Event Notification Report for April 16, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/15/2007 - 04/16/2007
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43305
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/17/2007
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 19:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2007
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 19:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
LARGE WATER LEAK ON HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER SYSTEM
"At 1915, on 04/16/07, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a large water leak on High Pressure Fire Water system. This system provides water for fire suppression to the plants process buildings. An alarm was received indicating a drop in the level of High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) elevated tank. The buildings were contacted to look for a large water leak and the leak was quickly located inside the C-337 process building. The exact system leaking was not apparent as the leak was under the building concrete floor. To stop the leak the
HPFW pumps supporting the system were shutdown and the sectional valves outside the building were closed. This action made the HPFW system for all process buildings inoperable. LCO actions 2.4.4.8 and 2.4.4.6 were entered. The leak was determined to be on C-337 system C-12 and this system and the two adjacent systems were isolated and all other previously isolated valves were reopened. The HPFW pumps were restarted and the HPFW elevated tank was refilled to the TSR required level. These actions restored HPFW operability to the other areas in the plant at 2101 hours. TSR required hourly fire patrols were initiated for the affected area in C-337. The leak is located on an underground eight inch header under the alarm and actuation controls for system C-12 inside the building.
"This is being reported as an event in which equipment is disabled or fail to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and no redundant equipment is available."
The licensee stated that this leak caused substantial damage to the concrete pad on the floor of the building. No structural damage is believe to have occurred but the concrete pad with have to be completely removed, the piping repaired, and eroded earth backfilled. A new concrete pad will then likely need to be poured. Nearly half a million gallons of water may have been lost through the break before it was isolated. The licensee has checked the site outfalls and no contamination was detected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1915, on 04/16/07, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a large water leak on High Pressure Fire Water system. This system provides water for fire suppression to the plants process buildings. An alarm was received indicating a drop in the level of High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) elevated tank. The buildings were contacted to look for a large water leak and the leak was quickly located inside the C-337 process building. The exact system leaking was not apparent as the leak was under the building concrete floor. To stop the leak the
HPFW pumps supporting the system were shutdown and the sectional valves outside the building were closed. This action made the HPFW system for all process buildings inoperable. LCO actions 2.4.4.8 and 2.4.4.6 were entered. The leak was determined to be on C-337 system C-12 and this system and the two adjacent systems were isolated and all other previously isolated valves were reopened. The HPFW pumps were restarted and the HPFW elevated tank was refilled to the TSR required level. These actions restored HPFW operability to the other areas in the plant at 2101 hours. TSR required hourly fire patrols were initiated for the affected area in C-337. The leak is located on an underground eight inch header under the alarm and actuation controls for system C-12 inside the building.
"This is being reported as an event in which equipment is disabled or fail to function as designed when the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and no redundant equipment is available."
The licensee stated that this leak caused substantial damage to the concrete pad on the floor of the building. No structural damage is believe to have occurred but the concrete pad with have to be completely removed, the piping repaired, and eroded earth backfilled. A new concrete pad will then likely need to be poured. Nearly half a million gallons of water may have been lost through the break before it was isolated. The licensee has checked the site outfalls and no contamination was detected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43306
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ENERGY SOLUTIONS
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #: R-73008
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ENERGY SOLUTIONS
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE State: TN
County:
License #: R-73008
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA SHULTS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/17/2007
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2007
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
MARIE MILLER (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
MARIE MILLER (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATED SHIPMENT EXCEEDING DOT REGULATIONS
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"The Radiation Safety Officer at Energy Solutions waste processing facility [Duratek Radwaste Processing, Oak Ridge ,TN] called the State to report an incoming shipment [open bed trailer] containing 12 boxes [of Dry Active Waste - 323 millicuries] from Dairyland Power Cooperative in Genoa, Wisconsin was surveyed for receipt and found to have greater than 200 Mr/hr on one box. The dose rate exceeded the DOT regulations referenced in 49 CFR 173.441. NRC regions 1 and 3 were notified on 4/16/07."
In further discussions with Dairyland Power Cooperative it was stated that when the shipment left La Cross power plant facility the survey of the boxes was within DOT shipping regulations. During transport the Dry Active Waste most likely settled to the bottom of the box which accounted for the elevated radiation levels. Dairyland Power Cooperative stated the state of TN would be contacting the state of WI about this incident.
TN Report ID Number: TN-07-074
*** UPDATE FROM STATE OF TN (SHULTS) TO KNOKE AT 1600 EDT ON 04/17/07 ***
Spoke to state of TN and they indicated they were not contacting the state of WI since Dairyland Power Cooperative was a NRC licensee.
Notified FSME (Morell) and R1DO (Miller) and R3DO (Kozak).
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"The Radiation Safety Officer at Energy Solutions waste processing facility [Duratek Radwaste Processing, Oak Ridge ,TN] called the State to report an incoming shipment [open bed trailer] containing 12 boxes [of Dry Active Waste - 323 millicuries] from Dairyland Power Cooperative in Genoa, Wisconsin was surveyed for receipt and found to have greater than 200 Mr/hr on one box. The dose rate exceeded the DOT regulations referenced in 49 CFR 173.441. NRC regions 1 and 3 were notified on 4/16/07."
In further discussions with Dairyland Power Cooperative it was stated that when the shipment left La Cross power plant facility the survey of the boxes was within DOT shipping regulations. During transport the Dry Active Waste most likely settled to the bottom of the box which accounted for the elevated radiation levels. Dairyland Power Cooperative stated the state of TN would be contacting the state of WI about this incident.
TN Report ID Number: TN-07-074
*** UPDATE FROM STATE OF TN (SHULTS) TO KNOKE AT 1600 EDT ON 04/17/07 ***
Spoke to state of TN and they indicated they were not contacting the state of WI since Dairyland Power Cooperative was a NRC licensee.
Notified FSME (Morell) and R1DO (Miller) and R3DO (Kozak).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43428
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY MEEKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY MEEKINS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/18/2007
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 22:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2007
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2007
Event Time: 22:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/18/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
INVALID ESF ACTUATION DURING REFUELING OUTAGE
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater(AFW) system reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On April 16, 2007, at 2223 with Unit 1 in Mode 3, starting up from refueling outage 18, the 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) trip AFW Pump Auto Armed light extinguished unexpectedly and the Steam Generator (SG) sample valves 11 through 14-SS94 and SG Blowdown valves 11 through 14-GB4 closed. At the time, the 11 and 12 SGFPs were already tripped and the 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were in service. No control room manipulations were in progress. A signal was generated to start the already in service AFW pumps.
"The invalid signal to start the AFW pumps was determined to be from a faulty SGFP alternate trip relay. The defective relay was replaced and the isolation signal was reset and retested satisfactorily.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ESF actuation and invalid system actuation.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater(AFW) system reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On April 16, 2007, at 2223 with Unit 1 in Mode 3, starting up from refueling outage 18, the 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) trip AFW Pump Auto Armed light extinguished unexpectedly and the Steam Generator (SG) sample valves 11 through 14-SS94 and SG Blowdown valves 11 through 14-GB4 closed. At the time, the 11 and 12 SGFPs were already tripped and the 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were in service. No control room manipulations were in progress. A signal was generated to start the already in service AFW pumps.
"The invalid signal to start the AFW pumps was determined to be from a faulty SGFP alternate trip relay. The defective relay was replaced and the isolation signal was reset and retested satisfactorily.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ESF actuation and invalid system actuation.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."