Event Notification Report for August 02, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/01/2007 - 08/02/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43544
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SERVICES
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SERVICES
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE NUCLEAR SERVICES
Region: 1
City: PITTSBURGH State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/02/2007
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2007
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
VERN HODGE (Part 21) (NRR)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
VERN HODGE (Part 21) (NRR)
POTENTIAL DEFECT INVOLVING FAILURE OF WESTINGHOUSE DB-25 CIRCUIT BREAKER
"The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements to 10 CFR 21 to report the potential for the existence of a SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD. This issue concerns the failure of a Westinghouse DB-25 circuit breaker to close after a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm was installed at site. Westinghouse supplied closing solenoid moving core release arms that do not meet the material hardness requirement for safety-related applications at Constellation Nuclear, Robert E Ginna Generating Station.
"Background: The closing solenoid moving core relay release arm for DB-25 circuit breakers is manufactured for and commercially dedicated by Westinghouse for Class 1E applications. After plant personnel installed a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm on a DB-25 safety-related breaker and placed the breaker in service it failed to close on demand. The investigation of this breaker showed that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm had interfered with the body of the control relay. While investigating this issue, it was determined that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was from a single batch that did not meet the required material hardness specification. Westinghouse shipped twenty- five closing solenoid moving core relay release arm kits to a single plant from the batch that did not meet the material hardness requirement.
"Evaluation: It is Westinghouse's understanding that the direct cause of the failure is that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was too weak and bent after several closures of the breaker. This changed the mechanical and electrical timing of the circuit breaker, preventing it from closing again.
"Safety Impact: Two of twenty five closing solenoid moving core relay release arms were actually installed on breakers at the plant [Ginna]. Only one breaker was actually placed into service. Had the defective closing solenoid moving core release arms been installed in redundant safety related breakers, this condition could have resulted in a common mode failure and the plant could have been in a condition outside the design basis. If the breaker was closed, the breaker would open but would then be unable to close again.
"Corrective Action: Upon discovery of the DB-25 circuit breaker failing to close [at Ginna], plant personnel took corrective actions to remove the defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from service. Westinghouse removed the remaining defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from stock.
"Plant Applicability: This notification is applicable to Robert E. Ginna Generating Station. Westinghouse has confirmed only one batch of closing solenoid moving core relay release arms was not manufactured to the correct hardness specification. No other plant received closing solenoid moving core relay release arms made from the batch that did not meet the correct material hardness specification from Westinghouse.
"Communications: Robert E. Ginna Generating Station is aware of the issue. Westinghouse will be issuing a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) documenting this issue.
"The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements to 10 CFR 21 to report the potential for the existence of a SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD. This issue concerns the failure of a Westinghouse DB-25 circuit breaker to close after a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm was installed at site. Westinghouse supplied closing solenoid moving core release arms that do not meet the material hardness requirement for safety-related applications at Constellation Nuclear, Robert E Ginna Generating Station.
"Background: The closing solenoid moving core relay release arm for DB-25 circuit breakers is manufactured for and commercially dedicated by Westinghouse for Class 1E applications. After plant personnel installed a new closing solenoid moving core relay release arm on a DB-25 safety-related breaker and placed the breaker in service it failed to close on demand. The investigation of this breaker showed that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm had interfered with the body of the control relay. While investigating this issue, it was determined that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was from a single batch that did not meet the required material hardness specification. Westinghouse shipped twenty- five closing solenoid moving core relay release arm kits to a single plant from the batch that did not meet the material hardness requirement.
"Evaluation: It is Westinghouse's understanding that the direct cause of the failure is that the closing solenoid moving core relay release arm material was too weak and bent after several closures of the breaker. This changed the mechanical and electrical timing of the circuit breaker, preventing it from closing again.
"Safety Impact: Two of twenty five closing solenoid moving core relay release arms were actually installed on breakers at the plant [Ginna]. Only one breaker was actually placed into service. Had the defective closing solenoid moving core release arms been installed in redundant safety related breakers, this condition could have resulted in a common mode failure and the plant could have been in a condition outside the design basis. If the breaker was closed, the breaker would open but would then be unable to close again.
"Corrective Action: Upon discovery of the DB-25 circuit breaker failing to close [at Ginna], plant personnel took corrective actions to remove the defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from service. Westinghouse removed the remaining defective closing solenoid moving core relay release arms from stock.
"Plant Applicability: This notification is applicable to Robert E. Ginna Generating Station. Westinghouse has confirmed only one batch of closing solenoid moving core relay release arms was not manufactured to the correct hardness specification. No other plant received closing solenoid moving core relay release arms made from the batch that did not meet the correct material hardness specification from Westinghouse.
"Communications: Robert E. Ginna Generating Station is aware of the issue. Westinghouse will be issuing a Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) documenting this issue.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43545
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: FT. LAUDERDALE State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: FT. LAUDERDALE State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/02/2007
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2007
Notification Time: 12:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB via email
JOHN WHITE (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB via email
TEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS STOLEN FROM CONSTRUCTION SITE
The following information was received via fax:
"Hotel under construction in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. Ten exit signs containing tritium were stolen. Owner contacting police and is searching for items. No further action will be taken on this incident."
The exit signs are general licensed material, model number SLXTURW10, manufactured by Forever Light, Inc. Each sign contains 7.09 Curies tritium. The signs were installed Saturday, 7/28, and noticed missing yesterday, 8/1.
Florida Incident No.: FL07-116
*** UPDATE FROM STEVE FURNACE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1047 ON 12/03/07 ***
During clean up of the construction site storage area, all ten exit signs were found and are in the possession of the building contractor.
Notified FSME EO (Morrell), R1DO (Rogge) and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following information was received via fax:
"Hotel under construction in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. Ten exit signs containing tritium were stolen. Owner contacting police and is searching for items. No further action will be taken on this incident."
The exit signs are general licensed material, model number SLXTURW10, manufactured by Forever Light, Inc. Each sign contains 7.09 Curies tritium. The signs were installed Saturday, 7/28, and noticed missing yesterday, 8/1.
Florida Incident No.: FL07-116
*** UPDATE FROM STEVE FURNACE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1047 ON 12/03/07 ***
During clean up of the construction site storage area, all ten exit signs were found and are in the possession of the building contractor.
Notified FSME EO (Morrell), R1DO (Rogge) and ILTAB via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43679
Rep Org: FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
Licensee: FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
Region: 1
City: SHIPPINGPORT State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PETER SENA III
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
Region: 1
City: SHIPPINGPORT State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PETER SENA III
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/01/2007
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2007
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
JERRY DOZIER (NRR)
PART 21 GROUP EMAIL
RAY POWELL (R1)
JERRY DOZIER (NRR)
PART 21 GROUP EMAIL
PART 21 REPORT - POPPET NUT AND STEM ASSEMBLY DEGRADATION ON MSIV
"In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is providing the required written notification of a concern regarding the potential for vibration inducted wear on the pilot poppet nut and stem assemblies provided for use in the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) Main Steam System Isolation Valves [MSIV] that if uncorrected could potentially create a significant safety hazard. FENOC evaluated the concern via a Prompt Operability Determination and concluded that there is reasonable assurance that currently installed valve components at BVPS-2 are operable and plans to replace the affected components during the next BVPS-2 refueling outage."
Valve manufacturer of defective valve components is Weir Valves and Controls USA Inc. in Salem, MA.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is providing the required written notification of a concern regarding the potential for vibration inducted wear on the pilot poppet nut and stem assemblies provided for use in the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) Main Steam System Isolation Valves [MSIV] that if uncorrected could potentially create a significant safety hazard. FENOC evaluated the concern via a Prompt Operability Determination and concluded that there is reasonable assurance that currently installed valve components at BVPS-2 are operable and plans to replace the affected components during the next BVPS-2 refueling outage."
Valve manufacturer of defective valve components is Weir Valves and Controls USA Inc. in Salem, MA.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.