Event Notification Report for April 30, 2007

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY - TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE

"Planned preventive maintenance activities are being performed today (April 30, 2007) on the Hatch Nuclear Plant's Technical Support Center (TSC). These work activities are planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within one work shift (< 12 hours). These maintenance activities include the performance of preventive maintenance on the TSC filter train, air handling unit, condensing unit and fan unit for the TSC filler train. During a portion of the time these activities are being performed, this equipment will not be available for operation. As such, the TSC HVAC will be rendered non-functional during the performance of portions of the work activity.

"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the Technical Support Center, during the time these work activities are being performed, it will take no more than two hours to return the equipment back to functional status, dependent on the stage of the work activity at the time an emergency occurs. Plans are to utilize the TSC for any declared emergency during the time these work activities are being performed as long as radiological conditions allow. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0. Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC.

"This event is reportable per I0CFR50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will make a courtesy notification to the State and local officials.

RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MISSING IN TRANSIT

The licensee's RSO reports that a Sentinel Model 880 delta radiography camera containing a 31 curie Iridium-192 source is missing in transit. The camera was shipped with two other radiography cameras from Anchorage Alaska on April 24, 2007. The cameras were being sent to QSA Global in Baton Rouge, Louisiana for source replacement. Two of the cameras arrived at QSA Global as scheduled on April 26, 2007. However, the third camera has not yet arrived as of the time of this report. The shipper is Federal Express. Each camera was assigned a separate FedEx tracking number but all three cameras were shipped at the same time. The RSO is attempting to track the package but has not yet received priority attention. The FedEx tracking system still shows the package in transit at Oakland CA. The RSO was not notified of the missing shipment by QSA Global until approximately 1400 CDT on 4/30/07.

* * * UPDATE FROM GRAY TO HUFFMAN AT 1814 EDT ON 4/30/07 * * *

The licensee reports that after a high priority trace by FedEx, the package was confirmed to still be in Oakland CA. FedEx stated that the camera will be sent onto Baton Rouge tonight. The licensee no longer considers the shipment missing. R4DO (O'Keefe), FSME (Morell), IRD(Cruz), and ILTAB (Sandler) notified. Applicable Federal Agencies have also been made.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy.

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GRASS INTRUSION INTO CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE

"A manual trip of Salem Unit 1 was initiated due to a loss of the circulators from heavy grassing at the circulating water intake structure. All rods fully inserted on the trip and all systems responded as designed, with decay heat being removed via the atmospheric relief valves and subsequently the steam dump system. All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps auto started as expected on low steam generator levels from the trip. Salem Unit 1 had entered the abnormal operating procedure for circulating water due to two (2) circulators being out of service; one circulator previously emergency tripped due to excessive traveling water screen [differential pressure] and a second circulator emergency tripped soon thereafter. The procedure provides guidance to trip the plant if less than three (3) circulators are in service and power is above ten (10) percent. Two (2) of the remaining four (4) in-service circulators emergency tripped due to excessive traveling water screen differential pressure. At this point the manual reactor trip was initiated. The crew entered emergency operating procedures and stabilized the plant at no load conditions.

"No personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the trip. Salem Unit 2 was not affected and is operating at 100% power.

"Salem Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547° F with pressure at 2235 psig.

"All ECCS and ESF Systems are available. Actions are being taken to return circulators to service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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FAILURE OF A SAFETY RELATED ACID DUMP VALVE TO PASS A WEEKLY TEST

"BWXT operates a component acid cleaning operation for [DELETED] components. One of the potential accident scenarios specifically evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is allowing the component to remain in the acid for sufficient time to dissolve the component and SNM into an unfavorable geometry acid solution. Dissolving through the [DELETED] and dissolving sufficient quantities of SNM to result in a potential safety issue would take hours."

"To protect against this accident scenario, there are strict procedural controls (Items Relied On For Safety - IROFS) on the duration of time the component is in the acid. In addition, there is an engineered feature consisting of a timer and automatic acid tank dump valve (IROFS). This system will dump the entire acid bath from the tank well before the [DELETED] material is breached in the event the operator does not remove the component."

"On April 30, 2007, at approximately 7:00 a.m., during a weekly functional test of the acid tank dump valve, the valve failed to open. This weekly test is listed in the ISA as a management measure to assure the continued availability and reliability of the dump valve system (IROFS). The last successful scheduled test of the valve was on April 24, 2007. The last successful use of the valve to dump the tank occurred on April 27, 2007. Therefore, the ability of the dump valve system (IROFS) to perform its intended safety function is questionable from April 27, 2007 to April 30, 2007. [DELETED] components were processed during the period when the functionality of the dump valve is in question. However, all [DELETED] operations were performed in accordance with operating procedures and there was no over [DELETED].

"BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, (b)(2).

"There is currently no [DELETED] components being processed in the acid tanks."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO PRIMARY CONTAINMENT NITROGEN LEAK

"At 1007 on the morning of 04/30/2007, operations personnel identified an adverse trend in Primary Containment Nitrogen makeup frequency. The subsequent investigation determined that Primary Containment Nitrogen was leaking backwards thru V22-0017 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Stop-Check Valve and V22-0016 HPCI Exhaust Check Valve, via the HPCI exhaust vacuum breakers and the environment of the HPCI room via the turbine seals.

"The degradation of V22-0016 and V22-0017 constitute a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. (50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)).

"At 2017 on the evening of 04/30/2007, V22-0017 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Stop-Check Valve and V22-0016 HPCI Exhaust Check Valve were declared inoperable due to Primary Containment Nitrogen leakage as described above.

"At 2032 on the evening of 04/30/2007, V22-0017 HPCI Turbine Steam Exhaust Line Isolation was shut to isolate Primary Containment Nitrogen leakage.

"With V22-0017 shut, HPCI is INOPERABLE and Unavailable."

The licensee is in a 14 day LCO under section 3.6.1.3 for Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV). However, they are in a 72 hour LCO for having "A" core spray and HPCI inoperable, concurrently. The licensee expects to have "A" core spray restored during dayshift on 5/1/07. Additionally, the licensee is in a 7 day LCO for EDG OOS.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY E. VANN TO J. KOZAL ON 5/01/07 AT 1048 * * *

The licensee provided a correction to the TS LCO statement referenced in the initial report. The 14 day LCO is not under section 3.6.1.3 for Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV). The correct LCO statement is 3.5.1 for ECCS Operating.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Lipa) notified.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ROBERT MURRELL TO P. SNYDER ON 6/11/07 AT 1511 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 5/01/07 at 0039 (ET) (EN 43331). Notification of this issue to the NRC on 5/01/07 was initially made due to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system being declared inoperable due to a primary containment nitrogen leak.

"Specifically, at the time, operations personnel identified an adverse trend in Primary Containment Nitrogen makeup frequency. The subsequent investigation determined that Primary Containment Nitrogen was leaking backwards thru V22-0017, HPCI Turbine Exhaust Line Stop-Check Valve, and V22-0016, HPCI Exhaust Check Valve, via the HPCI exhaust vacuum breakers and the environment of the HPCI room via the turbine seals.

"Since the initial report, Engineering has determined that the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety function.

"This conclusion is based on the fact that V22-0016 and V22-0017 open during HPCI operation and the closing function is no longer included in the 10CFR50 Appendix J Testing Program since the line does not constitute a potential primary containment atmospheric pathway during and following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). MO2290A and MO2290B (HPCI Turbine Steam Exhaust Vacuum Breaker motor operated valves), which are Appendix J Program valves, communicate with both the HPCI exhaust line and the torus air space and will isolate during a Design Basis Accident (DBA). Therefore, the HPCI injection was still operational and the HPCI exhaust line will not communicate directly with the containment atmosphere and will not provide a containment atmospheric pathway during and following a Design Basis Accident.

"All safety design functions of V22-0016 and V22-0017 were met. Additionally, as-left valve closure testing on both V22-0016 and V22-017 were successful and both valves were fully operable.

"This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report per 10 CFR 50.73."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (A.M. Stone).