Event Notification Report for June 27, 2007

MEDICAL TREATMENT WITH CONTAMINATION

"On June 27, 2007 a Honeywell employee sustained multiple contusions and abrasions to his head, face, and body as a result from a fall from the permanently installed man-lift device. The incident occurred at 1350 at the Honeywell Specialty Materials facility (Feeds Material Building) in Metropolis, IL. The employee was transported to the local medical facility with measurable levels of natural uranium contamination of 5,000 dpm/100 cm² on his clothing and skin.

"Honeywell Health Physics personnel accompanied the injured employee to the hospital where they provided contamination control recommendations to the attending medical staff. No contamination was detected on hospital facilities, equipment or staff following the treatment of the injured employee.

"Following decontamination of the injured employee survey results were less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm².

"All contaminated materials from the injured employee's decontamination and treatment were collected and returned to the Honeywell Specialty Materials site."

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AT EOF

"At approximately 1015 On June 27, 2007, with the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, a loss of phone service occurred in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint information Center (JIC).

"Discussions with the Oswego County 911 Center (only county within the 10 mile EPZ) determined that phone service in the service area was lost at approximately 1015 hours on June 27,2007. Most telephone and data capability at the EOF and JIC are out of service at this time. Cellular arid satellite phone backups are available at the EOF and JIC. The primary and backup means to notify federal, state and local agencies from JAF are unaffected and have been tested and are operational. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) notification system is unaffected and has been confirmed to be operational. Sirens and tone alert systems are unaffected.

"This loss of phone service is considered to be a major loss of offsite communications capability and is therefore reportable as an eight (8) hour telephone notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"Repairs are in progress.

"The NRC resident inspector has been briefed and the New York State PSC will be notified."


See related Event #43451.


* * * UPDATE AT 1242 EDT ON 6/28/07 FROM PAGE TO HUFFMAN * * *

"Phone service has been repaired, tested and restored to the EOF and JIC. The NRC Resident and New York State PSC have been informed.
R1DO (Powell) notified.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HABITABILITY ISSUE

"At 15:55 ET on 6/27/07 - notified by the Vogtle Emergency Preparedness that the limit switch full closed indication on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC Outside Air Damper not being functional [which] impacted habitability of the TSC. This is due to the full closed limit switch providing a signal to inflate the sealing boot on the associated damper. This is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (8 hour notification)

"At 6:53 ET on 6/27/07 - TSC HVAC was placed in service in the filtration mode with the damper limit switch manually adjusted to provide full closed indication. The TSC HVAC is fully functional and supporting TSC habitability at this time.

"TSC HVAC will remain in service in the filtration mode until the repair plan for the damper is implemented."

The licensee notified the Region 2 Duty Officer (Ayres).

* * * UPDATE AT 1037 0N 6/29/07 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO P. SNYDER * * *

"A plan has been created to repair the limit switch on the TSC HVAC Outside Air Damper. This will require securing the TSC HVAC for a period of time, thus rendering the TSC non functional. A plan has been written to cover required actions to be taken in the event of a plant event, in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q). Estimated outage time is four hours, it may be shorter depending on actions required to adjust limit switch to return full functionality to the TSC HVAC. You will receive a follow-up call when full TSC functionality has been restored."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers).

* * * UPDATE AT 1249 EDT 0N 6/29/07 FROM C. WILLIAMS TO W. HUFFMAN * * *

"The TSC HVAC outside air damper limit switch has been repaired and the TSC has been returned to functional status. The TSC HVAC was non-functional from 11:24 to 12:17 EDT." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ayres) notified.

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO OFF-SITE POWER FLUCTUATION

"Switchyard line 2001 tripped and re-energized during a thunderstorm. This caused main generator output breaker, ACB 3-4, to trip open. At this time '1D' reactor coolant pump (RCP) tripped and caused a reactor trip. Cause for the '1D' RCP trip is under investigation.

"The heat sink is being provided by Aux Feedwater and the use of Steam Dumps. Electrical power is being provided by offsite power."

All rods inserted. There were no complications during the trip and all systems functioned as required. Offsite power remained available throughout the transient. The electrical transient had no impact on Unit 2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 2217 EDT ON 6/28/07 FROM B. SHEAR TO W. HUFFMAN * * *

"This is a revision to a previously transmitted ENS call on 6/27/07 EN# 43449.

"Braidwood Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped on a loss of '1D' RCP greater than P-8 setpoint. The cause of the RCP trip was an electrical disturbance during a thunderstorm.

"The reactor trip automatically caused a main turbine and generator trip. Auxiliary feedwater system automatically started on the low-2 S/G water level that is expected from a full power reactor trip. Auxiliary feedwater and main steam dumps are providing a heat sink.

"A switchyard line also tripped during this electrical transient causing multiple switchyard breakers to open. Electrical power is being provided by offsite power.

"All control rods fully inserted. There were no complications during the trip and all systems functioned as required. Offsite power remained available throughout the transient. The electrical disturbance had no impact on Unit 2.

"The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector." R3DO (Louden) notified.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AT EOF

"At approximately 1015, Nine Mile Point Emergency Planning noted the loss of phone service in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint News Center (JNC) during a routine surveillance. Nine Mile Point emergency planning staff were subsequently notified at 1030. [During] discussions with the Oswego County 911 center (sole 10 mile EPZ county), it was determined that phone service in the Windstream phone company that services that area was lost at approximately 1015 hours. Most telephone and data capability at the EOF and Joint Information Center (JIC) is out of service at this time. Cellular and satellite phone backups are available. The primary and backup means to notify the local and state agencies from Nine Mile Point and JA Fitzpatrick is unaffected and has been tested as operable. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) notification system is unaffected and has been confirmed as operable. Sirens and tone alerts are unaffected.

"Local phone service provider is investigating cause which is currently unknown."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

See related Event #43453.

* * * UPDATE FROM MINNICK TO HUFFMAN AT 2034 EDT ON 6/27/07 * * *

"Repairs to the emergency phone systems have been completed and all systems tested satisfactory as of 2012 on June 27, 2007."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Powell) notified.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - FISHER TYPE 67C SERIES REGULATOR SCREW FRACTURE

The manufacturer provided the following information via facsimile:

This is a summary of a communication that was sent to inform all Fisher customers of record.

"Fisher Controls has determined that a faulty batch of screws (Fisher Part Number T13526T0012) was used in the applicable constructions listed below. In some cases, a fracture occurred in the threaded shank, while in other cases the screw head fractured. Multiple screw fractures were also found on the same regulator. The screw fractures were found in four different product orders.

"The function of the screw depends on the type of construction:
* On all models, the screw retains the diaphragm between the body and the spring case (six screws per regulator).
* On the Types 67C and 67CR, the screws retain the bottom plate (four screws per regulator)
* On the Types 67CF and 67CFR, the screws retain the drip well (four screws per regulator).

"If the screw is compromised, the ability of the regulator to retain pressure or function correctly may be impaired. Any abnormal function of an instrument supply regulator might, in turn, cause unexpected behavior of the instrument itself due to supply pressure changes. These changes could result in a range of performance problems, up to a loss of process control.

"Fisher has stopped shipment of these products and is currently purging their inventory.

"This notice applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher Controls International LLC that meets all of the following criteria:
* Can be any of the following constructions: Fisher Types 67C, 67CR, 67CF and 67CFR Instrument Supply Regulators or Type R130 Series Manifold Regulators.
* Must be manufactured in China between March 1 and June 15, 2007, with date of manufacture 3-07, 4-07, 5-07 or 6-07 stamped on the product.

"Action Required:
* No action is required for plants that do not have the subject equipment.
* Do not install any of the equipment specifically identified in this notice.
* If your plant has any of the equipment specifically identified by this notice or experienced problems regarding expected performance from these regulators, contact your local Fisher Representative Sales Office regarding appropriate corrective action.

"10CFR21 Implications:
* The recipient of this notice is requested to review the information contained in this notice to determine its applicability to his/her facility.
* If no equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been provided by Fisher Controls International LLC, then no further action is required.
* If equipment meeting the applicability requirements listed above have been supplied and used in a safety-related application, Fisher Controls requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21."

FAILED RELAY STARTS ONE TRAIN OF THE DECAY HEAT RIVER WATER SYSTEM

"This event is being reported via a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In this case, the telephone report is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"During Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) logic testing on June 27, 2007, an invalid actuation of the 'A' train of the Decay Heat River Water System (DR) occurred. The DR is comprised of the 'A' and 'B' trains, and serves as the reactor's ultimate heat sink. The ESAS has three independent input channels, which cause actuation in a two out of three logic. During ESAS logic testing, the channel under test is placed in the tripped state. Actuation relays in the other two channels should remain energized by the outputs from the other two channels not under test. The invalid actuation of the 'A' DR train during testing on June 27, 2007, was due to a failed ESAS relay in one of the other two channels not being tested. During this invalid actuation, the 'A' DR train was fully actuated. The operation of this normally standby system did not have any adverse impact on plant operation, nor any negative impact on the DR.

"The failed relay that caused the invalid actuation during ESAS logic testing did not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESAS, since the relay was failed in the actuated state. The failed relay was replaced on June 29, 2007."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.