Event Notification Report for July 31, 2007

24 HOUR REPORT OF A PROCESS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS

"During a review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) it was discovered that controls associated with the container transfer station in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area had not been included in the updated ISA Summary. Although process controls exist, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS (Items Relied on For Safety). This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR70.50 Appendix A(b)(1). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective, and was not challenged.

"All affected equipment is shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process.

"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70.50 Appendix A within 24 hours of discovery."

The licensee has notified Region 2 (Gibson) ,State, and local authorities.

* * * UPDATE AT 1433 EDT ON 09/14/07 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided the following information as a supplemental report:

"A detailed review of authorized process equipment and controls was performed to ensure each has been evaluated in an ISA and the required IROFS have been identified. This review identified ten other processes with a valid criticality safety analysis that were not specifically documented as a part of an ISA evaluation and the required IROFS had not been identified. The ISA reviews for these have been completed and the required IROFS documented. A total of twelve new IROFS have been identified."

The licensee will inform the NRC Region 2 Office and the Headquarters Project Manager. Notified R2DO (Musser) and FSME (Wastler).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

"On July 31, 2007, the licensee notified DHFS of the theft of a control device for a Masterminder 2 x-ray crawler. It has been stored in a locked storage trailer at a temporary jobsite located a few miles north of Rome, WI. The lock had been cut, and other equipment had been stolen. The device contains a Cs-137 source with an approximate activity of 126.5 mCi. Local law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have been notified, and are investigating. State and local emergency management have been notified, and a DHFS emergency responder has been dispatched to the site.

"The company was doing radiography on a natural gas pipeline. WeldSonix has provided a picture of the device.

"DHFS is planning on issuing a press release."

The state indicated that the device was 25 years old, and the activity level should be reduced by one half-life.

"Event Report ID No.: WI 07-0014"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"On 7/31/07 at 0051, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI valve quarterly IST was in progress and the BJ-HV-8278 HPCI to Feedwater injection valve failed to respond to an open signal during stroke timing.

"Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems are inoperable. The D Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) pump is inoperable for motor replacement."

The licensee is in a 14 day Hot Shutdown LCO.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SMALL HYDRAULIC FLUID SPILL IN INTAKE BAY

"OIL SHEEN IN THE PLANT FOREBAY

"At 0930 plant personnel reported an oil sheen in the plant Forebay at the Intake Structure. The source was hydraulic oil from a small boat used to harvest and remove Milfoil [ biological plant; marine life] from the Forebay. Actions were initiated in accordance with plant procedure RWI-007, Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan. The volume of the spill was approximately one (1) gallon. The spill was stopped, contained, and clean-up efforts are in progress.

"At 1100 the National Response Center was notified of the hydraulic oil spill along with other Alabama State and local agencies.

"This event is reportable as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or condition related to protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies was made.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector."

Specifically, the licensee notified the Alabama Department of the Environmental Management, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, and Limestone County Emergency Management Agency.