Event Notification Report for August 30, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/29/2007 - 08/30/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43650436104360743608
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43650
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Region: 1
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County:
License #: 44-0002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/18/2007
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2007
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
PAUL KROHN (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - 23 MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
Harvard University was replacing and recycling old exit signs. When workers arrived to remove the old exit signs and reprocess them, the signs could not be found. The licensee believes the exit signs may have went along with some old light bulbs that were being recycled. The licensee inspected the recycling chamber and found it free of contamination. Each sign originally contained 7.5 curies of Tritium. Decayed activity as of today is 93 curies. They initiated their investigation on August 30, 2007, and the investigation is on-going.
* * * UPDATE FROM R. GALLAGHER TO P. SNYDER AT 1021 0N 10/19/07 * * *
Harvard University has taken / is taking the following corrective actions:
"1). Training sessions provided to Harvard University recycling program staff [identification of H3 signs and new requirements to send all such signs to the Radiation Protection Office (RPO) for processing].
"2). Revision made to EXIT Sign Fact Sheet, which focused on requirements for building managers and requires transfer of any removed radioactive signs to the RPO for reclamation.
"3). Additional EXIT sign training provided to facility directors, facility managers, compliance officers, and the real estate program to heighten awareness of radioactive EXIT signs and proper recycling."
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has concluded their investigation of this matter and considers the corrective actions taken by the licensee to be acceptable.
Notified R1DO (R. Bellamy) and FSME EO (G. Morell).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Harvard University was replacing and recycling old exit signs. When workers arrived to remove the old exit signs and reprocess them, the signs could not be found. The licensee believes the exit signs may have went along with some old light bulbs that were being recycled. The licensee inspected the recycling chamber and found it free of contamination. Each sign originally contained 7.5 curies of Tritium. Decayed activity as of today is 93 curies. They initiated their investigation on August 30, 2007, and the investigation is on-going.
* * * UPDATE FROM R. GALLAGHER TO P. SNYDER AT 1021 0N 10/19/07 * * *
Harvard University has taken / is taking the following corrective actions:
"1). Training sessions provided to Harvard University recycling program staff [identification of H3 signs and new requirements to send all such signs to the Radiation Protection Office (RPO) for processing].
"2). Revision made to EXIT Sign Fact Sheet, which focused on requirements for building managers and requires transfer of any removed radioactive signs to the RPO for reclamation.
"3). Additional EXIT sign training provided to facility directors, facility managers, compliance officers, and the real estate program to heighten awareness of radioactive EXIT signs and proper recycling."
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has concluded their investigation of this matter and considers the corrective actions taken by the licensee to be acceptable.
Notified R1DO (R. Bellamy) and FSME EO (G. Morell).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43610
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: M. PLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: M. PLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 15:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 15:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1)
ART BURRITT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 62 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE
Event Description:
"Reactor scram (4 hr notification) automatic scram
"Primary containment isolation of Groups 2,3,4, and 5 due to RPV Level < low level setpoint (<127") due to reactor scram. (8 hr notification).
Actions Taken (reference applicable Technical Specifications):
"Implemented OT 3100 (Reactor Scram Procedure) EOP-1 (RPV Control). Placed the plant in a stable condition and implemented OP 0109, Plant Restoration. "
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Reactor was initially at approximately 63% power due to cooling tower damage which occurred more than a week ago. License was performing a surveillance test of the # 2 turbine stop valve. The valve was shut per the surveillance test procedure but they were unable to open the valve. Personnel were in the heater bay and mechanical assistance was applied to open the valve. The valve opened quickly at which point the licensee received a turbine stop valve closure signal which generated an automatic reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor vessel water level decreased below 127 inches, due to the reactor scram, which caused primary containment isolation of groups 2,3,4 and 5. Reactor vessel water began to increase because Reactor feedwater pumps "A" & "B" were still operating. Reactor feedwater pump "B" was secured. When reactor vessel water increased to 173 inches, high level alarm, reactor feedwater pump "A" automatically tripped. Highest reactor vessel water level increased to was approximately 179 inches. No SRV's opened. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems, EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained using a reactor feedwater pump. Only other anomaly was that for some unknown reason automatic pressure control went to mechanical pressure control during the transient. Licensee is investigating the event.
Event Description:
"Reactor scram (4 hr notification) automatic scram
"Primary containment isolation of Groups 2,3,4, and 5 due to RPV Level < low level setpoint (<127") due to reactor scram. (8 hr notification).
Actions Taken (reference applicable Technical Specifications):
"Implemented OT 3100 (Reactor Scram Procedure) EOP-1 (RPV Control). Placed the plant in a stable condition and implemented OP 0109, Plant Restoration. "
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Reactor was initially at approximately 63% power due to cooling tower damage which occurred more than a week ago. License was performing a surveillance test of the # 2 turbine stop valve. The valve was shut per the surveillance test procedure but they were unable to open the valve. Personnel were in the heater bay and mechanical assistance was applied to open the valve. The valve opened quickly at which point the licensee received a turbine stop valve closure signal which generated an automatic reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor vessel water level decreased below 127 inches, due to the reactor scram, which caused primary containment isolation of groups 2,3,4 and 5. Reactor vessel water began to increase because Reactor feedwater pumps "A" & "B" were still operating. Reactor feedwater pump "B" was secured. When reactor vessel water increased to 173 inches, high level alarm, reactor feedwater pump "A" automatically tripped. Highest reactor vessel water level increased to was approximately 179 inches. No SRV's opened. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems, EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained using a reactor feedwater pump. Only other anomaly was that for some unknown reason automatic pressure control went to mechanical pressure control during the transient. Licensee is investigating the event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43607
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRANK GORLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: FRANK GORLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 08:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2007
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 08:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE REMOVES TSC HVAC FROM SERVICE
"Planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed today (August 30, 2007) on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Normal Supply Breaker (1C) to the Diesel Generator Building Motor Control Center (MCC) (MPL # 1R24-S026). This MCC feeds the Technical Support Center (TSC) 480V AC distribution panel (MPL# 1R25-S102) which supplies power to the TSC HVAC. The work activities affecting the TSC are planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within one work shift (<12 hours). During this work activity the TSC HVAC system will be removed from service. If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center, during the time these work activities are being performed, it will take no more than four hours to return the equipment back to functional status, dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the TSC for any declared emergency during the time these work activities are being performed as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY FRANK GORLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0923 EDT ON 08/31/07 * * *
The planned maintenance was completed successfully and the TSC HVAC system was returned to service at 1748 EDT on 08/30/07.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer)
"Planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed today (August 30, 2007) on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Normal Supply Breaker (1C) to the Diesel Generator Building Motor Control Center (MCC) (MPL # 1R24-S026). This MCC feeds the Technical Support Center (TSC) 480V AC distribution panel (MPL# 1R25-S102) which supplies power to the TSC HVAC. The work activities affecting the TSC are planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within one work shift (<12 hours). During this work activity the TSC HVAC system will be removed from service. If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center, during the time these work activities are being performed, it will take no more than four hours to return the equipment back to functional status, dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time the emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the TSC for any declared emergency during the time these work activities are being performed as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC.
"This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY FRANK GORLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0923 EDT ON 08/31/07 * * *
The planned maintenance was completed successfully and the TSC HVAC system was returned to service at 1748 EDT on 08/30/07.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43608
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROY GILLOW
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ROY GILLOW
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 11:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1)
ART BURRITT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL FITNESS FOR DUTY SAMPLE COLLECTION ERROR
The licensee is conservatively making this report although no specific FFD impacts are indicated. A non-licensed employee responsible for FFD sample collection did not meet station reliability expectations and his access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is conservatively making this report although no specific FFD impacts are indicated. A non-licensed employee responsible for FFD sample collection did not meet station reliability expectations and his access to the site has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.