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Event Notification Report for September 12, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/11/2007 - 09/12/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
4363743635

Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43637
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2     State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/13/2007
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2007
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
Event Text
MODERATION CONTROL ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY DEGRADATION

"During an investigation of an unusual sinter test measurement result, it was determined that one of the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS), as documented in the [Integrated Safety Analysis] (ISA) summary, had degraded. This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 70.50 Appendix A (b)(2).

"The IROFS described for the moderation control of the powder additive at the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) blender operation did not function as required because of an error that occurred at the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) container transfer station. At no time did an Unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective and was not challenged.

"The container transfer station operation is shut down pending completion of an investigation and implementation of corrective actions."


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43635
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/12/2007
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2007
Event Time: 06:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING INTAKE STRUCTURE TRAVELING SCREEN FOULING

"As a result of high winds and a severe storm front moving through the area a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) found the intake canal water murky, wind speed was noted to be 40 MPH. The Traveling Screens were placed in the continuous mode of operation and increased monitoring was put in effect. At 0520 the NPO noted that 'a lot of weeds and fish were coming in through the intake' and that a full trash basket had been changed out. At approximately 0630 the NPO reported that the traveling screens were not moving and intake level was lowering due to the influx of debris. The Shift Nuclear Operator (SNO) entered the appropriate Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) for lowering intake level and commenced rapid power reduction. At 0635 with intake level at 240 feet the SNO inserted a manual scram and entered the appropriate AOP and Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP).

"Reactor Vessel level decreased to less than 177 inches above the top of active fuel resulting in a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 isolation signal. The PCIS Group 2 isolation resulted in a valid signal to close PCIS valves in the Drywell Floor Drain System, the Drywell Equipment Drain System, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, the Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) System, the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System, and the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) System. However, as a result of the power reduction the operators were able to maintain reactor vessel level above the actuation setpoint for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems and these systems were not required to operate.

"At 0640 the Scram was reset, at 0710 the Group 2 PCIS Isolation was verified, and at 0729 the Group 2 PCIS Isolation was reset.

"The cause of the traveling screens stopping has been determined to be due to shear pins on the traveling water screen shearing due to excessive debris loading.

"All equipment responded as expected during the downpower and subsequent manual Scram. All rods are in and the plant is stable in MODE 3, Hot Shutdown." Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The safety buses are being powered by offsite power. The 'B' train Residual Heat Removal pump was out of service at the time of the event for planned maintenance.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM G. DORMAN TO J. KNOKE AT 1205 EDT ON 09/12/07 * * *

"At 1034 with the plant shutdown and a cooldown in progress reactor vessel (RV) level lowered to less than 177 inches above TAF [Top of Active Fuel]. This resulted in a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) Scram signal and a PCIS Group 2 Isolation Signal. AP systems responded as expected. Reactor vessel level remained above the actuation setpoint for HPCI and RCIC and they were not required to operate. RV level was restored and the Scram was reset.

"At the time of the initial event and at this update the plant is in LCO action statement 3.5.1.A for the 'B' RHR Pump being out of service. The system is being restored at this time.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the state and is providing a press release to the media. Notified R1DO (Trapp).