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Event Notification Report for August 07, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/06/2007 - 08/07/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
4355843552

Power Reactor
Event Number: 43558
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/09/2007
Notification Time: 10:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2007
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
PART 21 - TWO COMMERICAL GRADE RELAYS CONTAINED DEFICIENCIES


" Event: On August 7, 2007, Duke Energy (Duke) completed a reportability determination which concluded that two relays contained deficiencies and were reportable under Part 21. The relays were Commercial Grade Items dedicated by Duke. Following dedication, a bench test performed on August 26, 2004 revealed that relay contacts were not set up properly at the factory. Eight other relays from the same purchase order were acceptable. The relays were Magnecraft Struthers-Dunn part number 219ABAP-115/125D. The Part 21 evaluation in 2004 was terminated based on incorrect guidance in the applicable Duke administrative directive. The directive error was identified March 29, 2007 and a review of prior Part 21 reportability determinations was initiated. The original 2004 problem report on these relays was reopened, leading to this Part 21 report being made at this time.

"Initial Safety Significance: None. The defective relays were never installed. The intended applications could not have resulted in a significant safety hazard. However, the Duke administrative directive on Part 21 evaluations states that all potential applications where the component might be installed as a substitute must be considered. Duke has concluded that installation in some unspecified application 'could have resulted in a significant safety hazard' and therefore the issue is being reported.

"Corrective Action(s): In 2004: There were eight (8) additional relays from the same purchase order. These were retested and found acceptable. The two identified defective relays were returned to the manufacturer. The manufacturer concluded that the relay contacts were improperly assembled. They consider this an isolated case. In 2007: The Duke administrative directive on Part 21 evaluations was corrected. Previous Part 21 determinations were reviewed, leading to this report."


NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this Part 21 notification by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43552
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2     State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/07/2007
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2007
Event Time: 15:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING PARTIAL LOSS OF CONDENSATE FEEDWATER FLOW

"Unit 2 RPS actuation / unplanned scram occurred at 1506 eastern time on low reactor water level scram initiation. The unit experienced a partial loss of condensate feedwater due to the trip of 2D 4160 volt station service bus [non-safety related]. The 2C 4160 volt bus remained in service supplying power to one condensate pump and one condensate booster pump. Investigation of the 2D 4kv bus trip is in progress. Also received a Group II isolation signal due to low reactor water level."

The reactor is currently stable with water level at 37 inches. Normal feedwater has been used to makeup water level and decay heat is being discharged to the condenser via turbine bypass valves. All rods fully inserted. No SRVs lifted during the transient. The lowest water level reached was -5 inches. The Unit remained in a normal electrical lineup. There were no significant LCOs in effect at the time of the scram. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notes that I&C activities had been in progress on the 2D 4kv bus about the time that it tripped however there is currently no specific connection between these activities and the bus trip.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.