Event Notification Report for May 28, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/27/2007 - 05/28/2007
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43392
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW RASMUSSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/28/2007
Notification Time: 08:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2007
Event Time: 01:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2007
Notification Time: 08:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2007
Event Time: 01:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 9 | Power Operation | 9 | Power Operation |
HPCI PUMP INOPERABLE DUE TO DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SETTING NOT WITHIN SPECIFICATION
"On 5/28/07 at 0100 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.5.1.7 (Comp) HPCI Comprehensive pump test when it was determined that HPCI pump set differential pressure was not within specifications and therefore would not support a declaration of operability for HPCI.
"The event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'.
"This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
"Initial investigation reveals a potential problem with the test equipment."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM M. RASMUSSEN TO W. HUFFMAN AT 1810 EDT ON 6/29/07 * * *
"This report is being retracted. Engineering has re-evaluated the test results and determined that HPCI System pump met its design basis requirements during testing activities. As such, the circumstance discussed in this event report did not result in any condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ayres) notified.
"On 5/28/07 at 0100 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.5.1.7 (Comp) HPCI Comprehensive pump test when it was determined that HPCI pump set differential pressure was not within specifications and therefore would not support a declaration of operability for HPCI.
"The event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident'.
"This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
"Initial investigation reveals a potential problem with the test equipment."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM M. RASMUSSEN TO W. HUFFMAN AT 1810 EDT ON 6/29/07 * * *
"This report is being retracted. Engineering has re-evaluated the test results and determined that HPCI System pump met its design basis requirements during testing activities. As such, the circumstance discussed in this event report did not result in any condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ayres) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43393
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/29/2007
Notification Time: 05:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2007
Event Time: 22:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2007
Notification Time: 05:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2007
Event Time: 22:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 8 | Power Operation | 8 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ACTUATION DUE TO MOMENTARY UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION
"Unit 1 was making preparations to parallel to the grid on 5/28/07. All busses had been transferred to the Startup power supply (230 KV System). Operations then started a large 12KV motor, Circulating Water pump 1-2. Starting this large motor caused a momentary dip in startup voltage. This voltage dip was sufficient to pick up the undervoltage relay on vital bus G, causing a start of that bus's Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The bus remained supplied by the startup power supply, the EDG did not load. This valid start of EDG 1-2 is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The EDG was subsequently shut down and returned to it's normal standby condition."
There is nothing unusual or not understood about this event and all systems functioned as required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Unit 1 was making preparations to parallel to the grid on 5/28/07. All busses had been transferred to the Startup power supply (230 KV System). Operations then started a large 12KV motor, Circulating Water pump 1-2. Starting this large motor caused a momentary dip in startup voltage. This voltage dip was sufficient to pick up the undervoltage relay on vital bus G, causing a start of that bus's Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The bus remained supplied by the startup power supply, the EDG did not load. This valid start of EDG 1-2 is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The EDG was subsequently shut down and returned to it's normal standby condition."
There is nothing unusual or not understood about this event and all systems functioned as required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.