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Event Notification Report for June 09, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/08/2007 - 06/09/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
4341443555

Power Reactor
Event Number: 43414
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/09/2007
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 79 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TURBINE TRIP AS A RESULT OF HIGH MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER TANK LEVEL

"On 06/09/2007 at 1100 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 received an automatic SCRAM due to a Turbine Trip Signal caused by a Moisture Separator Drain Tank Level High. All control rods inserted and all systems responded as required to the automatic SCRAM signal. Two Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) momentarily lifted in response to the pressure transient. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiations occurred as a result of the SCRAM. Reactor water level lowered below Level 3 (+2") as a result of the SCRAM and was recovered to the normal level band by the reactor feed pumps (RFPs). The expected Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations were received due to reactor water level lowering below Level 3 (+2") with all systems isolating as required. Additionally, the expected initiation of the RPT breakers from the turbine trip was received which resulted in the trip of both reactor recirculation pumps. Reactor pressure is being controlled using Main Steam Bypass Valves. Reactor Level is being maintained in band using RFPs. Cooldown is in progress to Mode 4. Investigation into the event is proceeding.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of this event.

"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System'; 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), ' Any event that results in an actuation of the specified systems'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."

* * * UPDATE FROM BOLAND TO HUFFMAN AT 1850 EDT ON 6/9/07 * * *

Follow-up review of the reported reactor scram revealed that the Group 8 isolation did not function as required. Specifically, the licensee provided the update below concerning the function of one of the reactor's five Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) that had been used the previous day for flux mapping and were in the drywell (not fully retracted) to permit decay when the scram occurred.

"The Group 8 isolation signal received during Unit 1 Rx SCRAM on 06/09/2007 @ 1100 did not automatically go to completion as designed. The 'D' TIP failed to automatically withdraw as required. When the TIP was manually withdrawn, the TIP Ball valve closed as required. The local resident was notified. A work order and PER was written to correct the deficiency."

The other four TIPs did retract and the corresponding ball valves shut as expected. R2DO (Fredrickson) notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM TIM GOLDEN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1804 ON 6/15/07 * * *

"Review of available data indicates that no Main Steam safety relief valves (MSRVs) opened in response to the Unit 1 reactor scram on 06-09-2007. There were no indications of an open MSRV on any discharge tailpipe thermocouple or acoustic monitor. Initial indications of the discharge tailpipe thermocouples for MSRVs 1-PCV-1-5, 1-PCV-1-30, and 1-PCV-1-31 did indicate slight increases in temperature (5 to 18 degrees F) as reactor pressure decreased, which resulted in the initial assumption of two SRVs opening. However, this behavior is a classical indication of slight main seat leakage. This equipment condition is under review via an open PER. The multiple reactor pressure instrumentation responses were reviewed. The peak reactor pressure was indicated at approximately 1093 psig which is 42 psi below the lowest nominal MSRV setpoint. Based upon the observed peak reactor pressure and no indication of an MSRV opening, it would appear that the MSRVs performed as required to during the reactor pressure transient event.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO(Shaeffer).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43555
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1     State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/08/2007
Notification Time: 13:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/09/2007
Event Time: 05:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT SUMMERS (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INVALID ACTUATION OF THE 'C' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.

"On 6/9/07 at approximately 0511 hours, the 'C' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and associated 'C' Emergency Service Water pump unexpectedly started while performing procedure TP-024-147, Diesel Generator 'C' Restoration after being out of service for scheduled overhaul and corrective maintenance activities. The EDG inadvertently started in response to an invalid emergency start signal that occurred when the incorrect states ink (SL-8) was opened in panel 0C521C. The cause of this event was due to a human performance error. The EDG was subsequently shutdown following the inadvertent start. Post- maintenance testing of the 'C' EDG was successfully completed.

"The consequences of this event are limited to the unplanned start of the 'C' EDG. The EDG started and functioned in accordance with its design. Since no actual plant condition existed which required the EDG to start, and since the start occurred inadvertently as a result of human error, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."