both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps supplying flow to all three Steam Generators. Cause of event is under investigation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO SOUTH CAROLINA OSHA DUE TO NON-WORK RELATED FATALITY ONSITE

"On October 3, 2007, a non-work related fatality occurred at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2. Specifically, at 1502 hours EDT, first responders were dispatched for a Progress Energy employee who suffered a medical condition that required immediate attention. Medical assistance was provided on-site by H. B. Robinson Plant first responders, and the employee was subsequently transported by ambulance to a nearby medical facility. At 1540 hours EDT, site personnel were notified that attempts to revive the employee were not successful and the employee had died. The employee was working in a non-radiologically controlled area of the plant and no radioactive material or contamination was involved.

"Notification of other governmental agencies, specifically the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA), was completed at 1830 hours EDT on October 3, 2007. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), which states that a report shall be made as soon as practical and in all cases within four hours of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality. The resident inspector has been notified."

POTENTIAL UNAVAILABILITY OF TWO WAY RADIO SYSTEM TO SUPPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN

"In response to Self-Assessment Report SA014668 and preparation for the 2008 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, a Fire Protection Improvement Plan implementation is in progress. Preliminary analysis of the major equipment, power supplies and cables associated with the two-way radio communication system (DCR-3341) indicates the potential for the plant two-way radio system to be adversely impacted and potentially unavailable to support post-fire safe shutdown operator actions and/or fire brigade fire fighting activities for a fire location in:
- Fire Zone AX-35 (Control Room and AC Equipment Room)
- Fire Zone TU-22 (Turbine Room) at the mezzanine elevation just outside Battery Room 1B
- Fire Zone TU-98 (Battery Room 1B)

"This review has identified discrepancies regarding the credited means of communication required for use by Operators in response to an Appendix R fire. The safe shutdown procedures E-O-06 and E-O-07, and the Manual Action Feasibility Study (Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation FPEE-003) only credit the plant two-way radio system.

"However, upper tier program documents (e.g., Fire Protection Program Plan, Appendix R Design Description) do not consistently contain the same requirements. For example, the Fire Plan, Rev 7, Section 12.9 requires both the 5-channel Gai-Tronics system between key shutdown locations AND the multi-channel portable radio communications equipped with repeaters and provided for use by the plant fire brigade shall be operable at all times. The Appendix R Design Description. Rev. 5 is silent on safe shutdown communications.

"It is not clear at this time whether the 5-channel Gai-Tronics should also be credited in the safe shutdown procedures. If so, then the cables supporting operation of the Gai-Tronics would need to be identified and located by fire zone to determine their availability in lieu of two-way radio communications for a fire in any of the three fire zones identified above.

"Until this is verified, the Appendix R timeline for achieving sate shutdown may not be able to be met. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(V)(A), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,
(B) remove residual heat,
(C) control the release of radioactive material, OR
(D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY JACK GADZALA TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1527 EST ON 11/30/07 * * *

"EN# 43689 provided notification that the Appendix R timeline for achieving safe shutdown may not be achievable due to potential loss of the credited two-way radio communication system due to fire and consequent need for face-to-face communications between the Operators. This position was adopted pending verification of the availability of the Gai-Tronics paging system.

"A subsequent engineering analysis of the major equipment, power supplies and cables associated with the Fire Protection/Appendix R two-way radio communication system, the Gai-Tronics plant paging system and the dedicated Emergency Gai-Tronics System, determined that adequate communications would have been available during a fire in the subject fire zones. Operators are familiar with and skilled in the use of the Gai-Tronics system as part of their job function. Interviews with on-shift Operators confirmed that operations would use the two-way radios; and if they failed, would then use the nearest Gai-Tronics handset station and then Emergency Gai-Tronics at specific locations for an Appendix R Dedicated Shutdown scenario. Where Operator manual actions are in close proximity to the Dedicated Shutdown panel, face-to-face communications would be achievable and timely.

"Consequently, the assumption of only face-to-face communications described in the Event Report would not have been necessary for all safe shutdown actions. Use of redundant communications systems (Gai-Tronics and Emergency Gai-Tronics) would have been available for fires in the subject fire zones such that the Appendix R safe shutdown time requirements would not have been significantly impacted. The loss of the two-way radio system for the identified fire zones would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. As such, this condition is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) as previously stated.

"Consequently, the notification made on 10/03/2007 (EN 43689) is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

CONTAMINATED WORKER TRANSPORTED TO OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY

"At 0540 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the Unit 2 Control Room was notified of a personnel injury in the Unit 2 containment. Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage and the individual was working in upper containment in support of the reactor vessel closure head replacement project. The individual injuries are apparently the result of being struck when a rigging clevis (not under load) dropped from an elevated position. Site emergency medical technicians responded to the scene and the individual was transported to a local medical facility [Lakeland Hospital, St. Joseph, MI] via ambulance at 0636 EDT. At the time of transport, the individual was considered to be potentially contaminated because complete surveys could not be performed while the individual was immobilized for transfer. Subsequently, after arrival at the hospital, radiation protection personnel verified the presence of low levels of contamination on outer contamination clothing and transport material. These materials are being returned to plant in accordance with DOT guidelines.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.