Event Notification Report for July 18, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/17/2007 - 07/18/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
4350243503435044350543506
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43502
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE FULLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE FULLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/18/2007
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 18:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JIM KRAFTY (R1)
JIM KRAFTY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
SPILL OF ETHYLENE GLYCOL REPORTED TO STATE
"Notified New Jersey D.E.P. [Department of Environmental Protection] of a spill of ethylene glycol in the Site Emergency Building at Oyster Creek. The spill was reported to NJDEP in accordance with N.J.A.E. 7:1.E, 7:26. The spill was contained and cleaned."
The spill occurred during work on the Site Emergency Building air conditioning system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/19/07 AT 1303 EDT FROM STEVE FULLER TO MACKINNON * * *
"At 11:55 on 7/19/07, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was informed that: The spill of ethylene glycol, reported to them on 07/18/07, was subsequently determined to be a substance other than ethylene glycol; it was not a hazardous substance; and it was not discharged to the environment.
"Therefore, no report was required and the NJDEP notification (on 07/18/07) was retracted.
"For the above reasons, the 4 hour non emergency ENS notification , made under EN # 43502, is hereby retracted."
NRC R1DO (Jim Krafty) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
"Notified New Jersey D.E.P. [Department of Environmental Protection] of a spill of ethylene glycol in the Site Emergency Building at Oyster Creek. The spill was reported to NJDEP in accordance with N.J.A.E. 7:1.E, 7:26. The spill was contained and cleaned."
The spill occurred during work on the Site Emergency Building air conditioning system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/19/07 AT 1303 EDT FROM STEVE FULLER TO MACKINNON * * *
"At 11:55 on 7/19/07, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was informed that: The spill of ethylene glycol, reported to them on 07/18/07, was subsequently determined to be a substance other than ethylene glycol; it was not a hazardous substance; and it was not discharged to the environment.
"Therefore, no report was required and the NJDEP notification (on 07/18/07) was retracted.
"For the above reasons, the 4 hour non emergency ENS notification , made under EN # 43502, is hereby retracted."
NRC R1DO (Jim Krafty) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43503
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/18/2007
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 12:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 12:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - VENT SPACE LESS THAN DESIGN BASIS
"During an inspection of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Steam Chase as a result of a similar situation being previously discovered on Unit 1, a storage gangbox was noted to be resting on one of the two hinged blowoff panels in the floor of the Steam Chase (elevation 130') and the hinged blowoff panels were determined to be restrained which would prevent their opening. The blowoff panels are designed to open to provide pressure and temperature relief between the torus room and 130 ft elevation of the reactor building for high energy steam line breaks. The 'as found' configuration of the blowoff panels hinder their capability to open, which constitutes a non-conforming and unanalyzed condition in that the vent area between the torus room and main steam chase in the reactor building is less than the area assumed in the analysis for a HPCI steam line break.
"As such, for a HPCl steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure across the torus room ceiling would likely be greater than 2.3 psid, which is the maximum differential pressure stated in Chapter 15A of the Unit 2 FSAR. There is no known analyzed limit for the differential pressure between the torus room and the 130 ft elevation of the reactor building. The actual differential pressure given the 'as found' condition is not known at this time.
"Corrective actions have been taken to restore the assumed vent area between the torus room and the reactor building 130ft elevation. The gang box has been removed and both blow off panels no longer have restricted movement. The remaining 3' x 3' floor plug has also been removed, completely restoring the assumed vent area into compliance. Based on this information there is reasonable assurance that an adequate vent path currently exists such that the plant is no longer considered to be in a condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"However, since the actual differential pressure given the 'as found' condition is not known at this time, the 'as found' condition as previously discussed is assumed to be an unanalyzed condition that represents a condition that significantly degraded plant safety; however, additional information is needed in order to more conclusively determine this. If more conclusive information is provided that indicates otherwise an update notification will follow."
This was also reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM GORLEY TO HUFFMAN AT 1435 EDT ON 8/30/07 * * *
"A review of the 'as found' configuration of the plant was performed to determine if this configuration would still be bounded by the calculations that support the HELB analysis in the Unit 2 FSAR. The 'as found' configuration consisted of having one torus plug in place rather than open and the two hinged torus ceiling blow-off panels bolted shut instead of being free to open. This engineering review concluded that if the torus ceiling blow-off panels do not open and with only one torus plug open, the torus pressures will not exceed the current FSAR pressures. Additionally, the torus pressures were found to be acceptable as a result of the modeling of friction in the HPCI pipe break mass and energy releases.
"This being the case, for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure across the torus room ceiling would be 1.93 psid for the 'as found' condition which is less than the maximum differential pressure of 2.27 psid as stated in Chapter 15A of the Unit 2 FSAR.
"It should be noted that corrective actions were taken upon discovery and that the assumed vent area between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation was restored shortly following discovery. The gang box was removed, the restraint on the blow-off panels removed and both blow-off panels were confirmed to have full range of motion to open if the conditions were present that would warrant that movement.
"Based on this review of the design calculations while taking the 'as found' conditions into consideration, the conclusion reached is that the nonconforming 'as found' conditions did not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For this reason this condition that was initially reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Shaeffer) notified.
"During an inspection of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Steam Chase as a result of a similar situation being previously discovered on Unit 1, a storage gangbox was noted to be resting on one of the two hinged blowoff panels in the floor of the Steam Chase (elevation 130') and the hinged blowoff panels were determined to be restrained which would prevent their opening. The blowoff panels are designed to open to provide pressure and temperature relief between the torus room and 130 ft elevation of the reactor building for high energy steam line breaks. The 'as found' configuration of the blowoff panels hinder their capability to open, which constitutes a non-conforming and unanalyzed condition in that the vent area between the torus room and main steam chase in the reactor building is less than the area assumed in the analysis for a HPCI steam line break.
"As such, for a HPCl steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure across the torus room ceiling would likely be greater than 2.3 psid, which is the maximum differential pressure stated in Chapter 15A of the Unit 2 FSAR. There is no known analyzed limit for the differential pressure between the torus room and the 130 ft elevation of the reactor building. The actual differential pressure given the 'as found' condition is not known at this time.
"Corrective actions have been taken to restore the assumed vent area between the torus room and the reactor building 130ft elevation. The gang box has been removed and both blow off panels no longer have restricted movement. The remaining 3' x 3' floor plug has also been removed, completely restoring the assumed vent area into compliance. Based on this information there is reasonable assurance that an adequate vent path currently exists such that the plant is no longer considered to be in a condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"However, since the actual differential pressure given the 'as found' condition is not known at this time, the 'as found' condition as previously discussed is assumed to be an unanalyzed condition that represents a condition that significantly degraded plant safety; however, additional information is needed in order to more conclusively determine this. If more conclusive information is provided that indicates otherwise an update notification will follow."
This was also reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM GORLEY TO HUFFMAN AT 1435 EDT ON 8/30/07 * * *
"A review of the 'as found' configuration of the plant was performed to determine if this configuration would still be bounded by the calculations that support the HELB analysis in the Unit 2 FSAR. The 'as found' configuration consisted of having one torus plug in place rather than open and the two hinged torus ceiling blow-off panels bolted shut instead of being free to open. This engineering review concluded that if the torus ceiling blow-off panels do not open and with only one torus plug open, the torus pressures will not exceed the current FSAR pressures. Additionally, the torus pressures were found to be acceptable as a result of the modeling of friction in the HPCI pipe break mass and energy releases.
"This being the case, for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure across the torus room ceiling would be 1.93 psid for the 'as found' condition which is less than the maximum differential pressure of 2.27 psid as stated in Chapter 15A of the Unit 2 FSAR.
"It should be noted that corrective actions were taken upon discovery and that the assumed vent area between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation was restored shortly following discovery. The gang box was removed, the restraint on the blow-off panels removed and both blow-off panels were confirmed to have full range of motion to open if the conditions were present that would warrant that movement.
"Based on this review of the design calculations while taking the 'as found' conditions into consideration, the conclusion reached is that the nonconforming 'as found' conditions did not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For this reason this condition that was initially reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Shaeffer) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43504
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: EAST PALESTINE State: OH
County:
License #: 03320-99
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: EAST PALESTINE State: OH
County:
License #: 03320-99
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 09:39 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 09:39 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DEFECTIVE RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"Licensee notified [Ohio] Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) at approximately 11:00 AM on 7/18/07. Licensee reported that an Ir-192 radiography source in the guide tube of a radiography camera could not be fully retracted. Source is housed in an Amersham Model 660B camera (Serial number: B1558). Source activity is 86 curies. Source was being used at a temporary job site in East Palestine, Ohio. Radiography crew was from licensee's Pennsylvania office. Source was being used in a building away from customer's main production facilities, in a make-shift chamber behind 3 foot concrete block walls. Area has been secured by licensee personnel, roped off, with boundaries established to ensure no exposure to non-radiological workers or members of the public. Licensee stated that no over exposure licensee personnel are expected as a result of this occurrence. QSA Global has been contacted by licensee to assist with source retrieval. Information current as of 11:45 AM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: Ohio BRP Duty Officer received call from QSA Global requesting waiver of 3-day notification for reciprocity work to enter Ohio and retrieve stuck source. Permission was granted. QSA Global rep stated that they would not be on-site until Thursday, 7/19. Information current as of 5:00 PM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: BRP Duty Officer contacted Licensee rep at temporary job site to discuss security of the camera and source. Licensee stated that boundaries are being maintained at the site and that the licensee would have a two-man crew (radiographer and assistant) on site throughout the night until QSA Global arrived to effect repairs. Information current as of 5:30 PM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: BRP Duty Officer spoke with licensee personnel Thursday morning, 7/19/07. Licensee had crews in attendance at the site throughout the night to maintain security of temporary job site. Licensee stated that the radiography camera had been maintenenced and resourced approximately two weeks ago. After discussions with the manufacturer the licensee suspects that a spring clip at the connecting nut may have dislodged, causing the nut to become misaligned and preventing the source from retracting. QSA Global is expected on site at approximately 1:30 PM on today (7/19/07). Information current as of 9:25 AM, 7/19/07."
Equipment is being returned to manufacturer for repair or disposal.
Ohio Notice: OH070004
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"Licensee notified [Ohio] Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) at approximately 11:00 AM on 7/18/07. Licensee reported that an Ir-192 radiography source in the guide tube of a radiography camera could not be fully retracted. Source is housed in an Amersham Model 660B camera (Serial number: B1558). Source activity is 86 curies. Source was being used at a temporary job site in East Palestine, Ohio. Radiography crew was from licensee's Pennsylvania office. Source was being used in a building away from customer's main production facilities, in a make-shift chamber behind 3 foot concrete block walls. Area has been secured by licensee personnel, roped off, with boundaries established to ensure no exposure to non-radiological workers or members of the public. Licensee stated that no over exposure licensee personnel are expected as a result of this occurrence. QSA Global has been contacted by licensee to assist with source retrieval. Information current as of 11:45 AM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: Ohio BRP Duty Officer received call from QSA Global requesting waiver of 3-day notification for reciprocity work to enter Ohio and retrieve stuck source. Permission was granted. QSA Global rep stated that they would not be on-site until Thursday, 7/19. Information current as of 5:00 PM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: BRP Duty Officer contacted Licensee rep at temporary job site to discuss security of the camera and source. Licensee stated that boundaries are being maintained at the site and that the licensee would have a two-man crew (radiographer and assistant) on site throughout the night until QSA Global arrived to effect repairs. Information current as of 5:30 PM, 7/18/07.
"UPDATE: BRP Duty Officer spoke with licensee personnel Thursday morning, 7/19/07. Licensee had crews in attendance at the site throughout the night to maintain security of temporary job site. Licensee stated that the radiography camera had been maintenenced and resourced approximately two weeks ago. After discussions with the manufacturer the licensee suspects that a spring clip at the connecting nut may have dislodged, causing the nut to become misaligned and preventing the source from retracting. QSA Global is expected on site at approximately 1:30 PM on today (7/19/07). Information current as of 9:25 AM, 7/19/07."
Equipment is being returned to manufacturer for repair or disposal.
Ohio Notice: OH070004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43505
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 10:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 10:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JIM KRAFTY (R1)
JIM KRAFTY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSITIVE RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A licensed operator had a confirmed positive random fitness-for-duty test. The test sample was taken on 07/15/07 and the Medical Review Officer confirmed a positive test at 1515 EDT on 07/18/07. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed operator had a confirmed positive random fitness-for-duty test. The test sample was taken on 07/15/07 and the Medical Review Officer confirmed a positive test at 1515 EDT on 07/18/07. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43506
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SOUTH TEXAS CARDIOVASCULAR CONSULTANTS, PLLC
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: L03833-003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: SOUTH TEXAS CARDIOVASCULAR CONSULTANTS, PLLC
Region: 4
City: SAN ANTONIO State: TX
County:
License #: L03833-003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 07/19/2007
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/24/2007
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2007
Event Time: 15:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
"On 07/18/07 at 3:50 pm, the agency received a telephone call from (deleted), the Chief Tech for the licensee, reporting the misadministration of patient involving Thallous Chloride. The nuclear medicine tech reported that a patient was injected twice with a total of 4mCi of Thallous Chloride.
"The licensee reported that the patient was informed the same day of the misadministration.
"Licensee was informed that the 30-day report is due 08/17/07."
Agency Action Taken: The licensee will submit the required written report within 30-days as per 25 Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 289.202(xx).
Texas Incident number: I-8427
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CINDY FLANNERY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0741 ON 07/24/07 * * *
This event (EN43506) has been reviewed and determined to NOT be a reportable medical event.
"On 07/18/07 at 3:50 pm, the agency received a telephone call from (deleted), the Chief Tech for the licensee, reporting the misadministration of patient involving Thallous Chloride. The nuclear medicine tech reported that a patient was injected twice with a total of 4mCi of Thallous Chloride.
"The licensee reported that the patient was informed the same day of the misadministration.
"Licensee was informed that the 30-day report is due 08/17/07."
Agency Action Taken: The licensee will submit the required written report within 30-days as per 25 Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 289.202(xx).
Texas Incident number: I-8427
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CINDY FLANNERY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0741 ON 07/24/07 * * *
This event (EN43506) has been reviewed and determined to NOT be a reportable medical event.