Event Notification Report for May 01, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/30/2007 - 05/01/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43340433344333543450
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43340
Rep Org: MATTINGLY TESTING SERVICES
Licensee: MATTINGLY TESTING SERVICES
Region: 4
City: BILLINGS State: MT
County:
License #: 25-21479-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK FICEK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: MATTINGLY TESTING SERVICES
Region: 4
City: BILLINGS State: MT
County:
License #: 25-21479-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK FICEK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/02/2007
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 12:10 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2007
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 12:10 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
NEIL O'KEEFE (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE TUBE DAMAGED
Approximately 1210 on 05/01/07, the RSO was contacted by one of his radiographers at Cenex in Laurel, MT that he couldn't get the source back into the radiography camera. The area was roped off pending the arrival of the RSO to take corrective action. The camera is an INC Model IR100 with 76 curies of Ir-192. The licensee did not know the serial number.
At 1245 the RSO arrived at the site and noticed a sharp angled cut on the source tube. The RSO shielded the source with lead and lead shot and replaced the source tube then retracted the source back into the camera. The RSO believes the damage to the source tube was caused by the radiographer. The RSO received 16 mrem exposure and the radiographer received 6 mrem.
Approximately 1210 on 05/01/07, the RSO was contacted by one of his radiographers at Cenex in Laurel, MT that he couldn't get the source back into the radiography camera. The area was roped off pending the arrival of the RSO to take corrective action. The camera is an INC Model IR100 with 76 curies of Ir-192. The licensee did not know the serial number.
At 1245 the RSO arrived at the site and noticed a sharp angled cut on the source tube. The RSO shielded the source with lead and lead shot and replaced the source tube then retracted the source back into the camera. The RSO believes the damage to the source tube was caused by the radiographer. The RSO received 16 mrem exposure and the radiographer received 6 mrem.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43334
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: PERKIN ELMER LIFE & ANALYTICAL SCIENCES
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 00-3200
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: PERKIN ELMER LIFE & ANALYTICAL SCIENCES
Region: 1
City: BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 00-3200
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE- MASSACHUSETTS - EXCESSIVE CONTACT RADIATION LEVEL ON SHIPPING PACKAGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Licensee received Type A package containing 100 millicuries of Na-22 from Los Alamos National Lab. External Radiation measurement of the package on contact was 360 mrem/hr. The TI on the package was listed as 7 (the licensee measured a TI of 8.5).
"Package was shipped on April 30, 2007 and flown to Boston Logan Airport by Fed Ex, after which it was trucked by Fed Ex to the licensee site at 331 Treble Cove road in Billerica, MA.
"The licensee has informed Fed Ex of the external radiation measurements."
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Licensee received Type A package containing 100 millicuries of Na-22 from Los Alamos National Lab. External Radiation measurement of the package on contact was 360 mrem/hr. The TI on the package was listed as 7 (the licensee measured a TI of 8.5).
"Package was shipped on April 30, 2007 and flown to Boston Logan Airport by Fed Ex, after which it was trucked by Fed Ex to the licensee site at 331 Treble Cove road in Billerica, MA.
"The licensee has informed Fed Ex of the external radiation measurements."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43335
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 17:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
JOHNSON (EPA)
WYATT (DOE)
TIMMONS (USDA)
MILLER (HHS)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
JOHNSON (EPA)
WYATT (DOE)
TIMMONS (USDA)
MILLER (HHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A SPILL OF ACIDIC WATER
The licensee made an offsite notification to the Maryland Department of the Environment based on the release of approximately 705 gallons of very acidic demineralized water (Ph of 1) to a storm drain. The drain is connected to a system that leads to the Chesapeake Bay. The acidic water is coming from a non-isolable leak from the 11 Waste Neutralizing Tank. The leakage is onto a gravel base below the tank which is about 5 feet from the storm drain. The leak rate is at a rate of about 1 GPM. The licensee has set up a system to divert some of the leakage from the storm drain and capture it in waste barrels but some of the water is still being spilled onto the ground. The long term remediation of this problem is to neutralize the tank with a caustic solution and then discharge the tank.
The licensee has also notified Calvert County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MORGAN TO HUFFMAN AT 1940 EDT ON 5/1/07 * * *
The licensee also made a report of this spill to the National Response Center (EPA). R1DO (Holody) notified.
The licensee made an offsite notification to the Maryland Department of the Environment based on the release of approximately 705 gallons of very acidic demineralized water (Ph of 1) to a storm drain. The drain is connected to a system that leads to the Chesapeake Bay. The acidic water is coming from a non-isolable leak from the 11 Waste Neutralizing Tank. The leakage is onto a gravel base below the tank which is about 5 feet from the storm drain. The leak rate is at a rate of about 1 GPM. The licensee has set up a system to divert some of the leakage from the storm drain and capture it in waste barrels but some of the water is still being spilled onto the ground. The long term remediation of this problem is to neutralize the tank with a caustic solution and then discharge the tank.
The licensee has also notified Calvert County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MORGAN TO HUFFMAN AT 1940 EDT ON 5/1/07 * * *
The licensee also made a report of this spill to the National Response Center (EPA). R1DO (Holody) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43450
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/27/2007
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 23:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2007
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2007
Event Time: 23:39 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.' The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the emergency AC electrical power systems as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(8). Specifically, the Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started due to an invalid system actuation.
"On May 1, 2007, at approximately 2339 hours (EDT), with H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, in MODE 5 with reactor coolant system temperature at approximately 84 degrees F, during activities associated with surveillance testing as part of Refueling Outage 24, the Train A EDG automatically started from the standby condition. The Train A EDG did not automatically connect to the associated emergency bus (E-1), because no E-1 bus undervoltage (UV) signal was present. The automatic start was caused by the inadvertent grounding of a test connection lead that was being used to monitor the Train A EDG during testing. The grounding of the test lead resulted in a drop in voltage on the starting circuitry that caused the actuation of the 4A diesel start relay. The Train A EDG successfully started and achieved the required speed and voltage. As previously stated, the EDG did not load because no UV signal was present on the associated E-1 bus. No failures or abnormalities were noted.
"The Train B EDG remained operable during this event and the Train A EDG was able to provide power to E-1 emergency bus, if necessary.
"The invalid EDG start event was entered into the corrective action program for HBRSEP, Unit No. 2. The investigation of this event has been completed. The results of the investigation determined that the EDG start was caused by improper isolation of a safety significant power source from the field installed equipment. The Plant Nuclear Safety Committee has reviewed the investigation associated with this reportable event and concurred with the investigation. Corrective actions for this event are in progress and are being tracked via the corrective action program."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.' The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the emergency AC electrical power systems as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(8). Specifically, the Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started due to an invalid system actuation.
"On May 1, 2007, at approximately 2339 hours (EDT), with H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, in MODE 5 with reactor coolant system temperature at approximately 84 degrees F, during activities associated with surveillance testing as part of Refueling Outage 24, the Train A EDG automatically started from the standby condition. The Train A EDG did not automatically connect to the associated emergency bus (E-1), because no E-1 bus undervoltage (UV) signal was present. The automatic start was caused by the inadvertent grounding of a test connection lead that was being used to monitor the Train A EDG during testing. The grounding of the test lead resulted in a drop in voltage on the starting circuitry that caused the actuation of the 4A diesel start relay. The Train A EDG successfully started and achieved the required speed and voltage. As previously stated, the EDG did not load because no UV signal was present on the associated E-1 bus. No failures or abnormalities were noted.
"The Train B EDG remained operable during this event and the Train A EDG was able to provide power to E-1 emergency bus, if necessary.
"The invalid EDG start event was entered into the corrective action program for HBRSEP, Unit No. 2. The investigation of this event has been completed. The results of the investigation determined that the EDG start was caused by improper isolation of a safety significant power source from the field installed equipment. The Plant Nuclear Safety Committee has reviewed the investigation associated with this reportable event and concurred with the investigation. Corrective actions for this event are in progress and are being tracked via the corrective action program."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.