Event Notification Report for August 27, 2007

SHIPMENT FAILED TO ARRIVE ON TIME

A shipment failed to arrive on time.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

Contact HOO for further details.

* * * UPDATE FROM J.R. TRAUTVETTER TO J. MACKINNON AT 0730 ON 08/27/07 * * *

Shipment arrived on site at 0720 EDT.

R1DO (J. Dwyer), FSME (C. Flannery), IRD (T. Blount ) and ILTAB (L. English) notified.

NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTION FROM B. LITKETT TO P. SNYDER AT 2005 ON 08/28/07 * * *

While the shipment did not arrive on time, it was enroute to the station in the custody of the driver the entire time in question. Therefore the shipment was never lost and this event is retracted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Burritt), FSME (McConnell), IRD (McDermott), and ILTAB (email).

LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

On August 15, 2007 Logan Generating Station personnel noted that a tritium exit sign was missing from its installed location. They did an extensive search of the premises from that time until August 27, 2007 when they concluded that the sign was lost. The search involved looking in the coal crushing area as well as the feeder and conveyor sites. An email was sent to plant employees asking if they knew the whereabouts of the sign. They completed walking searches of the remainder of the Coal Storage Building as well as a search through their trash cans and dumpsters without finding the sign. The sign was last seen present in its expected location during an inventory of tritium exit signs conducted on July 10, 2007.

The activity of the sign was originally 15 to 20 curies in the 1993 to 1994 time frame in which it was purchased.

The plant will conduct additional training on exit signs during its regular annual training period as well as continuing their monthly and quarterly inspections of installed nuclear devices.

The lost sign was additionally reported to the New Jersey Environmental Radiological Group.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

LOST STATIC ELIMINATORS

On 7/27/07 when completing an inventory, Micron Technology, discovered that nine (9) static eliminators were missing. The company did a thorough search of areas in and around where these instruments were expected to be installed and looked in their warehouse where removed equipment is typically taken when removed from use but the eliminators were not found. The company is continuing its search.

All of the eliminators had Po-210 sources with an activity of about 10 millicuries when purchased. One source was purchased in August of 2003. Four sources were purchased in June of 2005 and four sources were purchased in August of 2005.

The company plans on implementing a number of measures to ensure that eliminators are not lost in the future: 1. A cradle to grave tracking system will be implemented along with; 2. implementation of additional training and; 3. procedures for a more structured process from start to finish.


* * * UPDATE ON 08/31/07 AT 1201 EDT FROM KEVIN LUNDHAGEN TO MACKINNON * * *

4 of the 9 missing static eliminators have been found and they have been confirmed by their serial numbers. The 4 static eliminators were found inside a purge box. They are being shipped back, today 08/31/07, to the license holder, NRD, which is located in Grand Island, New York. Linda Gersey of NRC Region IV asked Micron Technology to update this event with the above information. Micron Technology is still looking for the other 5 missing static eliminators.

FSME EO (S. Wastler) and R4DO (R. Nease) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB.


* * * UPDATE ON 09/24/07 AT 1126 EDT FROM KEVIN LUNDHAGEN TO JOE O'HARA * * *

The 5 remaining static eliminators have been found. The 4 static eliminators were found inside a purge box. They are being shipped back to the license holder, NRD, which is located in Grand Island, New York. The fifth static eliminator was shipped back to the manufacturer in 2004.

FSME EO(M. Burgess) and R4DO(C. Johnson) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

ONE CHANNEL OF LOW MAIN STEAM LINE PRESSURE SIGNAL MISTAKENLY REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR 33 MINUTES

"On 8/27/07 at approximately 12:05, during performance of STP 3.3.6.1-02 step 7.7.2 the jumper was installed on contacts 1 and 2 of relay A71B-K4A PCIS TRIP CHANNEL A1 A MAIN STEAM LINE LO PRESSURE. The jumper should have been installed on contacts 1 and 2 of relay A71B-K4C PCIS TRIP CHANNEL A2 C MAIN STEAM LINE LO PRESSURE.

"The incorrectly installed jumper on contacts 1-2 of relay A71B-K4A resulted in the channel A1 not being able to trip on a low main steam line pressure signal of 850 psig (PS1014) thus making the function of PS1014 inoperable. At the same time PS1016 was being tested for channel A2 thus making the function for pressure switch PS1016 inoperable. Per Technical specification 3.3.6.1 'Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation' function 1b 'Main Steam Line pressure - Low' with both PS1014 and PS1016 inoperable, the tripping capability for channel A for Main steam Line Pressure - Low would be lost. This would be a automatic function with isolation capability not maintained per TS 3.3.6.1 condition B. Required action B.1 requires isolation capability to be restored in 1 hour. The I&C techs entered the AOT time for PS1016 at 11:32 AM and exited the AOT at 12:05 PM. Therefore, the isolation capability was lost for 33 minutes of the 1 hour.

"There was no violation of Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 function 1b.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 09:10 ON 10/26/2007 FROM ROBERT MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"An UFSAR review has determined that the Main Steam Line Low Pressure isolation is intended to mitigate a transient event. Specifically, the isolation is a safety feature intended to mitigate the consequences of an EHC Pressure Regulator Failure - Open. This transient is not a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Therefore this event resulted in a loss of a Safety Feature, not a loss of a Safety Function. This event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the event did not result in a condition that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

Notified the R3DO (Hills).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

GRATING INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOUND UNSECURED

"At 1645 hours on 8/27/07 it was determined that a section of grating in the containment pool swell region was not properly restrained. During a postulated large break Loss of Coolant Accident, the grating could become dislodged and subsequently impact the ECCS suction strainer located in the suppression pool below the grating. An engineering review determined that the force of the impact could be larger than the impingement forces that had been previously evaluated. The forces were postulated to impact one of two concentric suction strainers. The resulting damage could cause either Residual Heat Removal B and C loops or High Pressure Core Spray (not both) to be inoperable. This condition was determined to meet the reporting requirements for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' Since one of the strainers was for High Pressure Core Spray, a single train safety system, this event was also determined to meet the reporting criteria for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

"Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating, was entered and Required Actions taken within the specified completion time. The grating was subsequently restored to design configuration and the Technical Specification LCO was exited."

"Time of restoring grating to design was 1838 8/27/07, exited Tech Spec 3.5.1. Location of grating is in the Containment Building on the 599' elevation near the lower air lock. The section is a 3 X 7 foot piece of grating that is located on the level just above the suppression pool. We still are investigating when the grating hold down plates were removed, potentially removed during our recent recirc motor replacement in July 07. The grating hold down plates were discovered by an Operations Roving Operator during his tour on rounds."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.