Event Notification Report for April 12, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/11/2007 - 04/12/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43300
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOHN PIPKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JOHN PIPKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/12/2007
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2007
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 65 | Power Operation | 65 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - POSITIVE RANDOM TEST
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43332
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 06:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 06:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF RPS POWER SUPPLY
"On April 12. 2007 at approximately 0620, with the James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power plant (JAF) operating at 100% reactor power, an equipment malfunction occurred, resulting in the tripping of one of the two 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers. This caused a corresponding loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus, a half scram and primary containment isolation valve closures. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-60, 'Loss of RPS Bus 'B' Power'. All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus.
"At 0629, the 'B' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply. At approximately 0658 the RPS half scram was reset and at approximately 0702 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset. Restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Actions were entered for the affected equipment as required.
"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50 73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in primary containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of 'B' RPS bus: Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'B' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'B' Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to Radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto initiated).
"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs. an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification in lieu of a written LER.
"The loss of the 'B' RPS bus was caused by the tripping of one of the two in-series 'B' RPS motor generator EPA breakers. An apparent cause evaluation of the failure is in progress (Condition Report CR-JAF-2007-01422). At this time the failure is attributed to the failure of a subcomponent (capacitor) on the EPA breaker logic card. The logic card was replaced, restoring the 'B' RPS motor generator to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 12. 2007 at approximately 0620, with the James A Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power plant (JAF) operating at 100% reactor power, an equipment malfunction occurred, resulting in the tripping of one of the two 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers. This caused a corresponding loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus, a half scram and primary containment isolation valve closures. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-60, 'Loss of RPS Bus 'B' Power'. All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the 'B' RPS bus.
"At 0629, the 'B' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply. At approximately 0658 the RPS half scram was reset and at approximately 0702 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset. Restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Actions were entered for the affected equipment as required.
"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50 73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in primary containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of 'B' RPS bus: Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'B' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'B' Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to Radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto initiated).
"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs. an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification in lieu of a written LER.
"The loss of the 'B' RPS bus was caused by the tripping of one of the two in-series 'B' RPS motor generator EPA breakers. An apparent cause evaluation of the failure is in progress (Condition Report CR-JAF-2007-01422). At this time the failure is attributed to the failure of a subcomponent (capacitor) on the EPA breaker logic card. The logic card was replaced, restoring the 'B' RPS motor generator to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45506
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MEADWEST VACO
Region: 4
City: EVADALE State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: MEADWEST VACO
Region: 4
City: EVADALE State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/18/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2009
Notification Time: 13:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On April 19, 2007, the Agency was notified of a generally licensed device malfunction. The general licensee reported that the 'on-off' shutter mechanism failed on a frame beta gauge, designed for measuring mass per unit area of thickness of sheet material. The device was removed from operation, repaired, and put back into operation. The failure was determined to be caused by the lack of maintenance on the device.
"The device is a General License device, a Frame Beta Gauge, Model BG-V, serial no. 940331001, with two Krypton-85 sources of 0.2 Ci each, Model KAC.D3, serial no's. KS429 and KS430."
Texas Incident: I-8408
The following report was received via e-mail:
"On April 19, 2007, the Agency was notified of a generally licensed device malfunction. The general licensee reported that the 'on-off' shutter mechanism failed on a frame beta gauge, designed for measuring mass per unit area of thickness of sheet material. The device was removed from operation, repaired, and put back into operation. The failure was determined to be caused by the lack of maintenance on the device.
"The device is a General License device, a Frame Beta Gauge, Model BG-V, serial no. 940331001, with two Krypton-85 sources of 0.2 Ci each, Model KAC.D3, serial no's. KS429 and KS430."
Texas Incident: I-8408