Event Notification Report for September 11, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/10/2007 - 09/11/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43632
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-04848
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS, INC
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-04848
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/11/2007
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Notification Time: 18:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
JACK DAVIS (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN ILTAB
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
JACK DAVIS (FSME)
MATTHEW HAHN ILTAB
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RETURNED TO OWNER
On 9/7/07, Component Sales Company of Houston, Texas purchased a moisture density gauge for $400.00 from [DELETED], who stated that he got the gauge at a garage sale. The Component Sales Co. representative investigated the serial number of the gauge and notified the owner of the gauge. The owner, Tolunay-Wong Engineers of Houston, Texas recovered the gauge a CPN model serial number MD80204152 with 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241/Be. The Tolunay-Wong Company representative stated that the gauge had been used the day before but did not know it was missing. The company is trying to determine if the source rod had been properly locked in place. The state believes that [DELETED] may be a minor. The State has not notified law enforcement, and is unsure whether law enforcement will be involved at all "since the gauge has been recovered." The state is investigating this matter.
Texas Incident Number - I-8442
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY TUCKER TO KOZAL ON 9/12/07 AT 1645 * * *
The State provided the following update via email:
"The RSO informed the Agency on September 12, 2007, that the technician who inspected the gauge after its return confirmed that the source rod was locked in the stored position."
R4DO (Shannon), FSME EO (Bubar) and ILTAB (via e-mail) notified.
On 9/7/07, Component Sales Company of Houston, Texas purchased a moisture density gauge for $400.00 from [DELETED], who stated that he got the gauge at a garage sale. The Component Sales Co. representative investigated the serial number of the gauge and notified the owner of the gauge. The owner, Tolunay-Wong Engineers of Houston, Texas recovered the gauge a CPN model serial number MD80204152 with 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241/Be. The Tolunay-Wong Company representative stated that the gauge had been used the day before but did not know it was missing. The company is trying to determine if the source rod had been properly locked in place. The state believes that [DELETED] may be a minor. The State has not notified law enforcement, and is unsure whether law enforcement will be involved at all "since the gauge has been recovered." The state is investigating this matter.
Texas Incident Number - I-8442
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY TUCKER TO KOZAL ON 9/12/07 AT 1645 * * *
The State provided the following update via email:
"The RSO informed the Agency on September 12, 2007, that the technician who inspected the gauge after its return confirmed that the source rod was locked in the stored position."
R4DO (Shannon), FSME EO (Bubar) and ILTAB (via e-mail) notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43633
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUNKELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM BUNKELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/11/2007
Notification Time: 20:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 14:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2007
Notification Time: 20:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 14:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION AND SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
"At 1439 the Control Room received a Condition Report that identified an unanalyzed condition associated with the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems which resulted in declaring this equipment inoperable. The issue was recirculation flow from Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation back to the Auxiliary Building added additional area heat gain resulting in exceeding the design capacity for the area fan coil units. Technical Specification LCO was entered per TS 3.6.c requiring a reactor shutdown within 12 hours. At 1654 Engineering provided information that if the control switch for Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train A was maintained in the off position, the area heat load was within the capacity of area fan coil units. This was completed and both trains of Shield Building Ventilation and Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train B was returned to operable. Technical Specification requirements to shutdown were exited. The plant remains in a 7 day Action Statement per TS 3.6.c with Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train A inoperable.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY TIM BUNKELMAN TO JASON KOZAL AT 1657 ON 10/30/07 * * *
"On September 11, 2007 Kewaunee Power Station reported an unanalyzed condition associated with the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems, which resulted in declaring the equipment inoperable. The issue involved recirculation flow from the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System back into the Auxiliary Building causing additional area heat gain resulting in exceeding the design capacity for the area fan coil units.
"A subsequent engineering review concluded that required equipment in the Auxiliary Building Fan Floor area would have remained functional during a design basis accident provided service water temperature does not exceed 78.14 degrees Fahrenheit. A review of service water temperatures over the past three years did not identify any occurrences exceeding this value. Therefore, the safety function of the systems would have been met. Based on the analysis performed, Event Notification EN# 43633 is hereby retracted.
"The Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems remain in a non-conforming condition because the maximum service water design temperature is 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Service water temperature is being administratively limited to 71 degrees Fahrenheit pending final corrective action.
"The licensee has notified the Point Beach NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Madera).
"At 1439 the Control Room received a Condition Report that identified an unanalyzed condition associated with the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems which resulted in declaring this equipment inoperable. The issue was recirculation flow from Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation back to the Auxiliary Building added additional area heat gain resulting in exceeding the design capacity for the area fan coil units. Technical Specification LCO was entered per TS 3.6.c requiring a reactor shutdown within 12 hours. At 1654 Engineering provided information that if the control switch for Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train A was maintained in the off position, the area heat load was within the capacity of area fan coil units. This was completed and both trains of Shield Building Ventilation and Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train B was returned to operable. Technical Specification requirements to shutdown were exited. The plant remains in a 7 day Action Statement per TS 3.6.c with Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Train A inoperable.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.' "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY TIM BUNKELMAN TO JASON KOZAL AT 1657 ON 10/30/07 * * *
"On September 11, 2007 Kewaunee Power Station reported an unanalyzed condition associated with the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems, which resulted in declaring the equipment inoperable. The issue involved recirculation flow from the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System back into the Auxiliary Building causing additional area heat gain resulting in exceeding the design capacity for the area fan coil units.
"A subsequent engineering review concluded that required equipment in the Auxiliary Building Fan Floor area would have remained functional during a design basis accident provided service water temperature does not exceed 78.14 degrees Fahrenheit. A review of service water temperatures over the past three years did not identify any occurrences exceeding this value. Therefore, the safety function of the systems would have been met. Based on the analysis performed, Event Notification EN# 43633 is hereby retracted.
"The Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Shield Building Ventilation Systems remain in a non-conforming condition because the maximum service water design temperature is 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Service water temperature is being administratively limited to 71 degrees Fahrenheit pending final corrective action.
"The licensee has notified the Point Beach NRC Senior Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Madera).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43634
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVEN JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVEN JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/11/2007
Notification Time: 22:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Notification Time: 22:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION - BOTH EDG'S UNAVAILABLE
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable for planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. At 1449, Diesel Generator #1 (DG1) was declared inoperable and unavailable at 1509, due to malfunction of the day fuel oil day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. At time 1645, DG1 was restored to an available status by repairing the diesel fuel oil day lank high level shut off solenoid. At this time DG1 is able to perform the safety function. DG1 was declared operable at 2129."
While recovering the DG2 from planned maintenance, the operators were refilling the DG2 day tank and noticed the level increasing in the DG1 day tank. The operators determined that a mechanical failure of the float occurred in the DG1 solenoid valve. The valve should have remained shut to preclude overfilling the tank. The safety function of the valve occurs on a loss of power. On a loss of power, the solenoid valve fails open to allow the tank to be filled.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. McCUTCHEN TO J. KNOKE AT 1743 ON 09/12/07 * * *
"This update is being made to correct certain technical inaccuracies in the initial Event Notification [43634] and in the additional information reflected on the NRC website. The corrected initial Event Notification is as follows.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable due to planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. While recovering DG2 from planned maintenance, operators were refilling the DG2 fuel oil (FO) day tank and noticed that level was also increasing in [Diesel generator #1] DG1 FO day tank. The operators determined that the DG1 day tank float valve and FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve were both shut as designed, but were leaking by. At 1449, Operators declared DG1 inoperable but available due to leak-by of the FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. At 1509, DG1 was declared unavailable due to operators positioning its Maintenance Lock-Out (MLO) switch to OFF (lock out) for work on the valves. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] replaced the FO day tank high level shut off solenoid valve and at 1645, restored DG1 to an available status by repositioning the MLO switch to ON. Subsequently the replacement shutoff solenoid valve was also found to leak by. CNS realigned DG FO transfer systems and declared DG1 operable at 2129."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Shannon)
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable for planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. At 1449, Diesel Generator #1 (DG1) was declared inoperable and unavailable at 1509, due to malfunction of the day fuel oil day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. At time 1645, DG1 was restored to an available status by repairing the diesel fuel oil day lank high level shut off solenoid. At this time DG1 is able to perform the safety function. DG1 was declared operable at 2129."
While recovering the DG2 from planned maintenance, the operators were refilling the DG2 day tank and noticed the level increasing in the DG1 day tank. The operators determined that a mechanical failure of the float occurred in the DG1 solenoid valve. The valve should have remained shut to preclude overfilling the tank. The safety function of the valve occurs on a loss of power. On a loss of power, the solenoid valve fails open to allow the tank to be filled.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. McCUTCHEN TO J. KNOKE AT 1743 ON 09/12/07 * * *
"This update is being made to correct certain technical inaccuracies in the initial Event Notification [43634] and in the additional information reflected on the NRC website. The corrected initial Event Notification is as follows.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable due to planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. While recovering DG2 from planned maintenance, operators were refilling the DG2 fuel oil (FO) day tank and noticed that level was also increasing in [Diesel generator #1] DG1 FO day tank. The operators determined that the DG1 day tank float valve and FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve were both shut as designed, but were leaking by. At 1449, Operators declared DG1 inoperable but available due to leak-by of the FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. At 1509, DG1 was declared unavailable due to operators positioning its Maintenance Lock-Out (MLO) switch to OFF (lock out) for work on the valves. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] replaced the FO day tank high level shut off solenoid valve and at 1645, restored DG1 to an available status by repositioning the MLO switch to ON. Subsequently the replacement shutoff solenoid valve was also found to leak by. CNS realigned DG FO transfer systems and declared DG1 operable at 2129."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Shannon)